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In this dissertation, I construct scientifically and practically adequate moral analogues of 
cognitive heuristics and biases. Cognitive heuristics are reasoning “shortcuts” that are efficient 
but flawed. Such flaws yield systematic judgment errors, cognitive biases. For example, the 
availability heuristic infers an event’s probability by seeing how easy it is to recall similar 
events. Since dramatic events like airplane crashes are disproportionately easy to recall, this 
heuristic explains systematic overestimations of their probability (availability bias). The research 
program on cognitive heuristics and biases (e.g., Daniel Kahneman’s work) has been 
scientifically successful and has yielded useful error-prevention techniques, cognitive debiasing. 
I attempt applying this framework to moral reasoning to yield moral heuristics and biases. For 
instance, a moral bias of unjustified differences in animal-species treatment might be partially 
explained by a moral heuristic that dubiously infers animals’ moral status from their aesthetic 
features.  
While the basis for identifying judgments as cognitive errors is often unassailable (e.g., 
per violating laws of logic), identifying moral errors seemingly requires appealing to moral 
truth, which, I argue, is problematic within science. Such appeals can be avoided by repackaging 
moral theories as mere “standards-of-interest” (a la non-normative metrics of purportedly right-
making features/properties). However, standards-of-interest do not provide authority, which is 
needed for effective debiasing. Nevertheless, since each person deems their own subjective 
morality authoritative, subjective morality (qua standard-of-interest and not moral subjectivism) 
satisfies both scientific and practical concerns. As such, (idealized) subjective morality grounds 
iii 
a moral analogue of cognitive biases, subjective moral biases (e.g., committed non-racists 
unconsciously discriminating). 
I also argue that cognitive heuristic is defined by its contrast with rationality. 
Consequently, heuristics explain biases, which are also so defined. However, this property is 
causally-irrelevant to cognition. This frustrates heuristic’s presumed usefulness in causal 
explanation, wherein categories should be defined by causally-efficacious properties. As such, in 
the moral case, I jettison this role and tailor categories solely to contrastive explanations. As 
such, “moral heuristic” is replaced with subjective moral fallacy, which is defined by its contrast 
with subjective morality and explains subjective moral biases. The resultant subjective moral 
biases and fallacies framework can undergird future empirical research. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. Objective: Developing Moral Analogues of Cognitive Heuristics and Biases
Most people agree that racial discrimination is morally wrong. Despite this, there 
are people who racially discriminate. Why do they do this? To illuminate the project at 
hand, allow me to temporarily stipulate that racial discrimination is morally wrong (and 
set aside issues of moral truth, etc.—addressed in chapter 4). With this stipulation, we can 
restate the question as: Why do people perform this immoral act? We can then ask the 
more general question: Why do people perform immoral acts? 
Here are some possible explanations: (1) People perform immoral acts because 
they have the wrong moral view. That is, they subscribe to a misguided morality that 
condones actions that in actuality, are immoral. For example, David practices racial 
discrimination because he believes that racial loyalty, triumph, and dominance are moral 
virtues and ends. The pertinent feature of this explanation is its appeal to (something like) 
false moral beliefs.1 
Another possible explanation is: (2) People perform immoral acts because they do 
not care enough about acting morally. That is, the weight they assign to moral 
considerations is insufficient to preclude immoral action. For instance, while Lee thinks 
that racial discrimination is morally wrong, he does not much care about acting morally; 
as such, he practices racial discrimination when it is in his self-interest to do so. The 
pertinent feature of this explanation is its appeal to (something like) moral indifference or 
1 False moral belief illustrates the sort of thing that distinguishes this explanation from those that appeal to 
for instance, moral indifference, moral akrasia, false non-moral beliefs, or poor moral inference-making. 
Different metaethical views specify this sort of thing in different ways; this dissertation takes no 
position on what the right specification is. False moral belief is invoked merely for illustrative 
purposes. This dissertation is not committed to the presuppositions of false moral beliefs (e.g., that 
moral claims are truth-apt). Similar qualifiers apply to explanation (2). 
2 
morally problematic priorities. 
An additional possible explanation is: (3) People perform immoral acts because 
they succumb to a temptation or aversion—that is, they are weak-willed or akratic. For 
example, a Jim Crow era restauranteur may oppose racial discrimination for moral 
reasons, but when the opportunity to not discriminate arises, he succumbs to social 
pressure and discriminates. 
There is no single explanation of all immoral acts. Instead, there is a pool of 
explanations; each explanation in the pool pertains to a different set of cases. A potential 
explanation that could be added to the three already mentioned is: (4) People perform 
some immoral acts because they are flawed moral reasoners (i.e., flawed moral-inference 
makers).  For instance, consider racial disparities in sentencing despite controlling for 
non-racial factors.2 This constitutes racial discrimination and its constitutive acts are 
immoral—i.e., constitute moral errors. Yet regarding judges and jurors’ commission of 
such moral errors, appeals to (1) wrong moral views (e.g., endorsed racism), (2) moral 
indifference, and/or (3) moral akrasia do not provide an incontrovertible complete 
explanation. Flawed moral reasoning is a plausible explanation that warrants 
investigation. Furthermore, especially for explananda such as this, it is plausible that 
there are multiple contributing factors (a la as expressed in analyses of variance). As 
such, to warrant investigation, flawed moral reasoning need not even be a plausible best 
or dominant explanation in any instance. It merely needs to be a plausible significant 
contributing factor in some cases-of-interest. In other words, the bar for flawed moral 
2 For an overview with copious citations, see American Civil Liberties Union (2014). For a contrary view, 
see MacDonald (2008). While this example serves narrative functions, ultimately, the arguments of this 
dissertation do not depend upon it. The plausibility of there being such examples is addressed in §3. 
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reasoning being explanatorily useful and thus, worth investigating, is relatively low. 
So, how can we pursue this potential explanation? Perhaps we can exploit a useful 
tool for explaining non-moral errors, namely, cognitive heuristics and biases (CHB)—or 
more precisely, the paradigm utilized in the CHB cognitive psychological research 
program spearheaded by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, 
& Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 2003).3 
Cognitive heuristics are reasoning shortcuts that are efficient but flawed. Such flaws yield 
systematic errors—i.e., cognitive biases. For example (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a), 
(one species of) the availability heuristic infers the probability of an event not by directly 
measuring or assessing probability, but by “taking the shortcut” of assessing the proxy: 
the ease with which similar types of events can be recalled. As such, this heuristic yields 
errors when ease-of-recall and probability diverge. Since dramatic events (e.g., airplane 
crashes) are disproportionately easy to recall, our use of this heuristic yields systematic 
overestimations of the probability of dramatic events—i.e., yields (a species of) the 
availability bias.4 In addition to discovering, unifying, and explaining errors, the CHB 
research program also spurred techniques for preventing errors—i.e., cognitive debiasing. 
Given CHB’s usefulness in explaining non-moral errors, an intriguing proposal is 
adapting the CHB paradigm to explain some moral errors—i.e., some immoral acts, 
decisions, and/or judgments.5 Such adapting would yield moral analogues of cognitive 
heuristics and biases—i.e., something like moral heuristics and biases (ultimately, in 
3 In this dissertation, instances arise when it is not obvious whether to use the term, “paradigm,” 
“conceptual framework,” or “model.” I will usually use the broadest term, “paradigm,” as the risks of 
excluding important elements (e.g., associated explanatory strategies) outweigh the costs of unnecessary 
inclusion. Generally, the use of “paradigm” should not be interpreted as having significant implications. 
4 A primer on cognitive heuristics and biases is provided in chapter 2, §2.  
5 “Acts, decisions, and/or judgments” and forthcoming, “acts/decision/judgments,” are stand-ins for the 
more precise, but less accessible, “cognitive outputs.” This is addressed in chapter 2, §3. 
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chapters 3-5, ‘moral heuristic’ and ‘moral bias’ will be replaced with/specified as 
‘subjective moral fallacy’ and ‘subjective moral bias’). Such analogues hold scientific 
and practical promise. They offer (1) to illuminate various immoral 
acts/decisions/judgments by identifying and unifying them as instantiations of systematic 
moral biases, (2) explain many such biases with moral heuristics (or moral fallacies), and 
(3) yield techniques for reducing the incidence of immoral acts/decisions/judgments—
i.e., yield moral debiasing techniques (elaborations and additional benefits in §4). Given
this potential usefulness, the task of this dissertation is to develop moral analogues of 
cognitive heuristics and biases. This mostly involves developing meanings for the 
concepts, ‘moral heuristic’ and ‘moral bias’ (later replaced with/specified as ‘subjective 
moral fallacy’ and ‘subjective moral bias’). It also involves addressing issues that stem 
from those meanings, such as implications for the accompanying explanatory strategy. In 
general, the task of this dissertation is to make progress on the philosophical foundations 
of a moral psychological paradigm that features these analogues and can undergird 
fruitful empirical research.6 
6 It should be noted that the terms, “moral heuristics and biases,” have been employed elsewhere, including 
in empirical research (e.g., Lindstrom, Jangard, Selbing & Olsson, 2018; Petersen, 2009; Wilkinson‐
Ryan & Baron, 2009). In this respect, the notion of moral analogues of cognitive heuristics and biases is 
not novel. This dissertation is distinguished from such uses by the combination of the following. (1) 
This dissertation provides a philosophically rigorous foundation for the concepts that yields precise and 
justified definitions. Many uses simply state a plausible definition without justification and do not 
wrestle with the issues confronted in chapters 3 and 4. This is not meant pejoratively, as per the division 
of scientific labor, psychologists should not be expected to provide foundational philosophical defenses 
of new concepts—especially since withholding new concepts pending such defenses would be 
counterproductive. (2) The basis of the moral analogues includes ‘cognitive heuristic’ per the classical 
notion of the Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky school (Ch. 2, §2.3). This is distinct from Kahneman 
and Shane Frederick’s subsequent notion of heuristics per attribute substitution (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002, p. 53-60). While at bottom, the issues raised in this dissertation bear upon both the 
classical and attribute-substitution versions, the classical notion is more useful for the purposes of 
adaption—explicated in Ch. 3, n. 33. Uses of “moral heuristic” coming out of the attribute-substitution 
school include Bruers (2013) and Dubljević & Racine (2014). Another distinct conception of ‘cognitive 
heuristic’ is per the Gerd Gigerenzer school (e.g., Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 
1999). Gigerenzer (2010; Fleischhut & Gigerenzer, 2013) rejects “moral heuristics” per se, as he 
interprets the concept as entailing moral-domain-specificity; nevertheless, there are uses of “moral 
5 
A sensible method of developing moral analogues of cognitive heuristics and bias 
by adapting the CHB paradigm to explaining moral errors begins with taking those CHB 
concepts and regarding their meanings’ cognitive-domain-regarding (or domain-general-
regarding) features, replacing them with moral-domain-regarding-features to yield prima 
facie MHB concepts. Given that the central meaning of ‘cognitive heuristic’ is reasoning 
shortcut, such replacement yields a prima facie concept of ‘moral heuristic’ with the 
meaning: moral reasoning shortcut; given that the central meaning of ‘cognitive bias’ is 
systematic error, such replacement yields a prima facie concept of ‘moral bias’ with the 
meaning: systematic moral error.7 To complete the adaption, these prima facie concepts 
heuristic” that appeal to this school (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2006; Petersen, 2009). (3) (If I may be so 
bold) the foundation I provide yields a paradigm that is scientifically and practically adequate (though 
perhaps merely per one conception of such). Cass Sunstein (2005) provides a groundbreaking treatment 
of ‘moral heuristic,’ but one that is highly problematic (Ch. 4, §4.2; Ch. 4, n. 27). It is worth noting that 
uses of “moral heuristic” that lean upon Sunstein’s paradigm may be vulnerable to entanglement in the 
paradigm’s problems (e.g., Fischer, 2016; Sheehan & Lee, 2014). An exciting new approach -though 
one that suffers from some of the adequacy issues addressed in chapter 4- is provided by Hanno Sauer 
(2018) (while it will be a topic of future research, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation). As far as I 
can find, there is not a treatment of moral analogues of cognitive heuristics and biases that also 
conforms to 1-3. That said, I ultimately replace ‘moral heuristic’ with ‘subjective moral fallacy’ (Ch. 3; 
Ch. 5) and replace ‘moral bias’ with ‘subjective moral bias’ (Ch. 4); this will also distinguish the 
material provided in this dissertation. There are various relations that the philosophical foundations 
provided in this dissertation may hold with past and future uses of “moral heuristic and bias” and other 
moral analogues of cognitive heuristics and biases. These include (1) entailing adjustments in such uses 
(e.g., adjusting extensions), (2) offering philosophical buttressing that can be seamlessly slid under such 
uses, and (3) being irreconcilable with such uses and thus, yielding either competing conceptions or 
orthogonal concepts. An orthogonal concept result would support using distinct terms. Such relations 
will likely vary between different uses. 
7 The method of adapting described above involves developing the moral analogues by developing their 
concepts’ meanings—or more precisely, intensions. In this respect, such adaption takes an internalist-
oriented approach to the semantics of ‘moral heuristic/fallacy’ and ‘moral bias.’ Some may object to 
this. In its defense, the approach stems from ‘cognitive heuristic’ and ‘cognitive bias’ depending upon 
descriptivist means of reference. That is, ‘cognitive heuristic’ and ‘cognitive bias’ do not -or at least, 
should not- directly refer. In other words, employing traditional Kripke-Putnam-style causal reference 
and externalist natural-kind semantics would be inapt (Kripke, 1980; Putnam, 1975); more precisely, 
reflecting my revisionary posture, such reference and semantics would not be the best option or 
“policy” in this case. This stems from the kinds, cognitive heuristic and cognitive bias, not constituting 
either (traditional) natural kinds (a la kinds that “carve nature at its joints”) or even kinds that carve 
specific systems at their causal joints—i.e., system-specific objective kinds (SOK) (Ch. 3, §3). This 
reflects cognitive heuristics and biases’ implicit, though essential contrast with ideal-rationality (Ch. 3, 
§1, §5), and this essential property’s -or central property’s- causal-inefficaciousness (Ch. 3, §2, §5). (At
least prima facie) not constituting a (traditional) natural kind (or even an SOK) frustrates causal
reference, which frustrates externalist semantics, which supports internalist semantics for ‘cognitive
6 
will be subjected to scrutiny and where warranted, revised. This is done in chapters 3 
through 5.8   
heuristic’ and ‘cognitive bias,’ which supports an internalist-oriented approach to developing ‘moral 
heuristic’ and ‘moral bias.’ While my approach is internalist-oriented, the intensions are open to 
significant revision; if this presupposes some utilization of externalist semantics, I am fine with that, as 
I am open to hybrid approaches. Considering alternatives to my approach, perhaps a full-throated 
externalist semantics can be grounded in a promiscuous-explanatory view of natural kinds that can 
apply to cognitive heuristic and/or cognitive bias (my thanks to Theodore Bach for this suggestion). 
However, I suspect that the descriptive content that I identify with these concepts’ intensions would 
prove indispensable—i.e., even if externalist-oriented views could forego intensions per se, I suspect 
that the descriptive content would still have to play a vital role (e.g., in reference a la Stanford & 
Kitcher, 2000). In other words, I doubt a full-throated externalist semantics is workable for cognitive 
heuristic and cognitive bias, and some “hybridization” would be necessary. If this is right, adherents of 
externalist-oriented views should find my focus on descriptive content worthwhile, even if ultimately, 
incomplete. Otherwise engaging externalist views/options for ‘cognitive heuristic’ and ‘cognitive bias’ 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, perhaps there is a view that (a) renders cognitive 
heuristic and cognitive bias natural kinds, (b) achieves reference without any appeal to descriptive 
content, (c) overcomes canonical challenges (e.g., the qua problem—e.g., Mallon, 2017, §3), (d) yields 
a full-throated externalist semantics of ‘cognitive heuristic’ and ‘cognitive bias,’ (e) befits cognitive 
heuristics and biases more than alternative views, and (f) renders an intension-inclusive approach to 
‘cognitive heuristic’ and ‘cognitive bias’ neither useful, nor interesting. If so, a rejection of such a view 
(e.g., per rejecting promiscuous-explanatory views of natural kinds) -or more specifically, a rejection of 
the view being employed for ‘cognitive heuristic’ and ‘cognitive bias’- may be an assumed premise of 
this dissertation and a subject for future research. 
8 The concepts this adaption ultimately yields (see chapter 5) may be opaque at this point. ‘Moral heuristic’ 
will be replaced with ‘moral fallacy’ (Ch. 3). This is due to problems with cognitive heuristic’s central 
property, shortcut-ness, or more fully expressed: shortcut vis-à-vis the ideally rational algorithm 
(SCIRA). Those problems especially stem from SCIRA’s causal-inefficaciousness within the human 
cognitive system (Ch. 3, §2). That stems from SCIRA’s constituents’ explanatory cross-purposes, 
including serving non-causal explanations. Those constituents are: deviation from the ideally rational 
algorithm (DEVIRA), more economical than the ideally rational algorithm, and natural assessment 
process (revised as intuitive process). Ultimately, only DEVIRA (contrastively) explaining cognitive 
biases is scientifically useful and survives the adaption of ‘cognitive heuristic’ to the moral domain. 
This yields a moral analogue with the central property, deviation from the ideal moral reasoning 
procedure (‘DEVIMP’), which befits the term, “moral fallacy” (Ch. 3, §7). Per DEVIRA and 
DEVIMP’s contrastive (vs. narrow causal) explanatory function and moral fallacy constituting a 
practical kind, there is no need to unify moral fallacy through identification with a distinct cognitive 
mechanism—a mistake made with cognitive heuristic. To achieve scientific and practical adequacy, the 
aforementioned ideal-moral-reasoning-procedure should be determined by ideal-instrumental-moral-
rationality (IIMR)—i.e., subjective morality (Ch. 4) (I will often use hyphens in multiple-word term to 
facilitate readability). IIMR/subjective-morality evaluates one’s actions, etc. (i.e., means) in terms of 
their contribution to the ideal (vs. pragmatic) satisfaction of one’s genuine moral ends (Ch. 4, §2.2). 
One’s moral ends -or more generally, morality- is genuine by conforming with counterfactual 
idealization—more specifically, two-tiered idealization (i.e., an adaption of two-tiered internalism—
Rosati, 1996), in which the agent is idealized per those conditions/endowments that she would consider 
authoritative under ordinary optimal conditions. Actions/decisions/judgments that deviate from that 
dictated by genuine IIMR/subjective-morality constitute subjective moral errors and when systematic, 
instantiate subjective moral biases (Ch. 4, §3). Since a moral-reasoning-procedure is ideal per only 
yielding morally correct (i.e., not morally erroneous) acts/decisions/judgments, and since the moral 
errors in-question are subjective-moral-errors, this yields moral fallacy as subjective moral fallacy.  
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As will be seen, various scientific, metaethical (loosely speaking), and practical 
hurdles and objections arise. For instance, in the opening of this chapter, I temporarily 
stipulated that racial discrimination is morally wrong and set aside issues regarding moral 
truth, etc. The use of this temporary stipulation reflects the challenge of grounding moral 
error within the context of a scientific research program (Ch. 4). Scrutinizing the prima 
facie MHB concepts, addressing challenges and objections that arise, and responding 
with revisions (both to the concepts themselves and to pertinent aspects of the 
accompanying paradigm) will comprise the bulk of this dissertation.  
2. Potential Examples
Definitive examples are not available at this time, as there is not empirical inquiry 
regarding criteria that will be introduced later. Nevertheless, the following potential 
examples provide a general idea of what moral analogues of cognitive heuristics and 
biases might look like (more refined examples are provided in chapter 5). In other words, 
the general idea communicated below will be sufficient to get the inquiry off-the-ground, 
and I will be able to get more precise later.9 
First, let’s consider an exemplar instantiation of the prima facie concept of ‘moral 
heuristic’ (though this exemplar may not actually exist). A straightforward and if you 
will, “conceptually clean” hypothesized example is the cuteness heuristic: a cognitive 
process that infers an entity’s moral status by “taking the shortcut” of assessing the 
proxy, cuteness (e.g., per neotenous characteristics or baby schema—Jia, Park & Pol, 
9 Regarding empirical inquiry, as far as I am aware, there has not been empirical inquiry regarding the later-
introduced criteria—namely, criteria stemming from the standard, genuine ideal-instrumental-moral-
rationality (IIMR) (see Ch. 4). The following potential examples are compatible with the prima facie 
concepts of ‘moral heuristic’ and ‘moral bias.’ With respect to the analogues that will ultimately emerge, 
while these potential examples do not address certain complexities, they still provide a general idea of 
what those analogues might look like. 
8 
2015, p. 169). Such a process would (be conducive to) yielding moral errors when moral 
status and cuteness diverge. For instance, consider Roomba vacuum cleaners, which are 
little, reminiscent of a face, and scoot around the floor, self-propelled. An extreme 
potential instantiation of errors due to the cuteness-heuristic is people taking their 
Roombas with them on vacation to avoid leaving the appliance home “alone” (Associated 
Press, 2007). Potential errors that could be more widespread are inconsistencies in the 
treatment of non-human animals that are attributable to cuteness, or a lack thereof (e.g., 
dogs vis-à-vis pigs, or squirrels vis-à-vis rats).10 This heuristic would almost certainly 
yield some systematic moral errors—i.e., a moral bias.11 
A further sense of what the moral analogies might involve can be gleaned from 
the identifiable victim effect. An exemplar of this effect is aid to victims more strongly 
correlating with identifiability than more plausibly justifiable factors, such as need (Small 
& Loewenstein, 2003). A victim is identifiable insofar as there is a definite referent (e.g., 
a particular person that is the victim). An exemplar of an identifiable victim is “Baby 
Jessica” McClure, who in 1987, at 18 months old, was trapped in a well; her plight and 
eventual rescue was a media sensation. In contrast to identifiable victims, statistical 
10 While this heuristic lacks empirical confirmation, nonetheless, it is plausible in light of: (a) cuteness 
perception is induced by baby schema instantiated in both humans (Kringelbach, Stark, Alexander, 
Bornstein, & Stein, 2016), other animals (Borgi, Cogliati-Dezza, Brelsford, Meints, & Cirulli, 2014) 
and even in non-living objects (Cho, Gonzalez & Yoon, 2011), such as Volkswagen Beetles (Jia, Park & 
Pol, 2015), and (b) cuteness perception motivates caretaking (Glocker, Langleben, Ruparel, Loughead, 
Gur, & Sachser, 2009). Especially with respect to cute, non-living objects, it is worth noting that while a 
process’ being frequently overridden may frustrate its discovery and reduce its yielding of errors, that 
does not bear upon the process’ existence. Furthermore, overridden processes are still detectable. For 
instance, if people more quickly toss Legos and toy helicopters into a trash compactor than they toss 
stuffed animals, such a delay would be some evidence of an overridden cuteness heuristic. Cuteness 
certainly plays some role in the moral valuation of non-human animals (Loughnan & Piazza, 2018; 
Piazza, McLatchie, Olesen & Tomaszczuk, 2016; Sherman, Haidt & Coan, 2009). While the plausibility 
of this heuristic renders it a more compelling potential example, the example’s primary function is 
providing an exemplar instantiation of the concept, independent of its actuality. 
11 Such likely yielding of systematic errors is explicated in §3. 
9 
victims have indefinite referents. An exemplar statistical victim is an impoverished child 
that is a member of a group identified by sterile, bureaucratic language.  
An example of the identifiable victim effect is that people donate more money to 
identifiable victims than statistical victims, even when donating to statistical victims 
would be more efficacious. The strength of this effect is reflected in its persistence 
despite seemingly inconsequential identifiability. For instance, Small and Lowenstein 
show that the effect persists even when the victim is only identifiable via a randomly 
assigned ID number that is drawn at random before a decision to donate is made, as 
contrasted with a statistical victim, whose ID number would be randomly drawn 
immediately after the decision. For example, a hat containing randomly assigned ID 
numbers is presented to experiment participants. The only difference in experimental 
conditions is whether: (a) the experimenter draws and reads a number aloud before the 
participant makes the decision (thus providing a definite referent and identifiable victim), 
or (b) the experimenter announces that a number will be drawn after the participant 
decides (thus rendering the referent indefinite, and the victim statistical at the time of the 
decision).12  
Surely, the time at which the number is drawn is not morally relevant; surely, no 
plausible moral theory would say otherwise. As such—at least for the illuminative 
purposes of this introduction—experiment participants’ decisions to make larger 
donations in the former case and smaller donations in the latter case potentially 
instantiates a moral error. The systematicity of such decisions renders them a potential 
instantiation of a moral bias. Such systematicity also suggests the existence of a distinct 
12 Confidence in this finding may require replication, though we can set that aside for our current 
illustrative purposes. 
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psychological process that explains the bias.13 That process could involve assessing (a 
trait that roughly correlates with) identifiability and “taking the shortcut” of using that 
assessment as a proxy for more plausibly justifiable assessments for determining aid. 
Such a process would potentially constitute a moral heuristic.14 
There are additional examples of established phenomena that can provide a sense 
of the sorts of things that the moral analogues might involve.15 These phenomena 
include: implicit racial bias (Brownstein, 2015), blaming the victim (Lerner & Simmons, 
1966), prejudicial violence involving displaced aggression (Hovland & Sears, 1940), and 
the role of psychic numbing in tolerating genocide (i.e., indifference to the plight of 
individuals who are one-of-many in a much greater problem) (Slovic, 2007, p. 79).16  
3. Plausibility
Adapting cognitive heuristics and biases to yield scientifically and practically 
useful moral analogues is an intriguing proposal. However, do we have reason to think 
such analogues exist?17  
Numerous considerations bear upon this. Some are philosophical considerations 
13 This dynamic of systematic judgments suggesting a distinct process is explicated at the end of Ch.2, §1. 
14 The above will suffice for a potential moral error, bias, and heuristic for now, as the criteria ultimately 
adopted (n. 8) require extensive exposition (Ch. 3-5). More refined examples are provided in chapter 5. 
15 The following phenomena -as standardly conceived- often do not neatly fit into categories of a process 
(e.g., a heuristic) and generated judgments (e.g., a bias). In this respect, the phenomena point to 
promising places to look for such analogues, but conceptions of the phenomena may need to be tweaked 
to fit the analogues’ paradigm. 
16 This notion of “psychic numbing” differs from similar notions of the same name, such as that in which 
decreased affect is not accompanied by a decreased motivation to act (e.g., Lifton, 1967).  
17 (1) Considering the aforementioned employment of “moral heuristic and bias” in empirical research (e.g., 
Lindstrom, Jangard, Selbing & Olsson, 2018; Petersen, 2009; Wilkinson‐Ryan & Baron, 2009), 
establishing such existence may seem unnecessary. However, the relationship between these 
employments and the moral analogues I will be developing is unestablished—for example, they may be 
compatible conceptions, competing conceptions, or conceptually orthogonal (n. 6). Furthermore, I do 
not necessarily think those employments are correct, useful, etc. As such, I will build the case for the 
analogues I am developing independently of such employments. (2) The arguments that follow are 
compatible with both the prima facie moral analogues mentioned, and the moral analogues that will 
ultimately emerge (given plausible assumptions) (see n. 8). 
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(if you will). These include metaethical worries, loosely speaking (e.g., can moral error 
be grounded within the context of a scientific research program? Ch. 4), and conceptual 
considerations (e.g., revisions to ‘cognitive heuristic’—Ch. 3). Such considerations will 
be addressed later and are bracketed from the following. A separate consideration is 
whether there exists the right sorts of processes and actions/decisions/judgments for 
constituting the moral analogues (e.g., moral heuristics and biases). While this is 
ultimately an empirical question, we can still assess the plausibility of their existence 
(i.e., whether that plausibility is sufficient to proceed). This is addressed in the following. 
In other words, in the following, I will just establish that the right sort of processes, etc. 
plausibly exist, and get into the deeper philosophical issues later (which would be 
rendered moot if those processes, etc. were not plausible).     
3.1. Per Capacities & Processes 
Consider human cognitive capacities concerning epistemic and practical matters 
(e.g., perception, belief-formation, and decision-making). These capacities are not 
infallible, flawless, and perfect; they are non-ideal. For instance, sometimes humans fall 
prey to optical illusions and misjudge their environment. Sometimes they form 
unjustified beliefs due to invalid inference-making (e.g., affirming the consequent), inapt 
reasoning (e.g., ad hominem arguments), or motivated irrationality (e.g., wishful 
thinking). Sometimes humans perform imprudent actions due to akrasia (i.e., weakness 
of will). Sometimes they act irrationally due to inconsistent valuation (e.g., sensitivity to 
framing effects) or incoherent desires (e.g., intransitive preferences). 
Since human cognition is prone to non-ideal capacities when epistemic and 
practical matters are concerned, it certainly seems plausible that it would be similarly 
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prone to non-ideal capacities when moral matters were concerned. In other words, given 
that this kluge-ridden, mush of wetware sloshing around in our skulls exhibits such non-
ideality regarding epistemic and practical matters, it certainly seems plausible that it 
would exhibit similar non-ideality regarding moral matters. Finding that the mind’s 
propensity to non-ideality persisted concerning moral matters would be less surprising 
than finding that this propensity suddenly disappeared when moral matters were raised. 
As such, it is plausible that non-ideal capacities concerning moral matters exist.  
This establishes the plausibility that cognition concerning moral matters goes 
awry. Let’s now consider the plausibility of it going awry in the particular ways that 
would yield moral analogues of cognitive heuristics and biases. This requires shifting 
from capacities to processes. A pertinent way in which such processes can go awry 
involves imperfect proxies. For an illustration of this, recall the aforementioned 
availability heuristic. It involves answering a question about the probability of an event 
by assessing the ease with which similar events can be recalled. In this respect, ease-of-
recall constitutes a proxy for probability.  Sometimes—e.g., when events are dramatic—
ease-of-recall assessments deviate from assessments of probability. In other words, ease-
of-recall does not perfectly track probability. In this respect, ease-of-recall is an imperfect 
proxy. In cases in which such assessments deviate, the proxy is inapt. When the proxy is 
inapt, its use yields a response—e.g., a judgment—that deviates from the question’s 
answer. In this respect, such responses are inapt. In sum, the availability heuristic uses an 
imperfect proxy (i.e., ease-of-recall), which is susceptible (e.g., when events are 
dramatic) to being inapt and yielding inapt judgments.  
As is typically the case with processes featuring imperfect proxies, the availability 
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heuristic yields some systematic inapt judgments. This stems from the factor, whether-an-
event-in-question-is-dramatic, bearing a different relationship to ease-of-recall than it 
bears to probability—namely, dramatic events’ being easy to recall but not 
correspondingly probable. In other words, the curve for the pair of variables, event-drama 
and ease-of-recall, has a different shape from the curve for event-drama and probability. 
If there is at least one psychologically useful factor or condition (e.g., event-drama) that 
has a different relation/curve with the proxy (e.g., ease-of-recall) than it has with the 
target (e.g., probability), then the proxy will be inapt and yield inapt judgments (e.g., 
probability overestimations) when the factor is present, and thus, the process (e.g., the 
availability heuristic) will yield some (relevantly) systematic inapt judgments—that is, 
not all of the inapt judgments will be (relevantly) random.18 When a process uses an 
imperfect proxy, there is usually at least one such factor/condition.  
Our epistemic and practical capacities frequently rely upon imperfect proxies. 
Examples of such imperfect proxies include: the use of representativeness as an imperfect 
proxy for probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982b), and the use of negative affect as an 
imperfect proxy for riskiness (Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2002). Given that 
human cognition is prone to relying upon imperfect proxies when epistemic and practical 
matters are concerned, it certainly seems plausible that it would also be similarly prone to 
relying upon imperfect proxies when moral matters were concerned. Recall that when a 
process uses an imperfect proxy, there is usually at least one psychologically useful factor 
18 Such “(relevant) systematicity” and “(relevant) randomness” are only with respect to useful 
factors/conditions/categories in psychology—i.e., the sorts of things relevant to psychological 
descriptions and topics. In other words, such systematicity/randomness concerns the presence/absence 
of patternly-ness between the sorts of things that might be captured as values or variables in a 
psychologist’s regression equation. It is worth noting that as such, Laplacian-style, low-level 
determinism neither precludes (relevant) “randomness,” nor is sufficient for (relevant) “systematicity” 
in the pertinent senses. This is elaborated further in chapter 2 (§2.1, n. 21).  
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that bears a different relation with the proxy than the target, which yields systematic inapt 
judgments/decisions/actions. As such, it is plausible that amongst the processes 
concerning moral matters there are some that utilize imperfect proxies and yield 
systematic inapt judgments/decisions/actions.  
The preceding inductions established the plausible existence of non-ideal 
cognitive capacities concerning moral matters, processes concerning moral matters that 
feature imperfect proxies, and systematic inapt judgments/decisions/actions concerning 
moral matters. These inductions were undertaken using terms such as “non-ideal” 
(capacities), “imperfect” (processes and proxies), and “inapt” (proxies and 
judgments/decisions/actions). These terms serve as alternatives to “irrational,” 
“erroneous” and other loaded terms that are standardly invoked in explications of 
heuristics and biases. Such terms are loaded in a sense that involves the aforementioned 
bracketed philosophical considerations (e.g., the philosophical issues involved in 
attributing moral erroneousness to judgments/decisions/actions within the context of a 
scientific research program). The difference between the (a) non-loaded versus (b) loaded 
terms represents the difference between (a) establishing the existence of processes and 
judgments/decisions/actions that are of the right sort to constitute moral analogues (upon 
resolution of the philosophical considerations) versus (b) establishing the plausible 
existence of moral analogues that satisfy the philosophical considerations. In this respect, 
the established plausible existence of (1) processes concerning moral matters that feature 
imperfect proxies, and (2) systematic inapt judgments/decisions/actions concerning moral 
matters is sufficient for (a) establishing the plausible existence of those processes and 
actions/decisions/judgments that are of the right sort to constitute moral analogues of 
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cognitive heuristics and biases upon resolution of the philosophical considerations. 
3.2. Per Paradigm Applications 
An additional line of inductive support comes from the continuous expansion in 
the range of processes and outputs to which (adaptions of) the heuristics and biases 
paradigm have been successfully applied. 
Firstly, Kahneman and Tversky’s development of the cognitive heuristics and 
biases paradigm was itself inspired by the application of a similar paradigm to perceptual 
judgments. Such application is exemplified by Egon Brunswik’s (1943) use of the lens 
model to capture the haze illusion (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p. 52; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 2003, p. 35).  The haze illusion is an optical illusion in which objects in hazy, 
visibility-hindering weather appear farther away than they actually are. It was captured as 
the perceptual bias of systematically overestimating the distance of objects in hazy 
weather. It was explained by the perceptual heuristic (if you will) of inferring the 
distance of an object by assessing the perceived clarity of its edges (and the fact that in 
such weather, perceived edge-clarity decreases). Kahneman and Tversky’s program was 
spurred by their statistics students’ continuously falling prey to seemingly intractable 
non-ideal reasoning—e.g., the facetious “law” of small numbers (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1982c). To capture this, Kahneman and Tversky adapted the perceptual heuristics and 
biases paradigm to probabilistic judgment-making (this heritage is reflected in the initial 
reference to cognitive biases as “cognitive illusions”).  
Applications of the cognitive heuristics and biases paradigm progressed. This 
progression included both expanding the range of phenomena captured by the paradigm, 
and increasing the extent of capture—e.g., advancing from a vaguely recognized 
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tendency, to identifying a systematic bias, to explaining the bias by a hypothetical 
heuristic, to providing the empirical corroboration and falsification of alternative 
explanations necessary to establish the heuristic’s existence.  
Just as Kahneman and Tversky adapted the perceptual “heuristics and biases” 
paradigm and applied it to probabilistic judgments, Nisbett and Ross (1980) in turn, 
adapted Kahneman and Tversky’s paradigm and applied it to psychosocial judgments. 
For instance, Nisbett and Ross identified the act-observer bias, in which assessments of 
others’ behavior overestimate the influence of character and underestimate the influence 
of circumstances. As more researchers contributed to the research program, the domains 
of judgment to which (adaptions of) the heuristics and biases paradigm were applied 
expanded to include syllogistic inferences, causal attribution, memory, and prediction. As 
the presumed bright line dividing reason from emotion was revealed to be more and more 
blurry, applications of the heuristics and biases paradigm expanded beyond solely cold—
i.e., unemotional—reasoning and incorporated emotion-laden processing (e.g., the affect
heuristic). Another area of progress is the application of the paradigm to assessments of 
value (e.g., sunk-cost bias, framing effects, and status-quo bias). (Baron, 2008; Connolly, 
Arkes, & Hammond, 2000; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Koehler & Harvey, 
2004; Schneider & Shanteau, 2003) 
As such, the range of judgments captured under (adaptions of) the heuristics and 
biases paradigm include emotion-laden judgments, value assessments, and judgments 
regarding the social domain. These judgments include ingredients that in combination, 
seemingly get fairly close to a moral judgment. Applying (an adaption of) the heuristics 
and biases paradigm to the domain of moral judgments would be in keeping with the 
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paradigm’s history. 
Of course, the above does not entail that the paradigm could be adequately 
applied to moral judgments, as hurdles to such application abound. The conclusions 
yielded by the preceding induction regard merely what is plausible (not to mention the 
limited scope of considerations in play). Nevertheless, the precedent of an expanding 
range of outputs and processes being captured under the paradigm at least supports the 
mere plausibility, bracketing philosophical considerations, that the paradigm could be 
applied to the moral domain, which implies the plausible existence of the right sorts of 
processes and judgments/decisions/actions to constitute moral analogues of cognitive 
heuristic and biases (bracketing philosophical considerations).  
The preceding mutually-supporting inductions (§3.1 and §3.2) allow us to 
conclude that bracketing philosophical considerations, the existence of moral analogues 
of cognitive heuristics and biases is plausible, and sets the stage for a future, less 
cluttered addressing of the remaining philosophical considerations.  
4. Potential Benefits
There are several potential benefits from developing a paradigm, and, ultimately, 
a psychological research program regarding moral analogues of cognitive heuristics and 
biases. One benefit is the acquisition of additional scientific knowledge. The interest in 
this knowledge is buttressed by our interest in the particular subject matter—that is, we 
care about morality. Furthermore, morality is a characteristic feature of our species’ 
nature; as such, understanding human morality is an important part of understanding 
ourselves. 
Another potential benefit concerns theoretical progress. The heuristics and biases 
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paradigm has been successfully employed in various domains, including the perceptual, 
cognitive, and psychosocial domains. When viewed as an overarching research program, 
exploring the applicability of the heuristics and biases paradigm to the moral domain can 
be seen as a fitting step for a progressive scientific research program (a la Lakatos, 
2000). Even if the application was unsuccessful, such a result would be useful for 
determining the boundaries of the program’s domain of application. As such, 
investigating its application to the moral domain furthers the maturation of a fruitful 
scientific research program. 
There are potential benefits to moral philosophy as well. For instance, if certain 
immoral acts are to be explained by bad reasoning—as opposed to for instance, 
indifference to moral considerations—this would seemingly have implications for 
assessments of moral responsibility. 
A major potential practical benefit is the development of debiasing techniques to 
reduce the incidence of moral errors—i.e., immoral actions/decisions/judgments. This 
would be in keeping with other applications of the heuristics and biases paradigm, which 
have spawned successful debiasing techniques regarding perceptual judgment (e.g., 
pilots’ susceptibility to autokenesis illusions—Civil Aviation Authority, 2002), cognitive 
judgment (e.g., confirmation bias amongst CIA analysts—Cooper, 2005), and 
psychosocial judgment (e.g., overly-attributing others’ actions to their character vis-à-vis 
circumstances—Tetlock, 1997). It is worth noting that merely the identification of moral 
biases—i.e., independent of any knowledge of the generating processes—can yield useful 
techniques. For instance, knowledge of the relation between dramatic events and 
probability overestimation (i.e., the aforementioned availability bias) can yield the 
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technique of investing in laborious calculation when making such assessments without 
any knowledge of the heuristic that explains the bias. 
Another potential benefit stems from other explanations and accounts in a similar 
spirit to moral analogues of cognitive heuristics and biases—for instance, moral blind 
spots (e.g., per Banaji & Greenwald, 2013, or Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). An 
especially prominent example is implicit biases (e.g., Brownstein, 2015). Implicit biases, 
such as implicit racial bias, are unconscious biases that, notably, can persist despite 
conflicting with reflectively endorsed views. Implicit racial bias has recently received a 
lot of attention for the explanatory role it may play in the police treatment of African-
Americans.  Influential supporters of such explanations include former U.S. Attorney 
General, Eric Holder, and former FBI director, James Comey (Ehrenfreund, 2015; 
Kaplan, 2015). Implicit bias training has been included in prominent policy vehicles (e.g., 
the Justice Department’s Ferguson report, and the consent decree with the Seattle Police 
Department), and such training has already been adopted by several police departments 
(e.g., the Seattle, New Orleans, and St. Louis police departments) (Green, 2015; 
Mullainathan, 2015). In addition, appeals to implicit biases have also been raised to 
account for phenomena in other social domains, including healthcare, education, and law 
(Brownstein, 2015).  
Especially given the rising influence of implicit bias accounts, it is important that 
implicit biases have a firm conceptual and theoretical footing.  Developing a paradigm 
for moral analogues of cognitive heuristics and biases could contribute to this footing. 
For instance, the meaning of ‘implicit bias’ is unclear with respect to which of the 
following potential constituents of ‘bias’ are necessary conditions: (1) merely a statistical 
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pattern (e.g., kids are biased towards mint chocolate chip ice cream), (2) a thin sense of 
‘discrimination’ as differential treatment that lacks any attribution of erroneousness (i.e., 
is non-normative), and (3) and erroneousness, including moral erroneousness. The 
success of the implicit bias research program to date may depend upon equivocations 
regarding these constituents and limiting research to coextensive cases. This opens the 
door to questions such as: Do implicit associations of groups with positive attributes 
constitute an implicit bias? Must the group be defined by an immutable trait (which is a 
classic legal standard for unjust differential treatment)? What grounds whether 
differential treatment constitutes an error, especially a moral error? The moral analogue 
of ‘cognitive bias’—or more precisely, ‘cognitive error’—could provide a standard of 
error and bias that resolves these questions. In short, the analyses and arguments in this 
dissertation have potential applications outside of research programs on cognitive 
heuristics and biases and moral analogues thereof.  
Given these various potential benefits, developing moral analogues of cognitive 
heuristics and bias is a worthwhile endeavor. 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
1. Cognitive Psychology’s (Default) Explanatory Paradigm
The scientific discipline that studies heuristics and biases is cognitive 
psychology.1 Per its default explanatory paradigm, cognitive psychology seeks to explain 
cognitive capacities—that is, informational capacities (e.g., perception, language use, and 
reasoning).2 In some contexts, ‘capacity’ has a positive connotation (a la ‘skill’ or 
‘talent’). The sense meant here regards merely things one does, regardless of their value. 
For instance, perceiving an optical illusion (i.e., misperceiving the environment) 
constitutes a cognitive capacity. 
Capacities are specified or analyzed in terms of dispositions (e.g., per Marr’s task 
analysis—1983). Dispositions are conditional regularities between (a) conditions/factors 
affecting an object, and (b) that object’s responses. For example, a disposition of salt is 
that it is water-soluble. This is formalized as follows. Salt is such that: ceteris paribus, 
were it (a) submerged in water, it would (b) dissolve.3 Cognitive psychological 
dispositions are conditional regularities between (a) information affecting a mind (i.e., 
inputs), and (b) that mind’s informational responses (i.e., outputs). For example, most 
people are such that: were they (a) asked, “What’s two plus three?” (input), they would 
1 The following account relies heavily on Robert Cummins (1975; 1983, I-II; 2000). To some extent, it is a 
rational reconstruction that may deviate from current cognitive psychological practices. The terms used 
are meant per their sense in philosophy and may conflict with uses in cognitive psychology. This 
especially pertains to “disposition.”  
2 The term, “cognitive,” is somewhat tricky. In philosophy, “cognitive” sometimes means truth-aptness. 
This sense is not employed in this dissertation. In psychology, “cognitive” usually means information-
processing, simpliciter—for instance, it encompasses visual and linguistic processing. This is the 
meaning of “cognitive” in “cognitive psychology” (Anderson, 2005; Balota & Marsh, 2004; Eysenck, 
2001; Kellogg, 2002). However, in the forthcoming context of heuristics and biases, “cognitive” refers 
to a specific type of information-processing: that approximated by “thinking,” “reasoning,” or 
“inference-making.” This meaning is exemplified by inferences regarding probability, and it excludes 
perceptual and linguistic processing. In this respect, perceptual biases and cognitive biases are distinct 
species of bias. 
3 Henceforth, ceteris paribus clauses will often be omitted and should be considered implicit. 
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(b) answer, “Five” (output). While such regularities are invaluable, they are (arguably)
not explanatory; such regularities are not proper explanantia (i.e., that which explains), 
but explananda (i.e., that to be explained).4 
Outputs are not necessarily behaviorally expressed; they can be internal mental 
states or “entities,” such as unspoken judgments. For example, consider the McGurk 
effect (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976). Humans are such that: were they (a) 
simultaneously exposed to both the sound, “ba,” and the sight of lip movements that 
produce the sound, “ga,” they would (b) perceive the syllable, “da” (i.e., judge the sound 
to be “da”). This perception of “da” constitutes an output, despite it occurring within the 
mind. Outputs are simply products of cognition (whether behaviorally expressed or not). 
Cognitive psychology is often interested in behaviors (e.g., saying “Five”), as 
operationalizations of mental outputs (e.g., the internal mental judgment that the answer 
is five). Likewise, observable inputs are often operationalizations of presumed 
perceptions.  Inputs can also be internal (such as when the judgment that the answer is 
4 This position conflicts with the subsumptive or nomological approach (e.g., deductive-nomological 
explanation—Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). That approach contends that the pertinent proper 
explanantia are laws or generalizations. Such generalizations explain by either subsuming phenomena 
or when conjoined with initial conditions, entailing outcomes. This approach was embraced by 
cognitive psychology’s principal competing paradigm, behaviorism (a la Skinner, 1953), and 
harmonized with behaviorism’s rejection of appealing to processes within the “black box” of the mind. 
While such laws or generalizations are a vital component of progress in cognitive psychology, they 
(arguably) are not (sufficiently) explanatory, at least in the special sciences (Cummins, 1983; 2000). 
Such generalizations can be used to justify the identification of a particular disturbance as the 
precipitating condition for a particular system’s transition from one state to another; however, justifying 
the identification of a precipitating condition is distinct from constituting an explanation (Cummins, 
1983, p. 6). In other words, identifying the input that affected the output merely yields a disposition to 
be explained. The nomological approach can entail (or support the likelihood of) outcomes (i.e., 
outputs); however, such entailment constitutes prediction, which is insufficient for explanation. 
Generalizations can identify dispositions as a special case of a more general disposition; however, such 
identification does not explain the disposition, it merely contextualizes the disposition to be explained. 
At least in cognitive psychology, the proper explanans of such dispositions is process-models (Barsalou, 
1992; Bechtel, Abrahamsen & Graham, 1999; Bechtel & Wright, n.d.; Bermudez, 2005; Botterill & 
Carruthers, 1999; Cummins, 1983; 2000; Reynolds, 2007). While I think this analysis is generally 
correct and generally yields the right prescriptions, perhaps its tone (maintained for illuminative 
purposes) is overly dismissive and its use of “proper” is too rigid. 
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five is an input that leads to a subsequent output, such as translating that answer into 
another language). 
To introduce an important feature of cognitive psychological regularities, and, in 
turn, their explanations, consider the following. Some cognitive systems possess the 
disposition identified by the McGurk effect; some do not. Alternately framed, the 
McGurk effect is a regularity that applies to some cognitive systems, but not all. This is 
because the McGurk effect does not apply to cognitive systems, simpliciter. That is, 
something’s constituting a cognitive system (e.g., computers, non-human animals) does 
not entail that it conforms to the McGurk effect. The McGurk effect is not a regularity 
between cognitive inputs and outputs, simpliciter; in other words, the McGurk effect is 
not a “universal law of cognition.” Instead, it is a regularity between cognitive inputs to, 
and outputs from, a particular type of system. In this case, that type of system is the 
human cognitive system. In this respect, the McGurk effect is a system-specific regularity 
that describes a system-specific disposition.5 Most, if not all, cognitive regularities and 
dispositions are system-specific in this sense. In turn, most cognitive psychological 
explanations are system-specific.6 
To illustrate the way that cognitive psychology explains cognitive dispositions, 
let’s start with a simple example and work our way up. To begin, systems are similar to 
objects, and system-specific dispositions are similar to object-specific dispositions. An 
example of an object-specific disposition is the aforementioned water-solubility of salt—
5 The primary contrast to system-specific dispositions (and as mentioned soon, object-specific dispositions) 
is universal dispositions. Universal dispositions are dispositions possessed by all things. For example: 
Each thing is such that: were it (a) in motion, it would (ceteris paribus) (b) stay in motion. Arguably, 
such distinctions ground different explanatory paradigms (e.g., as reflected in differing uses of laws).  
6 Such system-specificity (or perhaps more aptly, system-relativity) will later bear upon constituting an 
objective (or objective-ish) cognitive psychological kind (Ch. 3, §3). 
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that is, salt is such that: were it (a) submerged in water, it would (b) dissolve. 
Why does salt do this? Why does salt have this disposition? Salt has this 
disposition by virtue of salt’s makeup (i.e., parts) and structure. As such, salt’s having 
this disposition is explained by providing a depiction of salt’s makeup and structure that 
renders explicit how possessing that makeup and structure is sufficient for possessing the 
disposition.7 For (a simplified) example: 
Salt’s makeup consists of Na+ atoms and Cl- atoms. They are organized in a 
crystalline structure of Na+ atoms bound together by Cl- atoms and visa-versa. That 
crystalline structure provides salt its granular form. The bond between Na+ and Cl- atoms 
is not as strong as the bond each can form with water molecules—i.e., H2O. Upon 
submergence in water, H2O molecules, while zipping past the crystal, bind to Na+ or Cl- 
atoms. Upon binding, the H2O molecules (moving in various directions), pull the Na+ 
and Cl- atoms they “grab” in those various directions. The bond between the Na+ and Cl- 
atoms is not strong enough to bring the H2O molecules to an abrupt stop; instead, the 
H2O molecules keep going and rip the Na+ and Cl- atoms away with them. In this way, 
the H2O molecules tear the crystal (i.e., grain of salt) apart atom by atom—that is, the salt 
dissolves.8 
7 The depiction explains by rendering explicit the sufficiency of the makeup and structure for possessing 
the disposition. Some readers may object that rendering explicit constitutes an inappropriately 
psychological criterion. To the extent possible, such readers are encouraged to interpret this criterion as 
a place-holder for an acceptable objective criterion of causal-mechanical explanation. 
8 A potential quibble with this explanation is that it is does not explain salt’s water-solubility because it 
vacuously identifies the bond between Na+ and Cl- as weaker than the bond each has with sets of water 
molecules; this is (allegedly) vacuous because these bonding differences is already captured by the 
disposition’s (i.e., explanandum’s) stating that salt is water-soluble. The problem with this quibble is 
that it presupposes an established identification of dissolution (as referenced in the explanandum) with 
the depicted molecular pulling-apart process. Even if correct, the quibble’s upshot would merely be 
rendering the explanation not an explanation of salt’s water-solubility, but an explanation of generic 
solubility, that is illustrated with salt and water. This does not impugn the explanatory power of 
explaining dispositions with makeup and structure-oriented depictions. 
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Having given the salt example, we can start working our way up to cognitive 
explanations by upgrading one feature at a time. The first upgrade concerns replacing 
“passive” parts with “active” parts.  
Consider a traditional mousetrap (pictured below). It has the disposition of: upon 
(a) a mouse disturbing the trip (i.e., trigger), the mousetrap (b) crushes the mouse under
the hammer (i.e., swinging bar). 
Figure 1. Victor metal pedal rat trap M200 (2019). This figure illustrates a traditional mousetrap and its 
parts.
The trip precariously restrains the holding bar, which holds back the hammer, which 
holds down the extended end of a tightly coiled spring. When the hammer is pulled back, 
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it pushes down the extended end of the spring, which winds the coiled spring tighter (i.e., 
compresses the spring, which stores potential energy). Disturbing the trip releases the 
precariously restrained holding bar, which releases the hammer. This allows the hammer 
to be pushed by the extended end of the now unwinding (uncompressing) coiled spring, 
which swings the hammer down upon and mouse and crushes it. For simplicity’s sake, 
we can use a bit of shorthand and just say that the spring “pushes” the hammer. In the 
mousetrap case, the disposition is manifested (in part) by virtue of parts “doing things,” 
such as pushing the hammer. 
In the salt case, there is a sense in which the parts of salt (i.e., the Na+ and Cl- 
atoms) were passive.  They did not do things; instead, things were done to them (if you 
will). For instance, the Na+ and Cl- atoms did not push away from each other; instead, 
they were pulled apart. In light of this passivity, it was fitting to identify salt as an object. 
With more dynamic entities with more active and interactive parts (i.e., makeup) (e.g., 
the mousetrap), it is fitting to identify them as systems and identify their parts’ activities 
as that system’s (inner) workings.  
When a system’s parts “do things” that contribute to manifesting a disposition, the 
parts can be described and identified in terms of what function they perform in bringing 
about the disposition; in other words, the parts can be identified in terms of what 
contribution they make to (a) the antecedent affecting condition’s yielding (b) the 
response.9 Such identifications/descriptions (e.g., per spring) contrast with describing the 
constituents in terms of their composition (e.g., per Na+ and Cl-). As such, we have 
moved from compositional descriptions to functional descriptions; in other words, a 
9 The functions in question here are Cummins functions (as opposed to proper or etiological functions). 
27 
functional perspective or level emerges. In the terminology of Daniel Dennett’s 
framework (2002), we have moved from the “physical stance” to the “design stance.” 
With more active and interactive constituents, we begin to see more complex 
organization. For example, the mousetrap cannot manifest the aforementioned mouse-
trapping disposition if the activities are performed simultaneously or at random. The 
activities must be performed in a specific order. For example, the spring cannot push the 
hammer before the holding bar releases the hammer. Such order in the performance of 
constituents’ activities constitutes the organization. The organization is crucial to 
manifesting such dispositions, and its inclusion in the depiction is crucial to such 
explanations. 
At this point, we can see that the explanatory paradigm in question is reflected in 
common explanations of an analogue clock’s time-keeping capacity—or more precisely, 
its disposition to, upon (a) the passage of time, (b) track that passage. Such explanations 
explain the disposition by showing how the gears, etc. work. More precisely, the 
explanation explains a system’s possession of a disposition by providing a depiction of its 
constitution and organization that renders explicit how possession of that constitution and 
organization is sufficient for possession of that disposition. This explanatory paradigm 
contrasts with appeals to laws and subsumptive generalizations (e.g., the deductive-
nomological model of explanation—Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948; n. 4). In this respect, 
the explanations in question are causal mechanical explanations. 
In some systems, such as mousetraps, watches, and vending machines, you can 
open up the system and see the inner workings. For example, you can see springs pushing 
hammers, gears turning dials, and spinning coils pushing bags of chips forward. In other 
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words, the inner workings are tangible (if you will). The inner “workings” of a cognitive 
system are not tangible (in this sense); they are informational (though, assuming 
physicalism, ultimately token reducible to tangible physical constituents).   
Things get very abstract on the informational level. Consider informational 
activities. For instance, in contrast to pushing levers and releasing latches, informational 
activities include adding numbers, alphabetizing names, and translating languages. Such 
informational activities are fittingly described as operations. One might think of the 
constituents of informational systems as that which performs such activities—for 
example, “adders” and “translators.” However, these “entities” exist at very high levels of 
abstraction. Their abstraction is (presumably) similar to high-level computer software. 
Such abstraction is at a high level in the sense that there would be numerous levels to 
reduce through before one could connect activities such as translating a language to 
physical realizers. Indeed, this abstraction typically leaves the cognitive psychological 
level so far removed from the physical level that the entities performing the activities fall 
away. For instance, a particular addition operation might be performed by the “entity,” 
“the calculator.” We might be tempted to think of “the calculator” as a tangible thing that 
is distinct from the adding activity it performs (a la the spring that is distinct from its 
pushing-the-hammer activity). However, “the calculator” is not a thing in the way a 
spring, amplifier, or electrical distributor is. To illustrate this, consider a floppy disk for a 
chess video game. When used, what performs that activities that provide us a game to 
play? For instance, what makes the image of the chess board? We might think it is the 
floppy disk, itself. However, we can now download that same chess game. What provides 
the image of the chess board in that case? It cannot be a tangible entity, as no tangible 
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entity has been added. Of course, if we drop down many levels of abstraction, it is all 
ultimately a matter of the states of transistors and other tiny tangible parts. Nonetheless, 
at the pertinent level of analysis, the activity of generating the chess board is performed 
by the chess software. There is not a thing of comparable tangibility to a spring.10 
Ultimately, due to the cognitive level’s extent of abstraction, our depiction of its 
“workings” need not feature parts that perform the activities. That is, we do not need to 
assign each activity to a performer. To do so can easily lead to problems. For one, it can 
lead to importing unjustified assumptions and entailments. For an extreme example, if the 
performer of the addition operation is dubbed, “the calculator,” we might presume that 
the mind can perform any operation that we associate with the capacities of a typical 
digital calculator (e.g., identifying the square root of 11). Assigning performers to 
activities can also yield vacuous posits, such as saying the adding of 3 and 4 was 
performed by the “3 and 4 add-er.” Such posits, though vacuous, can help us wrap our 
mind around abstract cognitive phenomena. For instance, as we subsume collections of 
dispositions under more general capacities (e.g., adding single-digit numbers), it is 
helpful to posit “a calculator” and think of it as that which performs the calculations.  
Nevertheless, it is important to remain aware of the nature of this crutch, and its 
limitations and pitfalls.11 
Returning to the pervious narrative, the inner workings of a cognitive system are 
10 One upshot of the abstract nature of information is that it renders mental processing (at least in practice) 
highly unobservable (e.g., as compared with the circulatory system, which is observable upon 
dissection). 
11 Ultimately, the metaphysics of information, informational activities, “entities” (e.g., goals or desires), and 
programs (upcoming) is a very thorny matter. This is true even when dealing with artefactual 
informational systems, such as personal computers; however, with such systems, one can at least appeal 
to articulated designs and explicitly written lines of code. When dealing with evolved, biological 
information systems, the nature of these informational “entities” gets even trickier. This topic is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. 
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cognitive processes (at least at the appropriate level of analysis). Cognitive processes 
consist of operations performed or executed in a particular order. That order and the more 
general organizational aspect of a cognitive process consists of the conditions governing 
the performance of operations. On the cognitive level, it is fitting to describe such 
organization as a program. The program “dictates” the execution of operations. More 
precisely, the program reflects the order and conditions under which particular operations 
are performed. 
Without the benefit of tangible inner-workings, operations must often be 
discerned through functional analysis. Such analysis infers (or more precisely, generates 
hypotheses regarding) the operations and programs necessary to achieve the 
manifestation of the disposition. For instance, suppose a system manifests the disposition 
of calculating the cube of small numbers. For example, the input, 5, yields the response 
125. A functional analysis of generating cubes reveals the intermediate step of generating
the square of the number. That is, one “goes from” 5 “to” 125—i.e., “transforms” 5 into 
125—by first, “transforming” 5 into 25. Given this method, the manifested disposition 
can be referred to as the analyzed disposition, and the operations inferred can be referred 
to as the analyzing dispositions (or analyzing functions, functional roles, or activities).12 
12 Carl Craver (2006) challenges the explanatory adequacy of such functional analytic models. He 
distinguishes “how-actually models” (i.e., that model how the system actually works) from “how-
possibly models” (i.e., that generate the correct input-output relations, and thus, show how the system 
might possibly work, but do not necessarily show how the system actually works). Craver correctly 
assesses that how-actually models are explanatorily adequate and how-possibly models are not. He 
raises important worries about solely functional accounts’ greater susceptibility to constituting merely 
how-possibly models and the expositions of these accounts’ greater susceptibility to inadequately 
addressing “how-actuality.” While he identifies various ways in which dual accounts (which include a 
componential analysis—i.e., a specification of the realizers of functional roles) allow for a variety of 
tests of how-actuality that are not available to solely functional accounts, nevertheless, the susceptibility 
of componential-inclusive accounts to those tests merely reflects such accounts’ greater in-practice 
accessibility to how-actuality testing—i.e., it does not negate the legitimacy of methods of how-
actuality testing available to solely functional accounts, let alone challenge solely functional accounts’ 
in-principle susceptibility to how-actuality testing. While componential supplements to functional 
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Classical cognitive psychology depicts such processing in terms of symbolic 
computational transformations (a la digital computing).13 The informational input 
triggers computational processing that, through the execution of operations in accordance 
with a program, transforms the informational input into an informational output.  
One possesses a cognitive disposition by virtue of possessing (1) the analyzing 
dispositions—i.e., operations—and (2) their conforming to the organizing program; 
together, these comprise a cognitive process. It will sometimes be tempting to identify the 
cognitive process or the program as the performer of operations. This metaphorical 
language is unproblematic so long as one keeps in mind that it is merely metaphorical. 
As with the salt, mousetrap, and other cases, cognitive psychological explanation 
capitalizes upon this by-virtue-of relation. In this respect, cognitive dispositions are 
explained by providing a depiction of the cognitive processes’ operations and program 
that renders explicit how a system’s possession of that process is sufficient for its 
possession of the disposition. 
With respect to typical cognitive input-output dispositions, the cognitive process 
is that by virtue of which the reception of the input is followed by the production of the 
output. This yields a linear dynamic of: input-process-output. In a sense, such outputs are 
accounts are very valuable for efficient how-actuality testing, nevertheless, their inclusion is neither a 
necessary condition of demonstrating resilience to how-actuality falsification nor a necessary condition 
of explanatory adequacy. Furthermore, such componential supplements are often unrealistic at the 
current level of development of cognitive psychology because of the number of layers between high-
level operations and their physical realizers. In other words, componential supplements to a functional 
analysis of language translation is currently just an ideal, and research into such capacities should not be 
foresworn until such supplements are available. Furthermore, the wedding of high-level functional 
accounts and componential realizers is most likely to come from their meeting in the middle (if you 
will), as opposed to merely slogging uphill from the lower levels. In other words, a more effective 
strategy is simultaneous research in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and neuroscience.  
13 Classical cognitive psychology contrasts with connectionist cognitive psychology, which models 
processes in terms of non-symbolic information propagating through artificial neural networks. 
Kahneman and Tversky’s program utilizes the classical paradigm. 
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a function of the input, and the process’ program specifies that function. Loosely 
speaking, the process “transforms” the input into the output.14  
Such input-output dispositions are explained by providing a depiction of the 
mediating process that renders explicit why possession of that process is sufficient for 
possession of the disposition. Such depictions are contained in input-process-output 
models. Such process-models are (at least, akin to) causal-mechanical explanations on a 
cognitive level—that is, an informational level.15  
The following is an example of a process model that explains a cognitive 
capacity. The capacity explained is determining whether a positive, whole number is 
prime. This capacity is formulated in terms of the following disposition: a regularity 
between (a) inputs of positive, whole numbers, and (b) outputs of correct displays of 
“Prime” or “Not Prime.” 
Explanandum: Disposition/Regularity: 
Input: Positive, whole number 
Output: Accurate display of “Prime” or “Not Prime” 
Explanans: 
Operations: 
(a) Assess whether input is 1
(b) Assign input to dividend
(c) Assign 2 to divisor
(d) Assess whether the divisor is greater than one-half the dividend
(e) Assess whether the quotient is a whole number
(f) Add 1 to the divisor
(g) Display “Prime”
14 Henceforth, scare-quotes for “transform” should be considered implicit.  
15 There is some room for quibbling over the causal-mechanical nature of such process models. Such 
quibbles can stem from disagreements over views of causation and problems concerning mental 
causation. Nonetheless, identifying such models as causal-mechanical (or something in that ballpark) is 
informative in a context in which such models are contrasted with the principal competing explanatory 
paradigm—namely, the subsumptive or nomological approach (e.g., deductive-nomological 
explanation) (see n. 4). 
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(h) Display “Not Prime”
Organizing Program: 
(1) Perform (a)
(2) If yes, perform (h) and stop
(3) If no, perform (b)
(4) Perform (c)
(5) Perform (d)
(6) If yes, perform (g) and stop
(7) If no, perform (e)
(8) If yes, perform (h) and stop
(9) If no, perform (f)
(10) Return to (5)
Cognitive processes are unobservable theoretical posits (a la subatomic particles). 
As such, claims about them must be inferred from observable phenomena. Such claims 
are inferred from observable input-output relations. (More precisely, such claims are 
inferred from relations between observable operationalizations of mental inputs and 
outputs.16) Such input-output relations are abstracted from sets of input-output pairs. An 
exemplar input-output pair is a judgment (a concept that will figure centrally in the 
chapters to follow). “Judgment” is sometimes construed as referring solely to an output; 
however, (at least in cognitive psychology) “judgment” implicitly refers to an input-
output pair—that is, an output per an input.17 Recall that per the cognitive psychological 
paradigm, inputs trigger cognitive processes, which transform those inputs into outputs. 
16 Regarding distinguishing operationalizations of inputs and outputs from their target constructs, 
sometimes, such distinctions can be ignored. For instance, regarding multiplying 8 and 5 in one’s head, 
a person’s speaking, “40,” is, to be precise, an operationalization of the output of concluding that the 
answer is 40. In other cases, such as when a speaker’s sincerity may be doubted, the distinction between 
an operationalization and the construct in question can be important (e.g., regarding answers to racially 
charged questions). 
17 This implicit reference to an input contained in ‘judgment’ (in the cognitive psychological sense, at least) 
is illustrated by the attributing of properties such as fallaciousness to judgments. Such properties can 
only be applied to an output per an input.  This is akin to how an answer can only be erroneous per a 
question. For instance, even the answer, “P & ~P,” can be correct per a certain question (e.g., what does 
applying modus ponens to Q and (Q > (P & ~P)) entail?). 
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Given the reception of a particular input, the particular output yielded is a function of the 
transformations executed. In addition, properties of the mediating processes can be 
reflected in properties of the mediated outputs-per-inputs. For instance, usually, the 
greater the number of transformations executed, the longer the time that elapses between 
the input and output. In this respect, judgments are a function and reflection of mediating 
processes. This is the basis of inferences from input-output relations to processes.  
A single judgment rarely provides much information about the mediating process. 
This is because there are usually too many plausible processes that could equally well 
yield that particular input-output pair. For instance, an input-output pair of 2 (input) - 4 
(output) does not tell you whether the mediating process is +2, or *2, or ^2, or (^3)-6, etc. 
Unsystematic judgments are also not very informative. Such judgment sets suggest that 
different inputs in the set are triggering different processes. The plausible sets of 
processes that can account for such judgment sets are practically limitless. For instance, 
the set of input-output pairs, {5-8, 4-14, 2-11, 3-3, 9-1}, is not very informative. 
However, systematic judgments are informative, as they suggest mediation by a coherent 
process—that is, a process with a coherent program. For instance, the set of input-output 
pairs, {2-4, 3-6, 4-8, 5-10…}, suggests that the mediating process is: *2. Initially, an 
account of the process is put forward as a hypothesis. If that hypothesis is resilient to 
falsification, alternative explanations, etc., the process’ existence is accepted.  
With this background on cognitive psychology’s explanatory paradigm, we can 
now turn to one of cognitive psychology’s most influential discoveries: heuristics and 
biases. 
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2. Cognitive Heuristics & Biases
Heuristics and biases are notable in the social sciences for providing an 
alternative to descriptive rational choice theory (DRCT). DRCT was the dominant 
descriptive model of human judgment. In fields such as neoclassical economics, it still is. 
In many ways, the heart of heuristics and biases is its contrast to DRCT. 
2.1. Strong-DRCT 
Strong versions of DRCT (strong-DRCT) contend that humans are ideally 
rational.18 Exemplars of ideal rationality include adherence to the rules and principles of 
logic, statistics, and probability theory (e.g., modus tollens, the relevance of sample size 
to inductive credence, and Bayes’ theorem).19  Strong-DRCT depicts the typical person 
as “homo-economicus”—a forward looking, self-interested, expected-utility maximizer 
who possesses consistent and stable preferences. Strong-DRCT entails that the cognitive 
processes underlying human judgment instantiate algorithms that are highly complex, 
computationally demanding, and consistent with sophisticated principles of ideal 
rationality (Simon, 1990, p. 194-198).20 (Doherty, 2003, p. 658-659; Gilovich & Griffen, 
2002, p. 1-6; Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997, p. 11; Little, 1991, p. 66) Henceforth, ideal 
rationality will often be referred to as simply, “rationality.” 
While strong-DRCT contends that “humans are rational,” it does not contend that 
18 “Strong-DRCT” (and forthcoming, “weak-DRCT”) are reconstructions of pivotal poles in DRCT theory. 
There are versions of DRCT that do not neatly fit this dichotomy.  
19 ‘Ideal rationality’ is loosely synonymous with ‘expected utility theory’ (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1947), ‘subjective expected utility theory’ (Savage, 1954), ‘full rationality’ (Selton, 2001), the ‘standard 
idealization’ (Cherniak, 1994), the ‘normative standard’ (Samuels, Stitch, & Faucher, 1999), and the 
‘standard picture’ of rationality (Stein, 1996). Its most pertinent contrast is with models whose norms 
are tailored to accommodate human limitations (e.g., processing and memory limits); such models 
include bounded rationality (Simon, 1990) and prescriptive (i.e., pragmatic) models of decision-making 
(Baron, 1994). 
20 Whether strong-DRCT entails or implies ideally-rational processing—or does neither—is contestable. On 
the one hand, “homo-economicus” could be merely an as if model; on the other hand, inference-to-the-
best-explanation is seemingly sufficient for at least, implying ideally-rational processing. I suspect that 
few DRCT theorists would have defended “homo-economicus” as a psychological theory; however, that 
is a separate question from whether such was entailed or implied. 
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every human judgment is rational. That is, strong-DRCT allows for some irrational 
judgments. Per terminological conventions, such irrational judgments are often referred 
to as “errors” or being “erroneous”; such “errors” can be presumed to be irrational and 
have the theoretical implications of irrational judgments.21 The irrational judgments or 
“errors” that strong-DRCT allows for are those that result from breakdowns and mistakes 
in carrying out otherwise rational judgment formation. That is, strong-DRCT allows for 
breakdowns and mistakes in the execution of rational programs. That is, strong-DRCT 
merely contends that the programs of judgment formation are rational.  
To elaborate (though still a simplification): an input triggers a program, and that 
program may or may not be successfully executed. Strong-DRCT contends that the 
programs are such that: were they successfully executed, they would yield rational 
judgments. The important feature of the judgment errors allowed for by strong-DRCT is 
21 There is some terminological tension here regarding rational/irrational and correct/erroneous. DRCT and 
the other theories of reasoning mentioned in this dissertation make claims regarding the rationality of 
human reasoning. Judgments whose outputs are the products of irrational reasoning can be referred to 
as irrational judgments. Psychological research tends to assess judgments not in terms of 
rational/irrational, but in terms of correctness and erroneousness. This is a sensible practice on 
epistemic-conservativism grounds. For instance, an experimenter’s knowledge of a question’s correct 
answer is sufficient for attributing erroneousness to an experiment participant’s divergent answers; 
attributing irrationality is a much trickier matter. Rationality and correctness can diverge. For instance, 
rational reasoning from information that is generally reliable, but in a particular case, turns out to be 
erroneous, can yield erroneous judgments. As such, precisely speaking, erroneousness is not sufficient 
for irrationality. However, cognitive psychological theoreticians and researchers speak as if it were 
sufficient. For instance, it is standard practice to speak about the implications of errors for DRCT 
despite the fact that such errors bear upon DRCT only if the errors are also irrational. This practice ends 
up being logically unproblematic because the practitioners exclude rational, erroneous judgments from 
the domain of pertinent judgments. Loosely speaking, an experiment that yields rational, erroneous 
judgments is considered a badly designed experiment whose findings are not theoretically relevant. In 
other words, erroneous judgments can be presumed to also be irrational because rational errors are 
tossed out as “not really errors.” Alternatively framed, in the pertinent contexts, “erroneousness” 
consistently means erroneous and irrational. While this use of “erroneousness” is imprecise, it is so 
entrenched that breaking from this convention (e.g., replacing such uses of “erroneous” with 
“irrational”) would probably cause more confusion than it would avoid. As such, I will follow 
convention and use “error” in the error-and-irrational sense. That is, in this dissertation, judgments 
identified as erroneous can be presumed to also be irrational (unless explicitly stated otherwise). This 
convention is asymmetrical in that correct judgments cannot be presumed to be rational; for instance, a 
prominent feature of heuristics is that they often generate judgments that are correct, but not (ideally) 
rational. 
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that the judgments’ erroneousness is not attributable to the program. For a useful analogy, 
consider a perfect airplane design. Airplanes built from a perfect design can still be 
susceptible to mechanical failures. For instance, builders can fail to follow the design. 
Parts can wear out. Birds can be sucked into the engines. Various factors can happen to 
align in a way that causes a failure. Such failures are not the designers’ fault. The fault 
may lie with the builders, the maintenance mechanics, or no one at all, such as when the 
failure is only attributable to bad luck. While the design is an important factor in the 
determination of the outcome, the design is not the only factor. Failures that occur are not 
necessarily attributable to design problems.   
A cognitive program is like an airplane design in that both provide instructions 
(loosely speaking). In both cases, a perfect set of instructions does not necessarily entail a 
perfect execution of the instructions. Just as a perfect airplane design does not preclude 
mechanical failures, similarly, a perfectly rational program does not preclude breakdowns 
and mistakes that yield errors. In this respect, while strong-DRCT contends that the 
programs of judgment formation are rational, this contention does not preclude erroneous 
judgments. In sum, strong-DRCT entails that while the programs that generate judgments 
are ideally rational, they are not necessarily successfully executed; strong-DRCT allows 
for errors that are not attributable to programs. 
This next part is a bit tricky. For the time being, breakdowns and mistakes that are 
not attributable to a flaw in a process’ program can be assumed to be (relevantly) 
“random” breakdowns and mistakes (or more precisely, relevantly unsystematic 
breakdowns and mistakes).22 Recall that features of an input-output pair reflect features 
22 The terms, “random”/“unsystematic” and “systematic” are potentially misleading (especially for 
philosophers). Recall from chapter 1 (n. 18) that such “systematicity” and “randomness” are only with 
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of the mediating process. Judgment formation that is susceptible to (relevantly) random 
breakdowns and mistakes is susceptible to correspondingly (relevantly) random judgment 
errors. Given a presumption in favor of processes’ rationality, the extent of irrationality in 
a process suggested by (relevantly) random judgment errors is merely, susceptibility to 
(relevantly) random breakdowns and mistakes. As such, (relevantly) random judgment 
errors are consistent with strong-DRCT. (Relevantly) systematic errors, however, are not. 
The coherence of (relevantly) systematic errors suggests that such errors are attributable 
not to (relevantly) random breakdowns and mistakes, but from a (relevantly) coherent 
program that itself deviates from rationality. As such, (relevantly) systematic errors are 
inconsistent with strong-DRCT.  
In sum, strong-DRCT contends that programs are ideally rational, but not 
necessarily successfully executed. In terms of competence vis-à-vis performance (as in 
linguistic competence vis-à-vis performance—Chomsky, 1980), programs that generate 
judgments can be construed as reasoning competences; the transformations executed 
(whether in accordance with such programs or not) can be construed as reasoning 
performances (Samuels, Stich, & Faucher, 1999). In these terms, strong-DRCT contends 
that humans possess ideally rational reasoning competences, are susceptible to 
respect to useful factors/conditions/categories in psychology—i.e., the sorts of things relevant to 
psychological descriptions and topics. In other words, such systematicity/randomness concerns the 
presence/absence of patternly-ness between the sorts of things that would be captured as values or 
variables in a psychologist’s regression equation. Attachment to metaphysical notions of 
systematicity/randomness can cause tremendous confusion here; to the extent possible, it is best to set 
those notions aside. For an extreme example, if you are disposed to fail to make correct judgments 
when a tank is running you over, this technically constitutes a systematic conditional regularity, but not 
one relevant to cognitive psychological inquiry. The presented senses of (relevantly) 
“random”/“unsystematic” and “systematic” are canonical in cognitive psychology. I cannot attest to this 
approach being perfect, but it certainly is useful. Perhaps a critique of it can be marshalled, but that is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. In this respect, the adequacy of this approach is an assumed 
premise of this dissertation. 
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(relevantly) random performance errors, but are not susceptible to (relevantly) systematic 
performance errors. 
2.2. Weak-DRCT 
Contrary to strong-DRCT, it was discovered that humans indeed make 
(relevantly) systematic errors (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982a; Gilovich, 
Griffen & Kahneman, 2002).23 As such, strong-DRCT does not accurately describe 
human judgment. However, weaker versions of DRCT (weak-DRCT) can explain certain 
systematic errors by replacing the strong contention—that human judgment, simpliciter, 
is ideally rational—with a weaker contention, such as: merely the default processes, basic 
orientation, or “core” of human judgment is ideally rational.24 
The important move here is taking the processes and mental phenomena that bring 
about judgments and dividing them into two groups. The first group is processes that 
belong to a core judgment system (or something of that sort). Weak-DRCT contends that 
these processes are rational. The second group is processes and “entities” (e.g., urges) 
that are not part of that core judgment system, but nonetheless, can affect judgment 
formation and determine what judgment is ultimately made. These processes and 
phenomena can be irrational.  
Weak-DRCT identifies the core judgment system as (something like) the default 
judgment system. The core system includes a repertoire of rational processes. When 
processes or entities from outside the core judgment system affect judgment formation, 
such affecting constitutes interfering with, disrupting, or overriding the core judgment 
23 Henceforth, regarding “random”/“unsystematic” and “systematic,” the qualifier, “(relevantly),” will often 
be omitted and should be considered implied. 
24 I do not necessarily contend that this is a viable distinction. 
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system’s processes. 
Weak-DRCT is particularly well suited to accounting for motivated irrationality, 
such as wishful thinking. The following illustrates a simplified, stereotypical weak-
DRCT account of wishful thinking. A plane carrying a young woman crashes into the 
ocean. Her father initiates a rational process of assessing whether his daughter survived. 
His intense desire for her survival interferes with that process and prevents him from 
reaching the conclusion that she is dead. The result is an erroneous judgment that she 
must have swum away from the crash and is safe and happy on a deserted island. 
In this case, the core judgment system, in accordance with a rational reasoning 
program, initiates a rational reasoning process. That process’ formation of a judgment is 
affected by the intense desire for a given conclusion. The ultimate result is the yielding of 
an irrational judgment.  
This account is consistent with weak-DRCT insofar as it does not posit irrational 
processes that belong to the core judgment system. Roughly speaking, weak-DRCT can 
account for irrationality and systematic errors that can be “blamed” upon a process or 
mental phenomenon from outside the core judgment system. For instance, suppose it 
were the case that everyone was such that: (1) were they assessing whether a loved one 
had died, they would draw a similarly irrational conclusion, and (2) were they in any 
other situation, they would only draw rational conclusions. These dispositions would 
yield sets of judgments with systematic errors. Namely, judgments’ erroneousness would 
correlate with whether they were assessing whether a loved one had died. As such, mere 
systematic error is insufficient to falsify weak-DRCT.  
In competence/performance terms, weak-DRCT allows for systematic 
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performance errors, but only those that are attributable to processes and entities from 
outside the core judgment system. Weak-DRCT contends that the reasoning competences 
of the core judgment system are rational. 
2.3. Heuristics & Biases 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky provided judgment models that 
fundamentally departed from both strong-DRCT and weak-DRCT (e.g., prospect 
theory—Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). They contend that many of the core judgment 
system’s processes were indeed irrational—that is, the processes deviated from ideally 
rational algorithms. This deviation did not consist of merely breakdowns and mistakes in 
executing algorithms; it did not consist of merely algorithms being disrupted, interfered 
with, or overridden. Instead, Kahneman and Tversky contended that many of the 
programs were adhering to wholly different inferential principles and that these principles 
were not ideally rational. Kahneman and Tversky were right. 
A classic illustration of this involves the following experiment (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 2003). Experiment participants (i.e. subjects) were given personality 
descriptions, such as:  
Dick is a 30-year-old man. He is married with no children. 
A man of high ability and high motivation, he promises to 
be quite successful in his field. He is well-liked by his 
colleagues. (p. 5) 
The experiment participants were told that the descriptions were of individuals, randomly 
sampled from a population of 100 (in total) engineers and lawyers. Participants were 
instructed to assess the probability that a given description was of an engineer or a 
lawyer. One group of participants were told that the population consisted of 70 engineers 
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and 30 lawyers. The other group was told the population had the exact opposite 
composition—30 engineers and 70 lawyers. In the terminology of probability theory, the 
composition of the population constitutes a base-rate. Probability theory dictates that 
base-rates matter. This is especially the case with Dick, since his description provides 
little information regarding whether he is an engineer or a lawyer. That is, probability 
theory dictates that the probability that Dick is an engineer is much higher when the 
population base-rate is 70/30 engineers/lawyers, than when it is 30/70 engineers/lawyers. 
Since DRCT contends that humans are ideally rational -which includes adhering to the 
principles of probability theory- DRCT entails that the probability estimates would vary 
greatly between the participant groups. They did not. Both groups estimated the 
probability at approximately 0.5, regardless of population base-rate. 
(Upon resilience to falsification and alternative explanations) this showed that 
people were often entirely insensitive to base-rates.25 This is an important finding 
because it showed that participants did not merely execute the algorithms of probability 
theory poorly; for instance, they did not merely under-weight base-rates. Instead, they did 
not execute those algorithms at all; they employed an entirely different inferential 
procedure (in this case, the representativeness heuristic—discussed shortly). If people 
were merely executing the algorithms poorly, this would be relatively harmonious with 
25 Readers should note that these findings are well established. In this dissertation, unless indicated 
otherwise, mentioned experiments are intended to illustrate the nature of the evidential support for 
findings and generally illuminate the subject matter. As is often the case with any isolated experiment, 
the resultant data will be consistent with numerous explanations. Alternative explanations to those 
presented in the dissertation may occur to the reader and appear to undermine the findings; however, 
readers should keep in mind that Kahneman and Tversky’s program has been well aware of a variety of 
alternative explanations and has taken measures, including subsequent experiments, to rule out many of 
them. This is not to say that an alternative explanation that might occur to the reader has necessarily 
been ruled out; it is only to say that one should not assess the feasibility of such alternative explanations 
merely by their consistency with the evidence that happens to be mentioned in this dissertation. 
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DRCT. More specifically, it would be consistent with bounded rationality variants of 
DRCT (e.g., Simon, 1990). Such variants conceded that people are not ideally rational, 
but only conceded it insofar as people can fail to execute ideally rational algorithms 
correctly. Such execution failures are still consistent with the basic orientation of 
people’s cognitive systems being ideally rational. Loosely speaking, such errors would be 
mere performance errors. Kahneman and Tversky showed that many irrational judgments 
were not merely performance errors; they showed that the core judgment processes—i.e., 
the reasoning competences—were not ideally rational.  (As with “capacity,” 
“competence” does not necessary connote positive value). (Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997, 
p. 24-25; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982a; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; 2000;
Tversky & Kahneman, 2003). 
Kahneman and Tversky primarily focused on intuitive judgment.26 They 
contended that several intuitive processes constituted cognitive heuristics.27 Cognitive 
heuristics are distinct processes of judgment formation that constitute reasoning shortcuts 
26 Tversky and Kahneman’s conception of “intuitive judgment” changed over time. Initially, they defined it 
per Braine’s (1978) formulation in which “A statement is intuitive only if its truth is immediately 
compelling and if it is defended in a single step” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982b, p. 499). They also 
employed senses in which “intuitive judgment” was characterized as “an informal and unstructured 
mode of reasoning” (vis-à-vis “analytic methods or deliberate calculation”) (p. 494), and “natural 
assessments that are routinely carried out as part of the perception of events and the comprehension of 
messages” (Tversky & Kahneman, 2002, p. 20). They situated intuitive judgment on a middle ground 
between perception and deliberation (Keren & Teigen, 2004, p. 93). Their later conceptions of “intuitive 
judgment” (vis-à-vis deliberative judgment) were more closely aligned with the system 1 (vis-à-vis 
system 2) judgments featured in early dual-processing theories of judgment (Evans, 2008) (system 1 and 
2 were later replaced with type 1 and 2—e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
27 The meaning of “heuristic” varies between disciplines and even within psychology (Hahn, Frost, & 
Maio, 2005). In this dissertation, “heuristic” connotes the classical conception from Kahneman and 
Tversky’s program; it is distinct from the conceptions of the Gigerenzer school (Gigerenzer, Todd, & 
the ABC Research Group, 1999), the cognitive miser model (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), the errors and 
biases program (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), and the attribute-substitution model (see Ch. 3, n. 27) 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Readers should note that reliance upon familiarity with the term, 
“heuristic,” from other contexts may be misleading as to its meaning within Kahneman and Tversky’s 
program. 
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(vis-à-vis ideally rational algorithms); they are efficient and useful, but flawed.28 As 
such, the judgments they produce are prone to characteristic errors (as assessed by 
inconsistency with the judgments entailed by ideal rationality).29 Such characteristic 
errors instantiate cognitive biases, which are systematic errors (within a set of 
judgments).30 Per this dynamic of being practical, yet flawed, heuristics are characterized 
as “quick and dirty” and “rough and ready” means of problem-solving (respectively: 
Gilovich & Griffen, 2002, p. 3; Over, 2004, p. 10). (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982b, p. 
494, 499; 1996, p. 582; Tversky & Kahneman, 2002, p. 20; 2003, p. 35, 52)31 
2.4. Representativeness Heuristic 
An exemplar heuristic is the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982a; 1982c; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982b; 1982c; 2002; 2003). “Representativeness” 
28 This dissertation focuses on the classical conception of cognitive heuristics (Ch. 1, n. 6) (e.g., Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; 2000). There is a subsequent conception per 
attribute-substitution (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p. 53-60); however, the classical conception is 
more useful for the purposes of adaption—this is explicated in chapter 3, n. 33 (after the main text 
introduces the analysis needed for the explication). 
29 The standard by which the program attributes erroneousness will be important later. That the CHB 
program’s standard of error-attribution is per inconsistency with ideally-rational judgments) is 
illustrated in: e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982b, p. xi-xii; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a, p. 48; 
1982b, p. 494; 1982c, p. 46; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a, p. 24; 1982c, p. 91; 2002, p. 20; 2003, p. 38. 
It is also supported by: e.g., Gilovich & Griffen, 2002, p. 1; Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997, p. 5-6; Keren 
& Teigen, 2004, p. 93. 
30 The term, “cognitive bias,” is sometimes used to refer to the disposition to generate judgments that 
systematically deviate from correctness (Keren & Teigen, 2004). This dissertation adopts the usage that 
refers to systematic deviation within a set of judgments or outputs. There is some ambiguity regarding 
the extension of cognitive biases. This stems from the question of how to classify instances in which a 
heuristic yields a judgment that conforms with ideal-rationality because the property that systematically 
correlates with judgments’ deviations from ideal-rationality is absent (e.g., regarding the 
aforementioned availability heuristic, probability estimates of non-dramatic events, ceteris paribus). 
Cognitive biases are systematic errors—i.e., deviations from ideal-rationality per the presence of a 
property in inputs. One interpretation of this is that the extension of a cognitive bias is the judgments 
that deviate from ideal-rationality. Another interpretation is that the extension includes the judgments in 
which the systematic pattern manifests. The manifestation of the systematic pattern requires not merely 
instances of erroneousness being present when the property (e.g., dramatic-ness) is present in inputs 
(e.g., events whose probability is assessed), but also instances of erroneousness being absent when the 
property is absent. In order for a heuristic to explain a cognitive bias, it has to explain both types of 
instances. 
31 This extensive citation partly reflects the Kahneman and Tversky program’s less than perfect fidelity to 
authoritative definitions. 
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(as in, “A is highly representative of B”) is a relation akin to prototypicality, 
stereotypicality, or exemplariness. Tversky and Kahneman characterize it as “an 
assessment of the degree of correspondence between a sample and a population, an 
instance and a category, an act and an actor, or more generally, between an outcome and 
a model” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996, p. 584).32 For instance, a personality sketch can 
vary in the extent to which it is representative of one group versus another. For example: 
“Pat played with trucks as a child, played football in high school, and worked in 
construction as an adult.” This personality sketch can vary in the extent to which it is 
representative of American males versus American females. Other examples of the 
representativeness relation include: a comment being representative of a type of person 
(e.g., a rigid ultimatum being representative of a military hawk), a sequence of heads and 
tails being representative of a fair coin (e.g., H-T-T-H-T-H is perceived as more 
representative of tosses of a fair coin than is H-H-H-T-T-T), and a (e.g., high) price of 
gold being representative of a (e.g., declining) world economy (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1982b, p. 85).  
The “logic” or principles of representativeness differ from the principles of 
probability theory (and thus, ideal rationality). Probability theory includes the 
conjunction rule, according to which, the probability of a conjunction (A&B) cannot be 
greater than the probability of one of its conjuncts (e.g., A): P(A&B) ≤ P(A). For 
example, the probability of Pierre being an accountant who speaks French (A&F) cannot 
be greater than the probability of Pierre being an accountant (A). This is because 
32 Kahneman and Tversky do not provide an “a priori” definition of representativeness; they define it 
“empirically” based upon usage (Tversky & Kahneman, 1996, p. 585). Criticism of this approach can 
be found in Gigerenzer (1996, p. 594; 1998, p. 2-3). 
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everyone who is an accountant who speaks French (A&F) is necessarily an accountant 
(A). Otherwise stated, the probability that an object is a member of a subset cannot be 
greater than the probability that it is a member of an encompassing set. For example, 
since an apple (A) is a fruit (F), the probability that the thing rattling around in a 
lunchbox is an apple (A&F) cannot be greater than the probability that it is a fruit (F).  
Violations of the conjunction rule constitute commissions of the conjunction 
fallacy. While the conjunction rule applies to probability, it is not part of the logic of 
representativeness (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982b, p. 90). For example, someone who 
rides the subway, talks fast, and hates the Red Sox is more representative of the group, 
New Yorkers, than the group, Americans; this is the case regardless of the fact that New 
Yorkers are a subset of Americans. 
2.5. The Linda Problem 
Kahneman and Tversky discovered that when people are asked to assess 
probability, they often assess representativeness instead. One prominent demonstration of 
this involved the following question, which we can refer to as the “Linda problem” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982b, p. 92): 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. 
She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply 
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, 
and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.  
Please rank the following statements by their probability, 
using 1 for the most probable and 8 for the least probable: 
(a) Linda is a teacher in elementary school.
(b) Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes.
(c) Linda is active in the feminist movement
(d) Linda is a psychiatric social worker.
(e) Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters.
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(f) Linda is a bank teller.
(g) Linda is an insurance sales person.
(h) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist
movement.
The pertinent statements are (c), (f), and (h). Experiment participants perceived 
Linda’s personality sketch to be highly representative of feminists, not representative of 
bank tellers, and somewhat representative of feminist bank tellers. When assessing the 
extent to which a profile (Linda) is representative of a group (feminist bank tellers) that is 
defined by membership in both a highly representative group (feminists) and an 
unrepresentative group (bank tellers), the high and low extents of representativeness are 
balanced out to produce a medium representativeness assessment. As such (“R” for 
representativeness): R(Feminist) > R(Feminist & Bank teller) > R(Bank teller). Because 
the logic of representativeness does not include the conjunction rule, this ranking is 
unproblematic.  
The conjunction rule prohibits ranking “Feminist & Bank teller” as more probable 
than “Bank teller” (as the former is a subset of the latter). Nevertheless, when asked to 
assess the probability of Linda’s membership in the aforementioned groups, subjects 
committed the conjunction fallacy. We can refer to such commissions as the Linda-
conjunction-fallacy.33 They also provided the same rankings given by others asked to 
assess the extent to which Linda was representative of those groups (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982b, p. 94). Tversky and Kahneman dubbed this (type of) phenomenon, the 
conjunction effect.  
Responding to the Linda Problem with a ranking in which “Feminist & Bank 
33 I will often use hyphens with multiple-word terms to facilitate readability. 
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teller” is more probable than “Bank teller” constitutes an erroneous judgment. The 
systematic commission of such errors renders them instantiations of a cognitive bias. The 
bias’s systematicity suggests that its constitutive judgments are mediated by a coherent 
process—that is, processing in accord with a coherent program.  Kahneman and Tversky 
put forward the representativeness heuristic as an account of that program. In other 
words, they explained the Linda-conjunction-fallacy (and the conjunction effect) as the 
result of subjects employing the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1982b).34  
More specifically, Kahneman and Tversky explained the Linda-conjunction-
fallacy with process models featuring the representativeness heuristic (which we can call, 
the Linda model): 
34 Readers should note that the portrayals of research findings in this dissertation are often simplifications 
(in respects not relevant to the dissertation’s arguments). For example, portrayals may imply that a 
cognitive heuristic is the complete determiner of a judgment. The more complicated reality is that often, 




Explanandum: Linda-Conjunction-Fallacy (disposition) 
Input: The Linda Problem 
Output: Ranking (i.e., ranking Linda is a feminist bank teller as more probable 
than Linda is a bank teller) 
Explanans: Linda Model 
Operations: 
(a) [Linda-Bank-teller] Representativeness:
(a.1) Activate the prototype that best represents [the biographical 
description of Linda (which we can refer to as the “Linda 
prototype”)] 
(a.2) Activate the [Bank-teller] prototype 
(a.3) Measure the extent to which the [Linda] prototype is 
representative of the [Bank-teller] prototype 
(a.4) Assign the value of that measurement [low] to [Linda-Bank-
teller] 
(b) [Linda-Feminist] Representativeness:
(b.1) Activate the [Linda] prototype  
(b.2) Activate the [Feminist] prototype 
(b.3) Measure the extent to which the [Linda] prototype is 
representative of the [Feminist] prototype 
(b.4) Assign the value of that measurement [high] to [Linda-
Feminist] 
(c) [Linda-Feminist-Bank-teller] Representativeness:
(c.1) Identify a compromise value [medium] that is approximately 
halfway between the value [low] assigned to [Linda-Bank-
teller] and the value [high] assigned to [Linda-Feminist]. 
(c.2) Assign the value of that measurement [medium] to [Linda-
Feminist-Bank teller] 
(d) Scale Conversion:
(d.1) Convert the value [low] assigned to [Linda-Bank-teller] and 
the value [medium] assigned to [Linda-Feminist-Bank-
teller] to the [Ranking] scale used in [the Linda Problem] 
Organizing Program: 




As evidenced above, the Linda model contains a depiction of the cognitive 
system’s mediating process (in terms of operations according to a program) that renders 
explicit how possession of the mediating process is sufficient for possession of the 
disposition, the Linda-conjunction-fallacy.  
Recall that weak-DRCT contended that merely the core judgment system was 
ideally rational. As such, weak-DRCT was consistent with systematic biases that were 
attributable to processes and entities outside the core judgment system. In this respect, 
such attributions could explain away biases that, prima facie, might appear to falsify 
weak-DRCT. However, as the evidence of heuristics continued to pour in, such 
explaining away becomes increasingly ad hoc and strained. What might be considered the 
straw that finally broke weak-DRCT’s back was the fall of the cognitive miser theory of 
heuristics. This last gasp of weak-DRCT conceded the prevalence of heuristics and biases 
but contended that humans intentionally execute heuristics due to “miserliness” about 
expending cognitive resources (Gilovich & Griffen, 2002, p. 4). If people employ 
heuristics for efficiency’s sake, this is consistent with their nonetheless, possessing 
rational reasoning competencies. In other words, just because people often use quick and 
dirty methods, does not mean that they lack rational reasoning programs—they may just 
not bother to use them when stakes are low.  
The principle rebuttal to the cognitive miser theory of heuristics was the 
persistence of heuristics despite the provision of financial incentives (Camerer & 
Hogarth, 1999; Gilovich & Griffen, 2002; Grether & Plott, 1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982b; Larrick, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Wilson, Houston, Etling & Brekke, 
1996). In other words, if people still use heuristics when there is money on the line, it 
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shows that heuristics is simply what the judgment system has at its disposal (or at least 
what the intuitive judgment system has at its disposal).  
These findings supported Tversky and Kahneman’s natural assessments model 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 2002), in which heuristics are executed automatically (a la the 
processes underlying perceptual illusions).35 That is, heuristics are default processes that 
occupy the core of the judgment system (assuming this notion of a core remains viable). 
At least with respect to intuitive judgment, these findings arguably put the final nails in 
the coffin of weak-DRCT and DRCT, simpliciter—at least in cognitive psychology. 
3. Judgments/Decisions/Actions
The following regards an important taxonomical clarification that may avert 
confusion. In the cognitive psychological paradigm, the primary ontological categories 
are informational inputs (e.g., questions like: What’s 15 times 4?), cognitive processes 
(i.e., informational transformations, such as doubling, taking that product, and doubling 
again), and informational outputs (e.g., respondent answers like: 60). There are many 
kinds of outputs. Three such kinds are judgments, decisions, and actions. Initially, 
instantiations of immorality—i.e., moral errors—were identified as simply, acts. A more 
precise identification is: acts, decisions, and/or judgments. Some tension over how I 
should identify moral errors—and thus, moral biases—stems from this dissertation’s 
incorporation of diverse subject matters and disciplines. For instance, on the one hand, 
the dissertation’s focus on morality favors identifying moral errors as acts; this is because 
acts are often considered the paradigmatic objects of moral evaluation. On the other hand, 
the focus on cognitive processing favors emphasizing judgments and decisions, as they 
35 Per contemporary views, such judgments of “natural assessment” are one of the variants of “intuition” 
that were the theoretical predecessors of type 1 judgment-making. 
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are the paradigmatic outputs in cognitive psychology. For some readers, the distinctions 
between acts, decisions, and judgments are very important. Nonetheless, perhaps 
counterintuitively, such distinctions are often beside the point for the project at hand. 
To illustrate this, suppose that in a school lunchroom Owen offers Valerie a trade 
of his veal parmigiana for her spaghetti. A cognitive psychological theory might predict 
that she will form the judgement that her spaghetti is more valuable. An economic theory 
might predict that she will perform the act of trading away her spaghetti. Are these 
theories consistent? According to the theories’ surface meaning, they are. This is because 
judgments and acts are simply different phenomena. The standard (often implicit) view 
regarding the relation between such outputs is a linear causal chain, wherein acts are 
precipitated by decisions (e.g., intentions to act), which are precipitated by judgments 
(which are something like beliefs, but with less exclusive conditions). Given these 
distinctions, claims about judgments never contradict claims about actions. Nevertheless, 
despite the above theories’ surface consistency, such theories’ implicit assumptions 
render the theories inconsistent. This is because such theories assume that ceteris paribus, 
judgments, decisions, and actions align—that is, their contents are in agreement. For 
example, ceteris paribus, Valarie’s judgment that her spaghetti is more valuable aligns 
with a decision to decline the trade, which aligns with the act of declining the trade. 
There are exceptions, such as akrasia (wherein an action conflicts with something like a 
decision); however, these exceptions are accommodated by the inclusion of ceteris 
paribus clauses (henceforth, often left implicit). This assumed alignment is reflected in 
such theories’ operationalizations—for instance, the cognitive psychological theory 
might operationalize its predicted judgment in terms of Valerie’s act of declining the 
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trade. Through the alignment assumption, a theory that predicts a particular judgment can 
be transformed into a theory that predicts the action that aligns with that judgment. The 
same transformability applies across acts, decisions, and judgments. As such, theories 
that vary in whether they refer to acts, decisions, or judgments are nonetheless, indirectly 
commensurable. For example, cognitive heuristics and biases (qua theory) usually refers 
to judgments; descriptive rational choice theory usually refers to choices -i.e., decisions- 
or when employed in economics, actions. Nevertheless, it is canonical to treat them as 
theoretical competitors.  
The alignment assumption accommodates incorporating moral evaluation, which 
emphasizes acts. For example, suppose a decision theory predicts that Valarie will make 
the decision to trade for the veal parmigiana. A moral theory might entail that given the 
treatment of veal calves, Valerie’s act of trading for the veal parmigiana would be 
morally wrong. The alignment assumption between decisions and actions allows the 
moral theory’s entailments to be commensurable with the decision theory’s prediction.  
The alignment assumption also allows for explanations regarding judgments, 
decisions, or actions to (ceteris paribus) be applied to their counterparts. For example, an 
explanation of an action can be reformulated as an explanation of an aligned decision. It 
also licenses shorthand statements such as, “Some immoral acts are explained by moral 
heuristics,” even if a more precise formulation might be “Some immoral acts are 
explained by decisions, that are explained by judgments that are explained by moral 
heuristics.” Alignment allows the (de dicto) explanandum (i.e., that which is explained) 
to be slid up and down the causal chain of aligned phenomena that constitute outputs (i.e., 
judgments, decisions, and actions). 
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In all, given the alignment assumption, acts, decisions, and judgments are not only 
rendered ceteris paribus indirectly commensurable, but also ceteris paribus practically 
interchangeable (from the perspective of researchers, for instance). For example, it 
usually makes little difference whether a theory predicts a judgment that aligns with 
making a trade or predicts the act of making the trade (as operationalizations reveal).  
The alignment assumption and its products, indirect commensurability and 
practical interchangeability, renders the distinction between acts, decisions, and 
judgments often beside the point for the project at hand. Further, thus far, appeals to 
judgments, decisions, and actions have been construed as referring to distinct phenomena. 
An alternative interpretation is that while such theories differ in what phenomena they 
mention, they are really all referring to a singular thing—namely, a broader, 
undifferentiated output that encompasses more thinly sliced phenomena, such as 
judgments, decisions, and actions. Carving up such undifferentiated outputs into acts, 
decisions, judgments, etc. would often involve a more finely grained perspective than is 
relevant. For example, suppose we are investigating racial disparities in sentencing. An 
explanandum-of-interest may be a juror’s voting guilty given the trial observed (qua 
output-per-input). More fine-grained distinctions could differentiate between (a) the 
judgment (or assessment) of guilt (e.g., the thought, “He did it.”), (b) the decision to vote 
guilty (e.g., the thought, “When I get my juror-ballot, I’m going to write ‘guilty’”), and 
(c) the act of registering the guilty vote (e.g., writing the word, “guilty,” on the ballot and
dropping it in the hat at the center of the table). However, making such distinctions would 
involve more specificity than the investigation calls for; such distinctions would be 
beside the point. For (an extreme) example, one could separate the registering of the 
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guilty vote into the bodily movements for each pen stroke, grasping the ballot with one’s 
hand, locating the hat, reaching out to hold the ballot above the hat, etc. However, if the 
investigation concerns racial disparities in sentencing, such differentiation would be 
absurd. Just as one can identify the registering of the guilty vote as an explanandum and 
ignore each individual pen stroke subsumed under it, one can identify voting guilty as an 
explanandum and ignore differentiating the judgment, decision, and act subsumed. 
The exception is when alignment is not the case, as with akrasia. An analogous 
illustration of the exception would be if such bodily movements contributed to an 
ultimate output that conflicted with the ultimate output expected (via the alignment 
assumption) from the preceding proximate links in the causal chain. For example, if 
following an affirmative decision to spank a child, raising one’s hand in an aggressive 
pose triggered an aversion to proceeding (i.e., “caused one pause”) and ultimately, 
yielded an output without spanking—that is, an ultimate output that conflicted with the 
output expected from the preceding decision to spank. It is only in such cases that we 
need to mention, let alone differentiate, bodily movements. In this respect, differentiating 
judgments, decisions, and actions is also usually unnecessary. 
An additional advantage of construing the phenomena-of-interest as broader 
outputs is that it avoids commitments regarding how judgments, decisions, and actions 
relate. For instance, presuming a linear causal chain from judgment to decision to action 
sounds similar to presuming a linear causal chain from justificatory reasons for a moral 
judgment to the moral judgment. This presumption would be highly problematic given 
Jonathan Haidt’s findings in “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail” (2001)—that is, 
the finding of justificatory reasons for moral judgments often being formulated after the 
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formation of that moral judgment (i.e., rendering the reasons not explanatory reasons for 
the judgment, but post-hoc rationalizations). In short, construing the phenomena-of-
interest as outputs side-steps this minefield. 
Ideally, I could simply speak in terms of “outputs” (e.g., rephrasing the opening 
question as “Why do people generate immoral outputs?”). However, this would involve 
too large a break with conventional language. As such, within this dissertation, outputs of 
interest may be identified (explicitly or implicitly) as “acts,” “judgments,” etc. or in 
ambiguous terms (e.g., as with “blaming the victim”). Such identifications will often 
merely reflect conventional phrasing and should not be construed as implying substantive 
differentiation. In other words, the particular terms used are usually merely stand-ins for 
output.  In this dissertation, the appropriate construal of such phenomena -including 
moral errors- is as outputs (unless explicitly stated otherwise). As such, in this 
dissertation, terms such as “act,” “decision,” “judgment,” etc. can generally be treated as 
interchangeable.  
Armed with this chapter’s background information on the cognitive psychological 
paradigm, DRCT, and cognitive heuristics and biases, we are now in a position to 
develop moral analogues of cognitive heuristics and biases. 
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CHAPTER 3: ADAPTING ‘COGNITIVE HEURISTIC’ 
1. Worry: Is ‘Cognitive Heuristic’ an Adequate Basis for a Moral Analogue?
As stated (Ch. 1, §1), I am going to develop the moral analogue of cognitive 
heuristics by adapting ‘cognitive heuristic’ to the moral domain. This involves taking 
‘cognitive heuristic’ and replacing its cognitive-domain-regarding features (or domain-
general-regarding features) with moral-domain-regarding features to yield a prima facie 
concept of the moral analogue. However, as we shall see, a problem immediately arises 
(regarding the kind, cognitive heuristic).  
The central meaning of ‘cognitive heuristic’ is reasoning shortcut. However, 
shortcut (simpliciter) is incomplete. This is because ‘shortcut’ is inherently relative (a la 
‘taller [than…]’ or ‘faster [than…]’); it is only meaningful vis-à-vis some relatum. As 
addressed (Ch. 2, §2.3), that relatum is: the algorithm that the principles of ideal-rationality 
dictate for the given judgment task. Additionally, a process’ constituting a shortcut is 
understood in terms of the resources expended in executing that process. Such resources 
include time and cognitive resources, such as the number of computations required. In this 
respect, ‘shortcut-ness’ is understood as being “cognitively economical” (Hastie & Dawes, 
2001, p. 95).  Putting together the preceding, a more complete statement of shortcut is: 
requiring less resources to execute than would be spent by the algorithm that the principles 
of ideal rationality dictate for the given judgment task. We can summarize this as: shortcut 
vis-à-vis the ideally-rational algorithm (SCIRA). 
SCIRA distinguishes cognitive heuristics from pertinent contrast class members 
(e.g., algorithms and the genus, reasoning processes, simpliciter). As such, SCIRA is the 
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central property (a la essential property) of cognitive heuristics.1 However, cognitive 
psychologists (at least those working within the Kahneman and Tversky tradition), do not 
investigate whether the processes that they call “cognitive heuristics” are indeed more 
economical than the corresponding algorithm—i.e., actually possess SCIRA. In this 
respect, they do not know whether those processes actually constitute cognitive 
heuristics. This apparent indifference to SCIRA-possession, and, in turn, constituting a 
cognitive heuristic, raises doubts about whether being a cognitive heuristic (or not) 
actually matters—i.e., it raises doubts about whether the kind, cognitive heuristic, 
matters. Especially considering the kind’s centrality in the cognitive heuristics and biases 
(CHB) paradigm, it should matter. A desideratum of the pertinent mattering is being 
scientifically-useful.2 If cognitive heuristic is not scientifically useful, then it warrants 
revision or elimination.3 This threat of scientific inadequacy needs to be resolved before 
cognitive heuristics can serve as the basis for a moral analogue. As such, we need to 
1 There may be some fudging when jumping between the concept, ‘cognitive heuristic,’ and the kind, 
cognitive heuristic—i.e., jumping between linguistics and metaphysics. However, those jumps are 
unproblematic and rendering explicit the moves and architecture that makes this so yields an extremely 
lengthy and laborious read. Nonetheless, a worthwhile sense of such can be gleaned from the following 
alternative formulation. ‘SCIRA’ is the distinguishing feature of the meaning of ‘cognitive heuristic’ 
(more specifically, the distinguishing feature of that semantically-internal concept’s intension). 
Cognitive psychologists’ not testing for the corresponding/concordant property, SCIRA, reflects a 
divorce between (a) uses of the term, “cognitive heuristic,” (to refer to those processes), and (b) the 
meaning of the concept, ‘cognitive heuristic.’ This divorce is not a clash between intension and 
extension, but a case of uses’ unfaithfulness to meaning. (The possibility of such is reflected in the 
possibility of divorces regarding concepts that lack an intension—e.g., uses of “water” that are 
unfaithful to ‘water.’) This divorce raises doubts about conceiving of those processes per ‘cognitive 
heuristic (per that meaning)’ and raises the prospect of revising or eliminating that (descriptive) concept 
and in turn, its (dependent) corresponding kind. 
2 For simplicity’s sake, I will often assess scientific usefulness in binary terms—i.e., a kind being 
scientifically useful or not. A more refined rendering accommodates a continuous scale of scientific 
usefulness (i.e., assessments of more/less). In this respect, “not scientifically useful” should be 
interpreted as implicitly, insufficiently scientifically useful (e.g., a kind being “not scientifically useful” 
by virtue of being much less scientifically useful than members of the kind’s contrast class). In other 
words, while jade is not scientifically useless, we still might defensibly say, “Nephrite is scientifically 
useful, and jade is not.” Such binary talk’s implicitly accommodating a continuous scale also occurs 
with “making an explanatory contribution (or not).” 
3 Mentioned kinds are italicized (e.g., “Is cognitive heuristic a scientifically-useful kind?”). 
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figure out whether or not cognitive heuristic is a scientifically-useful kind?  
2. Does the Kind, Cognitive Heuristic, Make a Causal Explanatory Contribution?
Most objects instantiate numerous kinds. For example, a penny instantiates the 
following kinds: currency, coin, copper, metal, etc. Kinds vary in their scientific 
usefulness. For instance, in many contexts, it is scientifically useful to classify and 
theorize about objects in terms of their natural kinds (e.g., samples qua nephrite versus 
qua jade—Putnam, 1975).4  
One basic way that a kind can be scientifically useful is entering into -or more 
precisely, contributing to- scientific explanations. Of particular interest in this context is 
the default form of explanation in cognitive psychology (Ch. 2, §1)—namely, process 
models, or more specifically, informational-level causal-mechanical explanations of 
cognitive dispositions.  
Heuristics cause manifestations of cognitive dispositions (e.g., the 
representativeness-heuristic depicted in the Linda model causes the manifestation of the 
Linda-conjunction-fallacy—Ch. 2, §2.5).5 As such, those heuristics contribute to causal-
mechanical explanations of those dispositions. This may seem sufficient for the kind, 
heuristic, contributing to those explanations; however, it isn’t. 
4 The colloquial kind, jade, encompasses two distinct mineralogical kinds, jadeite and nephrite. Jadeite and 
nephrite are superficially similar (e.g., in color and toughness); this accounts for their sharing the kind, 
jade. However, jadeite and nephrite differ in their microstructures (i.e., chemical compositions). 
Allowing for simplification, when all objects of a kind have the same microstructure (e.g., as all 
instances of nephrite do), this allows one to examine a single instance, discover certain properties (e.g., 
number of chains, or cleavage angle), and conclude that all other instances of the kind possess those 
properties. (Bird, 1998, p.69, n. 27) That is, the shared microstructure grounds inductive inferences that 
render those properties projectable to all instances of the kind. In this respect, nephrite constitutes a 
natural kind. Jadeite does as well. Since nephrite and jadeite have different microstructures, projectable 
properties of nephrite cannot be justifiably projected onto instances of jadeite, and visa-versa. In this 
respect, jade (which encompasses both nephrite and jadeite) is not a natural kind. 
5 For brevity, I’ll refer to cognitive heuristics as simply, “heuristics” until §7. 
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To illustrate this, consider the following case (adapted from Dretske, 1988, p. 
81).6 Suppose you are at an opera. The plot is a murder mystery. At the end of the opera, 
the diva summons her highest tone and belts out the climactic line, “The butler did it!” 
This shatters a champagne glass. The opera goes on tour and the diva shatters numerous 
glasses in this way. Suppose you wanted to give a causal explanation of those glasses’ 
shattering. One way to identify the singings that caused the shatterings is as instantiations 
of the kind, high-note. Another way is as instantiations of climactic-reveal. High-note is 
an acoustic-oriented kind; climactic-reveal is a semantic-oriented kind. Of course, the 
singings caused the shatterings by virtue of their acoustic properties, not their semantic 
properties. As such, the singings shattered the glasses qua (instantiation of) high-note, 
and not qua climactic-reveal. This stems from the differing extent of correspondence 
between the kinds’ properties -especially their central properties- and the properties that 
caused the shatterings. In this respect, qua high-note has significant explanatory power 
that qua climactic-reveal lacks. That explanatory power is reflected in the greater 
understanding qua-high-note conveys. For instance, given knowledge that the singings 
caused the shatterings, there is a tremendous difference in understanding those events 
between (1) thinking of the singing in terms of the meaning of the words sung (as if it 
were a spell for shattering glasses), (2) total ignorance of the manner in which the singing 
bears upon the glasses’ shattering (e.g., a pre-scientific perspective), and (3) accurately 
(with respect to the shatterings) thinking of the singing in terms of its acoustic (i.e., 
physical) nature. This greater understanding is reflected in the differing conceptions’ 
different inductive utility (from those shatterings). In these respects, identifying the 
6 While Dretske’s original case regards properties’ causal-relevance, his analysis can be adapted for kinds’ 
explanatory-contributions. 
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singings as instantiations of high-note makes an explanatory contribution that the 
climactic-reveal identification does not. In this respect, the kind, high-note, makes an 
explanatory contribution that climactic-reveal does not.  
Note that this does not undermine the singings’ constituting climactic reveals (just 
as samples of nephrite indeed constitute jade). Furthermore, one can truthfully say that 
those climactic-reveals (i.e., those singings) caused and thus, explained those shatterings. 
Nevertheless, that is insufficient for the shatterings to be caused or explained by the 
singings qua climactic-reveal—i.e., it is insufficient for a (significant) explanatory 
contribution by the kind, climactic-reveal.7  
Likewise, that (a) heuristics -i.e., those processes that constitute heuristics- cause 
and explain the manifestations of cognitive dispositions is not sufficient for (b) the kind, 
heuristic, making an explanatory contribution. For the contributions of those heuristics to 
yield a contribution by the kind, heuristic, the former contributions must be made by 
those processes qua heuristics. A la the contribution of qua-high-note (vs. qua-climactic-
reveal), this comes down to properties. As stated (§1), the central property of heuristic is: 
shortcut vis-à-vis the ideally-rational algorithm (SCIRA). As such, a contribution by the 
kind, heuristic, requires a contribution by SCIRA.8  
7 While the referential utility of climactic reveal in those cases may constitute some explanatory 
contribution, it is no more than the explanatory contribution one’s finger makes to a causal explanation 
when one identifies the cause by pointing at it. In this respect, that explanatory contribution is not 
significant and when using binary assessments for simplicity’s sake, we can just say that the kind does 
not make an explanatory contribution.    
8 An alternative formulation of the preceding is that ‘high-note’ (as invoked by “high-note”) makes an 
explanatory contribution that ‘climactic-reveal’ does not by virtue of the former’s (greater) concordance 
between its intension and those properties of the referent that are causally-efficacious (or more 
generally, explanatorily-relevant) with respect to the explanandum. Likewise, for ‘heuristic’ to make an 
explanatory contribution, its intension -or more precisely, its intension’s distinguishing feature, 
‘SCIRA’- must concord with explanatorily-relevant properties of the referent—i.e., the property, 
SCIRA, must be explanatorily-relevant to the manifestation of cognitive dispositions.  
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Since causal-mechanical explanation is a form of causal explanation, such an 
explanatory contribution requires a causal contribution to the manifestation of those 
dispositions. That requires that SCIRA is a causally-efficacious property with respect to 
those dispositions. As such, that those processes that constitute heuristics make causal 
and explanatory contributions to those dispositions yields an explanatory contribution by 
the kind, heuristic, only if SCIRA is a causally-efficacious property with respect to those 
dispositions. So, is it?9 
2.1. Is SCIRA a Causally-Efficacious Property? 
For a property to be causally-efficacious with respect to a system’s manifestation 
of a disposition, that system must be sensitive to that property. System-sensitivity to a 
property does not require that the system (in some sense) appreciates that property—for 
instance, it does not require that the system has a concept of the property. It merely 
requires that the system possesses the capacity to differently interact with objects in 
accordance with whether those objects possess the property.  
For example, consider a vending machine that is sensitive to the property “being-
9 A couple of notes on causal-efficaciousness: (1) In philosophy, the most common appeals to the phrase, 
“causal-(in-)efficaciousness,” concern the possession of (something like) any causal powers at all. For 
example, considerations of whether Platonic numbers, moral properties, or qualia are causally-(in-) 
efficacious, in this more general sense. In this dissertation, however, “causal-efficaciousness” is always 
appealed to with respect to a particular (set of) explananda (e.g., cognitive dispositions). For instance, 
despite mass being an exemplar causally-efficacious property in the general sense, a mirror’s mass may 
be a causally-inefficacious property with respect to the explanandum, the mirror’s capacity to reflect 
light. (2) Considering the weakness of theories of causal-efficaciousness (or more broadly, causal-
relevance), I will rely upon intuition to assess properties’ causal-efficaciousness. For an overview of 
leading theories, see McKitrick (2005) and Braun (1995). Most leading theories (e.g., counterfactual 
theories, exclusion theories) have significant problems (including strong counterexamples). 
Furthermore, (it is at least, my impression that) the theories are (rightly) given little weight versus 
intuitions. For instance, when the proffered theories conflict with an intuitive assessment of a property’s 
causal-efficaciousness in a given case, few seem to side with the theory over the intuition. It is in this 
respect that these theories of causal-efficaciousness are weak. They can help illuminate the idea of 
causal-efficaciousness, but since they are seemingly rarely strong enough to overrule intuitive 
assessments, there is no need to specify causal-efficaciousness in terms of one of them. In other words, 
until such theories are strong enough to override some intuitions, you might as well just stick with the 
intuitions.  
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a-quarter.” Suppose the vending machine will release both an item worth twenty-cents 
and a nickel if you insert a quarter; but will not do so if you insert a non-quarter (e.g., a 
dime). In this respect, the vending machine differentially interacts with coins in 
accordance with whether they possess the property, being-a-quarter. In this respect, the 
vending machine is sensitive to the property, being-a-quarter. As such, being-a-quarter 
can be a causally-efficacious-property with respect to dispositions of the vending 
machine. By contrast, the vending machine is insensitive to the property, minted-in-2018. 
This is despite the fact that coins that possess this property have “2018” embossed on 
them. For instance, the vending machine cannot differentially interact with coins in 
accordance with whether they possess the property, minted-in-2018, versus minted-in-
2017. As such, minted-in-2018 cannot be a causally-efficacious-property with respect to 
dispositions of the vending machine.  
Likewise, for SCIRA to be a causally-efficacious property with respect to 
cognitive dispositions, the cognitive system must be sensitive to SCIRA. An important 
contrast with heuristics is simple-yet-ideally-rational-algorithms, such as processes that 
instantiate disjunctive syllogism or &-elimination.10 A system that is sensitive to SCIRA 
would be capable of differentially interacting with heuristics (which possess SCIRA) 
versus simple-yet-ideally-rational-algorithms (which do not). With this in mind, we can 
consider how the cognitive system might be sensitive to SCIRA.  
2.2. Is the Cognitive System Directly-Sensitive to SCIRA? 
The principal form of system-sensitivity to properties is (what we can refer to as) 
direct-sensitivity. Direct-sensitivity is simple, straightforward sensitivity, such as the 
10 I will often use hyphens in multiple-word terms for readability’s sake. 
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vending machine’s sensitivity to being-a-quarter. Is the cognitive system directly-
sensitive to SCIRA?  
Consider that a process cannot constitute a shortcut vis-à-vis an ideally-rational-
algorithm if that process constitutes an ideally-rational-algorithm. As such, direct-
sensitivity to whether a process possesses SCIRA requires ruling out the process’ 
constituting an ideally-rational-algorithm. This requires satisfying the following 
disjunction: either (1) possession of the principles of ideal rationality (to evaluate the 
ideal rationality of a process that potentially possesses SCIRA) or (2) sensitivity to the 
pertinent ideally-rational-algorithm (to determine that a process-in-question is not that 
ideally-rational-algorithm).  
Satisfaction of the first disjunct (i.e., possessing the principles of ideal-rationality) 
also requires distinguishing those principles from other possessed principles such that 
only the ideally-rational ones are employed for such evaluation. In other words, even if 
all of the principles are “in there,” that is insufficient. Especially in light of the 
falsification of descriptive rational choice theory (DRCT) (Ch. 2, §2), there is not 
sufficient reason to believe that the cognitive system possesses and distinguishes the 
principles of ideal-rationality.  
Let’s turn to the second disjunct (i.e., sensitivity to the pertinent ideally-rational-
algorithm). Considering that there are numerous heuristics, sensitivity to their SCIRA-
possession via the second disjunct requires possession of the pertinent ideally-rational-
algorithm for each one. This requires possessing a host of ideally-rational-algorithms 
(and distinguishing them from other processes, such that only the former is employed for 
comparison with a potential SCIRA-possessing process). In other words, this requires the 
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cognitive system’s possessing a distinguished list of ideally-rational-algorithms. Once 
again, especially in light of the falsification of DRCT, there is not sufficient reason to 
believe that the cognitive system possesses and distinguishes such a host of ideally-
rational-algorithms.  
As such, there is not sufficient reason to believe that the disjunction is true.  
Furthermore, both disjuncts are precisely the sorts of entailments of DRCT that brought 
down the theory (Ch. 2, §2). In a post-DRCT context, one cannot simply assume that the 
cognitive system satisfies this disjunction. There is not sufficient evidence to support 
such satisfaction. Furthermore, such satisfaction is discordant with the well-established 
findings of the cognitive heuristics and biases (CHB) research program (Ch. 2, §2.3-2.5). 
Since the cognitive system’s direct-sensitivity to SCIRA requires the satisfaction of the 
disjunction, and we lack sufficient reason to believe the disjunction, we lack sufficient 
reason to believe that the cognitive system is directly-sensitive to SCIRA. 
2.3. Is the Cognitive System Indirectly-Sensitive to SCIRA? 
While direct-sensitivity is the principal form of sensitivity, it is possible for 
systems to be sensitive to properties indirectly. The simplest form of indirect-sensitivity 
to a property-of-interest is via direct-sensitivity to some other property that is coextensive 
with the property-of-interest—that is, a property that functions as a proxy for the 
property-of-interest. One way a proxy could be coextensive with SCIRA is by virtue of 
an analytical or conceptual relation between the proxy and SCIRA. At least as far as I am 
aware, there is no property that (1) is coextensive with SCIRA by virtue of 
analytical/conceptual relations, (2) is a property to which the cognitive system’s 
sensitivity is not ruled out by CHB’s refutation of DRCT, and (3) is a property to which 
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the cognitive system is plausibly sensitive. As such, we can conclude that there is 
insufficient reason to believe that the cognitive system is indirectly-sensitive to SCIRA 
via direct-sensitivity to analytically/conceptually-related proxies. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to have properties that are coextensive with SCIRA 
(other than via analytic/conceptual-relations). A major way in which this could occur 
involves (1) the isolation of processes that possess SCIRA in a distinct system (e.g., in an 
extreme case, a distinct module), and (2) the system’s being indirectly-sensitive to 
SCIRA via direct-sensitivity to the proxy, emanating-from-that-system.  
(2) is the easy part (if you will); (1) is the hard part. Recall that SCIRA (i.e.,
shortcut-vis-à-vis-the-ideally-rational-algorithm) entails deviating-from-the-ideally-
rational-algorithm, which thus, excludes simple-yet-ideally-rational-algorithms (e.g., 
disjunctive syllogism). As such, the isolation of processes that possess SCIRA to a 
distinct system requires excluding simple-yet-ideally-rational-algorithms from that 
system. Considering the lack of direct-sensitivity to SCIRA, how would simple-yet-
ideally-rational-algorithms be excluded?  
The most plausible possibility is that while the system was insensitive to SCIRA-
possession, selection (e.g., via evolution or reinforcement learning) was not—i.e., 
selection occurred per SCIRA-possession.11 This would require something like the 
following scenario. At time 1 (t1), conditions were such that evolution selected only 
heuristics and did not select any simple-yet-ideally-rational-algorithms. At t2, conditions 
had changed such that a separate system developed that selected simple-yet-ideally-
rational-algorithms and only processes that did not constitute heuristics. The conditions at 
11 The following is mostly presented in terms of evolution, as its easier to digest. Reinforcement learning is 
addressed at the end. 
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t2, which yielded the non-selection of any heuristics, allowed the first system to be the 
only system containing heuristics. As such, the first system contained only heuristics and 
all the possessed heuristics—i.e., only processes that processed SCIRA and all the 
possessed processes that possessed SCIRA. As such, sensitivity to processes’ emanation-
from-that-system would be sufficient for indirect-sensitivity to SCIRA-possession 
(despite direct-insensitivity).  
While this scenario is coherent, there is insufficient reason to believe it is true. 
This is because there is insufficient reason to believe that a suite of processes as 
complicated as heuristics (e.g., the representativeness heuristic, the availability heuristic, 
etc.) would evolve without the evolution of any simple-yet-ideally-rational-algorithms, 
such as &-elimination. For instance, there is insufficient reason to believe that a creature 
could execute the representativeness and availability heuristic and yet be unable to 
conclude for example, that since her tribemate has berries and meat, her tribemate has 
meat (&-elimination). In other words, there is no heuristic for &-elimination that could 
take the place of actually evolving &-elimination. Even if there were, there certainly is 
not a corresponding heuristic for every simple-yet-ideally-rational-algorithm whose 
failure to evolve was implausible given the evolution of various complicated heuristics. 
In addition, this scenario requires that no heuristics were acquired once t2 was reached 
(or that such heuristics -and no non-heuristics- were somehow added to the first system). 
In sum, there is insufficient reason to believe this scenario is true. 
The following is an alternative scenario that would also achieve the isolation of 
heuristics (despite direct-insensitivity to SCIRA). At t1, conditions were such that 
evolution selected all now-possessed processes that do not constitute heuristics, including 
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all now-possessed simple-yet-ideally-rational-algorithms. At t2, conditions had changed 
such that a separate system developed that selected all now-possessed cognitive 
heuristics and only cognitive heuristics. The conditions at t1, which yielded the selection 
of all now-possessed process that do not constitute cognitive heuristics, including all 
now-possessed simple-yet-ideally-rational-algorithms, (1) would allow the exclusion of 
those processes from the subsequently developed system and (2) would allow that all 
subsequently-acquired processes -which were confined to another system- consisted of 
only cognitive heuristics (i.e., processes that possessed SCIRA). As such, sensitivity to 
processes’ emanating from the second system would be sufficient for indirect-sensitivity 
to SCIRA-possession (despite the lack of direct-sensitivity).  
Again, this scenario is coherent, but there is insufficient reason to believe it is 
true. Ultimately, this is because the exclusion of all now-possessed heuristics from 
evolving prior to t2 (and thus, being confined to the second system) is plausible only if 
evolution is sensitive to deviating-from-ideal-rationality—for instance, evolution 
rejecting heuristics prior to t2 because at that time, evolution was only selecting for 
ideally-rational-algorithms. However, evolution selects per (things like) practical 
usefulness (with respect to things like survival and reproduction), not per conformity with 
ideal-normative standards, such as ideal-rationality. As such, prima facie, evolution is 
insensitive to ideal-rationality. Note that this conclusion is merely prima facie because 
despite evolution’s selecting for practical-usefulness, the cognitive system could be 
indirectly-sensitive to ideal-rationality due to ideal-rationality being coextensive with 
practical-usefulness—i.e., processes might be practically useful only if they are ideally-
rational.  
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One way in which this might occur is by definition—that is, if the ideal-rationality 
of a process is defined in terms of its practical usefulness. However, this would be a 
corruption of the notion of ideal-rationality, which is exemplified by conforming to the 
principles of logic, statistics, and probability theory. Furthermore, it would eviscerate the 
aforementioned distinction between ideal-rationality and prescriptive-rationality (i.e., 
practical or pragmatic rationality). As such, this “by definition” route to ideal-rationality 
and practical-usefulness being coextensive is blocked.  
Could ideal-rationality and practical-usefulness be coextensive other than by-
definition? No. The entire narrative surrounding cognitive heuristics is that they are 
practically useful despite their deviation from ideal-rationality. So long as the notion of 
ideal-rationality remains faithful to being exemplified by conforming to logic, statistics, 
and probability theory, ideal-rationality and practical usefulness are not coextensive. As 
such, evolution’s selecting per (things like) practical usefulness and not per conformity 
with ideal-normative standards, such as ideal-rationality, yields sufficient reason to doubt 
evolution’s sensitive to ideal-irrationality, and certainly, renders it sufficiently insensitive 
to rule out excluding all now-possessed cognitive heuristics from evolving prior to t2, 
which sufficient reason to doubt that all now-possessed cognitive heuristics are confined 
to the second system, and in turn, that this scenario provides a plausible means by which 
the cognitive system could be indirectly-sensitive to SCIRA-possession. 
These scenarios do not exhaust all the possibilities by which it is in-principle 
possible to confine all and only (possessed) heuristics to a distinct system. Nonetheless, 
they illustrate the inevitable pitfalls that any such scenario encounters. This includes 
scenarios in which process-selection is achieved entirely through reinforcement-learning 
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(as opposed to evolution). This is because, like evolution, reinforcement-learning (e.g., 
per positive/negative feedback) selects per (things like) practical usefulness, not 
conformity to an ideal-normative standard, such as ideal-rationality. Furthermore, the 
scenarios in which solely reinforcement-learning would yield a distinct system to which 
all and only heuristics were confined (despite direct-insensitivity to SCIRA-possession) 
would be even more convoluted. As such, we can conclude that there is insufficient 
reason to believe in the confinement of all and only heuristics to a distinct system (i.e., 
isolation of heuristics to a distinct system). As such, there is insufficient reason to believe 
in the cognitive system’s being indirectly-sensitive to SCIRA-possession via sensitivity 
to the proxy, system-of-emanation. Recall that indirect-sensitivity to SCIRA-possession 
via sensitivity to analytical/conceptually-related proxies is also blocked. There is 
insufficient reason to believe in any other means of indirect-sensitivity to SCIRA-
possession. Recall that direct-sensitivity to SCIRA-possession is blocked. As such, we 
can conclude that there is insufficient reason to believe that the cognitive system is 
insensitive to SCIRA-possession. As such, SCIRA cannot be a causally-efficacious 
property with respect to cognitive dispositions.  
Recall that the causal and explanatory contributions of (the processes that 
constitute) heuristics to cognitive dispositions yields an explanatory contribution by the 
kind, heuristic, only if SCIRA is a causally-efficacious property with respect to those 
dispositions (a la the causal and explanatory contributions of the singings that constitute 
climactic-reveals yields an explanatory contribution by climactic reveal only if semantic 
properties are causally-efficacious to the glasses’ shattering). There is not sufficient 
reason to believe that SCIRA can be a causally-efficacious property with respect to such 
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cognitive dispositions. As such, there is not sufficient reason to think that the 
contributions of heuristics to cognitive dispositions yields an explanatory contribution by 
the kind, heuristic. As such, we do not have sufficient reason to think that heuristic is 
scientifically-useful in this way. Recall that if cognitive heuristic is not scientifically-
useful, then it warrants revision or elimination (which would wreak havoc upon the 
development of its moral analogue). As such, we have yet to fend off the threat of 
heuristic warranting revision or elimination. 
3. Is Cognitive Heuristic an Objective Kind?
Another way a kind can be scientifically-useful is being an objective kind. An 
exemplar of kind objectivity is natural kinds carving nature at its objective joints. The 
objectivity at-hand in cognitive psychology is limited due to the domain-of-inquiry’s 
being not nature, but a specific-(type-of)-system (i.e., not cognition, simpliciter, but the 
human cognitive system).12 While the objectivity at-hand in cognitive psychology is 
limited, the general spirit of objectivity still applies, as we can sensibly talk about carving 
specific-(types-of)-systems at their objective joints.13 Those objective joints are grounded 
in causality. In this respect, kinds are specific-system-objective insofar as they align with 
the causal operations of that system.14 Regarding physiology, lung is such a kind; white-
organ is not. In cognitive psychology, an extreme exemplar of a kind aligning with the 
causal operation of the system is a kind that maps onto a mental module (a la Fodor, 
12 This harmonizes with cognitive psychology’s explaining not via “universal laws of cognition,” but via 
causal-mechanical explanation (Ch. 2, §1). 
13 We might describe the limited objectivity of specific systems as “objective-ish-ness”; nonetheless, for 
readability’s sake, I will refer to this notion as simply, “objectivity.” Such objectivity harmonizes with -
but does not require- a narrow view of causation. 
14 It is noteworthy that just as a given property can be causally-efficacious in one system and not another, 
likewise, a given kind can align with the causal operation of one system and not another. As such, the 
same kind can be a specific-system-objective in one system, but not another. For example, the kind, 
bitter-tasting-food, may be such with respect to the system, human-being, but not the system, catapult. 
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1983). More modest exemplars are kinds that map onto specific cognitive systems and/or 
are unified by identification with a distinct cognitive mechanism. Such kinds constitute 
(what we can call) system-specific-objective-kinds (SOK).15 Though not presented in 
these terms, that constituting a SOK is way for heuristic to constitute a scientifically-
useful kind is reflected in Gerd Gigerenzer’s demand for -and Daniel Kahneman’s 
(attempted—n. 33) acquiescence to- unifying heuristics through identification with a 
distinct cognitive mechanism (Gigerenzer, 1998; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  
3.1. System-Intrinsic Objectivity   
The pertinent objectivity of specific-systems -i.e., system-intrinsic objectivity- is 
vulnerable to conflation with system-extrinsic objectivity. To introduce this distinction, 
consider the following numbers: (a) 1163, (b) 1167, (c) 1171, (d) 1175, (e) 1181 and (f) 
1187. A difference between (1) {a, c, f} and (2) {b, d, e} is that the numbers in the first 
set are prime, while the numbers in the latter set are not. Nonetheless, there is not 
sufficient reason to think that when you first read those numbers, your cognitive system 
represented or processed the numbers in the first set in a way that systematically differed 
from how it represented or processed the numbers in the latter set.  
There are two types of objectivity at hand here. For the first type, consider that 
numbers that are prime (or not) are objectively prime (or not). As such, there is an 
objective distinction between the sets of numbers. This objectivity is independent of the 
human cognitive system. As such, it constitutes (what we can call) system-extrinsic 
15 In many ways, the spirit of SOK-hood resembles that of natural kind-hood; nonetheless, the former is the 
preferable category in this case. For one, it is more specific. What matters for our purposes is whether a 
kind is aligned with the causal operation of the human cognitive system; it does not matter whether that 
category maps onto natural kind-hood, which is sensitive to considerations that do not bear upon our 
concerns. SOK-hood is also preferable in its being more ecumenical, in that it avoids having to make 
contentious commitments regarding the criteria of natural kind-hood.  
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objectivity with respect to the human cognitive system. The system-extrinsic objective 
difference between the sets of numbers also applies to sets of representations of those 
numbers. That is, your representations of 1163, 1171, and 1187 were systematically 
system-extrinsic-objectively different from your representations of 1167, 1175, and 1181, 
in that the former are representations of prime numbers and latter are representations of 
non-prime numbers.  
The other type of objectivity at-hand here is the objective “carving” sense realized 
by alignment with the causal operation of the human cognitive system. This sense regards 
whether your representations of 1163, 1171, and 1187’s participation in the causal nexus 
of the human cognitive system was systematically different from that of your 
representations of 1167, 1175, and 1181—for instance, whether there was a systematic 
difference in how the numbers were processed, stored, retrieved, what mechanisms or 
systems they used, etc. This constitutes (what we can call) system-intrinsic objectivity 
with respect to the human cognitive system.16 System-specific-objective-kinds are 
objective in this system-intrinsic sense. 
To transition towards this distinction’s bearing upon heuristic, first consider the 
following beliefs: (a) The capital of Peru is Lima, (b) The capital of Guinea is Bissau, (c) 
The capital of Cambodia is Phnom Penh, and (d) The capital of Croatia is Nicosia. Some 
of these beliefs are true; some are false. With respect to system-extrinsic objectivity, the 
set of beliefs that are true is objectively distinct from the set of beliefs that are false. 
However, with respect to the system-intrinsic objectivity of objective carving and causal-
16 It might be tempting to consider such system-intrinsic objectivity (which could have been called system-
relative objectivity) a form of subjectivity. In a sense, it is; however, we do not want to lose the 
reference to the sense of objectivity in “carving a system at its objective joints.” 
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alignment, there is insufficient reason to believe that the true beliefs are systematically 
distinct from the false beliefs—e.g., stored in separate memory systems.17  
Now, recall (the aforementioned species of) the availability heuristic (i.e., 
estimating the probability of an event by assessing the ease with which events of that type 
can be recalled) (Ch. 1, §1). Suppose someone provides probability estimates for 
numerous events, each time using the availability heuristic. Some of those events are 
dramatic; some are not. (Ceteris paribus) those estimates will instantiate (the 
aforementioned species of) the availability bias—i.e., systematically overestimating the 
probability of dramatic events (due to dramatic events’ greater ease-of-recall). The 
overestimations are erroneous; suppose the non-dramatic events are estimated accurately. 
With respect to system-extrinsic objectivity, the overestimations are objectively distinct 
from the accurate estimations. Nonetheless, the distinction’s system-extrinsic objectivity 
does not entail system-intrinsic objectivity with respect to the human cognitive system 
(e.g., the estimations of dramatic events being produced by a different system). 
Heuristics (i.e., shortcuts vis-à-vis ideal rationality) deviate from ideal-
rationality—e.g., the standards of logic, statistics, and probability theory. In contrast with 
the system-extrinsic (plausible) subjectivity of standards of beauty and taste, the 
standards of logic, statistics, and probability theory are system-extrinsic objective (or so 
we can stipulate). As such, heuristics can constitute an objectively distinct kind in the 
system-extrinsic sense of objectivity. Nonetheless, this does not entail that heuristics are 
objectively distinct in the system-intrinsic sense—i.e., the causal-alignment sense—i.e., 
per alignment with the causal operations of the human cognitive system—i.e., the 
17 If necessary, assume the beliefs have the same (immediate) causal origin (e.g., reading a young student’s 
error-riddled homework). 
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“carving” sense (i.e., the objective distinction in the system-extrinsic sense does not 
entail that cognitive heuristics are for instance, housed in a distinct module or executed 
by a separate system from those executing otherwise similar processes). The system-
intrinsic sense of objectivity is the sense of interest with specific-system-objective-kinds 
(SOK). 
So, since constituting a SOK is a way for heuristic to constitute a scientifically-
useful kind, is there sufficient reason to think that heuristic is a SOK? No. As established 
regarding the human cognitive system’s indirect sensitivity to SCIRA (§2.3), there is 
insufficient reason to believe that all and only cognitive heuristics are isolated in a 
distinct system. As such, given insensitivity (including direct-insensitivity—§2.2) to 
SCIRA-possession (i.e., the central property of heuristic), there is insufficient reason to 
believe that the kind, heuristic, aligns with the causal operation of the cognitive system 
(e.g., that the distinction between cognitive heuristics and simple-yet-ideally-rational-
algorithms, such as &-elimination, aligns with the causal operation of the cognitive 
system).18 As such, this way of the kind, heuristic, being scientifically-useful also does 
not bear fruit and the threat of revising/eliminating heuristic remains.  
4. Does the Kind, Cognitive Heuristic, Contribute to Why-Have Explaining?
An emerging theme here is that upon scrutiny, heuristics may be more 
problematic than they seem. Another episode of this regards the presentation of being-a-
shortcut as the function or purpose of heuristics. This sounds right, but upon scrutiny -and 
18 Heuristic’s not constituting a SOK is rooted in the cognitive system’s insensitivity to SCIRA, which in 
turn, is rooted in the causal-inefficacy of SCIRA. Heuristic’s not constituting a SOK is merely rooted in 
(vs. entailed by) SCIRA’s causal-inefficacy due to the possibility of sensitivity despite causal-inefficacy 
via indirect-sensitivity. However, this possibility only yielded unpromising and convoluted paths to 
SOK. In sum, a lot ripples out from the causal-inefficacy of a kind’s central and distinguishing property. 
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an uncharitable interpretation- this is telos-talk (if you will). A more charitable 
interpretation is that it is a nod towards the more refined versions of such talk, such as 
that being-a-shortcut explains the presence of heuristics—that is, explains why we have 
those processes that constitute heuristics—that is, why-have explaining of heuristics. 
More specifically, the thought might be that we have those processes that constitute 
heuristics because they were selected for because they constitute shortcuts—e.g., selected 
for via evolution (e.g., Gilovich & Griffen, 2002, p. 10-11) and/or reinforcement-learning 
(e.g., Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). This explanation (or at least, the proffering of its 
plausibility) was especially valuable in the context of cognitive heuristics and biases’ 
(qua theory or model’s) arrival as a theoretical competitor of descriptive rational choice 
theory (DRCT) (Ch. 2, §2.1-2.2). Especially given the presumption in favor of human 
rationality that surrounded DRCT’s dominance, being-a-shortcut provided a plausible 
explanation for why we would have cognitive heuristics instead of ideally-rational 
algorithms. Recall that (a) the threat of revision/elimination looms for heuristic pending 
the establishment of its scientific-usefulness (§1), (b) one basic way that heuristic can be 
scientifically-useful is by contributing to an explanation, and (c) such a contribution by 
the kind, heuristic, requires a contribution by SCIRA (§2). So, does SCIRA make an 
explanatory contribution to why-have explaining of heuristics? More specifically, were 
heuristics selected for because they possess SCIRA?  
4.1. Selection per SCIRA via the But-For Condition? 
To illustrate what such selection might look like, let’s examine a simple, fictional 
scenario in which heuristics would straightforwardly be selected for because they possess 
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SCIRA.19 Suppose that at one point in our evolutionary history, the human cognitive 
system consisted of only ideally-rational-algorithms. While such processes are 
guaranteed to yield correct judgments (or at least, valid or justified conclusions), their 
execution can require extensive time and cognitive resources. Sometimes, fast reasoning 
that is usually close to correct can be more fitness-enhancing than slower reasoning that 
is correct. For example, it is better to quickly process the approximate trajectory of an 
approaching predator and react sooner than it is to assess the trajectory with perfect 
accuracy but do so slowly and react too late. Suppose that per such, we evolved cognitive 
heuristics that replaced ideally-rational-algorithms. Those heuristics would have been 
selected for because they constituted shortcuts vis-à-vis the ideally-rational-algorithms 
that they replaced. In this respect, we would have evolved cognitive heuristics because 
they possessed the property, SCIRA—that is, the presence of those processes in the 
human cognitive system today would be due to their possession of the property, 
SCIRA—that is, SCIRA would be why we have those cognitive heuristics. As such, 
‘SCIRA’ and thus, heuristic would make an explanatory contribution to why-have 
explaining of the presence of heuristics.  
Of course, the preceding scenario is fictional—there is not reason to think that the 
human cognitive system ever consisted of only ideally-rational-algorithms. Nevertheless, 
the scenario will help us wrap our heads around how SCIRA could so contribute (and 
provides an anchor case -if you will- from which we can devise more plausible 
variations). In particular, the scenario provides a clear illustration of an important aspect 
19 Discussion of the selection of heuristics will often be in terms of evolutionary selection (as opposed to 
for instance, selection via reinforcement-learning). This is because it is easier to explicate the upcoming 
topics in these terms. After drawing conclusions regarding evolutionary selection, I will then address 
whether those conclusions generalize to all selection (including via reinforcement-learning). 
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of SCIRA so contributing—namely, the role played by the appeal to ideally-rational-
algorithms. Like with sensitivity to SCIRA (§2), for an explanatory contribution by 
SCIRA -i.e., shortcut-vis-à-vis-the-ideally-rational-algorithm- a contribution from 
merely the shortcut-part (if you will) is insufficient; a contribution from the vis-à-vis-the-
ideally-rational-algorithm-part is required.  
The key feature of the preceding scenario is that but for heuristics’ possession of 
SCIRA, we would possess ideally-rational-algorithms. As such, our possession of 
cognitive heuristics would not merely be attributable to their being cognitively 
economical (i.e., the shortcut-part), it would be attributable to their being more 
cognitively economical than (i.e., vis-à-vis) the ideally-rational-algorithms they 
replaced. In this respect, the vis-à-vis-the-ideally-rational-algorithm-part would be 
contributing to explaining the presence of those cognitive heuristics. As such, so would 
SCIRA and in turn, heuristic. 
In the above scenario, by previously possessing only ideally-rational-algorithms 
and then replacing them with heuristics, the but-for-condition clearly obtains (i.e., but for 
heuristics’ possession of SCIRA, we would possess ideally-rational-algorithms). 
However, we do not need a scenario this outlandish to secure the but-for-condition. Even 
if we never possessed only ideally-rational-algorithms, if we merely would have 
possessed them but for heuristics’ possession of SCIRA, that is sufficient for satisfying 
the but-for-condition (and an explanatory contribution being made from the vis-à-vis-the-
ideally-rational-algorithm-part).  
However, this is still a tall order. The realistic plausibility of our having otherwise 
evolved ideally-rational-algorithms is not very promising. In this respect, an explanatory 
79 
contribution of heuristic via satisfaction of the but-for-condition is not very promising. 
Nonetheless, it segues into a something with greater potential. 
4.2. Selection per SCIRA via SCIRA-Score? 
Suppose ideally-rational-algorithms (or more generally, ideal-rationality) 
constituted a standard vis-à-vis which processes became more selectable as they 
approached. SCIRA could capture this by being construed in (something like) the 
following way: a process constitutes a shortcut-vis-à-vis-the-ideally-rational-algorithm to 
the extent that the process has a high ratio of (a) the outputs’ closeness to the output that 
the ideally-rational-algorithm would produce, over (b) the resources (including time) 
expended to execute the process. We can call this ratio the SCIRA-score. The higher the 
SCIRA-score, the more a process constitutes a heuristic.20 If processes are selected for 
per their SCIRA-score, this would be sufficient for explanatory work by the vis-à-vis-the-
ideally-rational-algorithm-part of SCIRA. 
So, are processes selected for per their SCIRA-score? Let’s stick with the 
evolutionary context for now to make things easier. Firstly, a correlation between 
SCIRA-score and selection is insufficient for processes to be selected for per their 
SCIRA-score. In other words, correlating with something that matters for selection is not 
the same as mattering for selection. Adapting a canonical example (e.g., Wright, 1973, p. 
141), the heart both pumps blood and makes “thump-thump” sounds. Making-“thump-
thump”-sounds correlates with pumping-blood. We can even suppose that the things that 
pump blood are coextensive with the things that make “thump-thump” sounds. 
20 Constituting a heuristic may be an all-or-nothing condition -and not a continuous matter- so there might 
need to be threshold conditions, etc. Nonetheless, this complexity does not affect the argument; so, we 
can set it aside. 
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Nevertheless, the heart was not selected for because it makes “thump-thump” sounds. As 
such, making “thump-thump” sounds does not explain why we have hearts; making-
“thump-thump”-sounds does not make a why-have explanatory contribution. 
With this in mind, we can return to the question: Are processes selected for per 
their SCIRA-score? There is strong reason to doubt that they are. As broached in §2.3, 
processes are selected for because of (something like) practical usefulness. As such, 
prima facie, they are not selected for because of their (extent of) conformity to an ideal-
normative-standard, such as ideal-rationality. However, this conclusion is merely prima 
facie because processes might be practically useful due to their being ideally-rational.  
As addressed (§2.3), one way in which this might occur is by definition—that is, 
if the ideal-rationality of a process is defined in terms of its practical usefulness. 
However, recall that this would be a corruption of the notion of ideal-rationality, which is 
exemplified by conforming to the principles of logic, statistics, and probability theory.  
Another way in which processes’ practical usefulness could be due to their 
SCIRA-score would be if SCIRA-score was constitutive of practical usefulness. There is 
strong reason to doubt this. To illustrate this, consider a scenario in which one hears a 
rustling in the bushes that could be from either a tiger or a rabbit. Ideal-rationality 
dictates that one’s (credence in) beliefs should be proportionate to the evidence. 
However, it is practically useful to almost always believe that it is a tiger. This is because 
believing a tiger is present when it is merely a rabbit has a trivial practical cost (e.g., 
running away for no reason). However, believing that a rabbit is present when it is a tiger 
has tremendous practical cost (e.g., your life). That is, regarding the presence of tigers, 
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false-positives have trivial costs, while false negatives have tremendous costs.21 
Whenever this dynamic applies (e.g., as with the lethality of unfamiliar berries), 
overwhelmingly erring in favor of false-positives will be more practically useful than 
proportioning one’s beliefs to the evidence. As such, SCIRA-score is not constitutive of 
practical usefulness; SCIRA-score presumably correlates with practical usefulness, but 
this is insufficient for constitutive-ness. In short, the link between practical usefulness 
and rationality regards prescriptive-rationality, not ideal-rationality.  
Up until now, we have been discussing selecting-per-SCIRA in terms of 
evolutionary scenarios. However, another means of selecting for SCIRA (and thus, 
SCIRA making a why-have explanatory contribution) is selection through reinforcement-
learning. While selection in evolution is governed by fitness (i.e., survival and 
reproduction), selection in reinforcement-learning is governed by (something like) 
positive/negative feedback. Nonetheless, the same dynamics of practical usefulness 
apply. In short, conformity with an ideal normative standard, such as ideal-rationality, 
just is not constitutive of practical usefulness—neither practical usefulness per survival 
and reproduction, nor practical usefulness per positive/negative feedback.  
Even if one is not fully convinced by the preceding, recall that the question of this 
section regards whether an explanatory contribution by heuristic -i.e., SCIRA- can be 
established. The preceding is sufficient to block the establishment of heuristic -i.e., 
SCIRA- making an explanatory contribution to why-have explaining of the presence of 
(the processes that constitute) cognitive heuristics, and in turn, block the establishment of 
heuristic being scientifically-useful in this respect. As such, heuristic has still yet to fend 
21 My thanks to Sara Worley for this point. 
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off revision/elimination. 
5. Does the Kind, Cognitive Heuristic, Contribute to Explaining Cognitive Biases?
Suppose that heuristic was deemed not scientifically-useful and warranted 
elimination. This would prompt the question: “What about cognitive biases? Surely, they 
are scientifically-useful, right?” Are they? Recall that the central meaning of cognitive 
bias is systematic error. Within the CHB paradigm, judgments are erroneous by virtue of 
possessing the property, deviating-from-the-ideally-rational-judgment. (Ch. 2, §2.3) 
Recall that there is insufficient reason to believe that the human cognitive system is 
sensitive to SCIRA (i.e., shortcut-vis-à-vis-the-ideally-rational-algorithm).22 This reflects 
an insensitivity to ideal-rationality, in general. (§2) As such, the system is insensitive to 
whether a judgment it produces conforms to or deviates from ideal-rationality. As such, a 
kind that carves up judgments per their deviation from the ideally-rational judgment does 
not align with the causal operation of the system.23 In this respect, cognitive bias is not a 
system-specific-objective-kind (SOK) (with respect to the human cognitive system). 
Nonetheless, regardless of whether cognitive bias is a SOK, cognitive biases are 
still phenomena of interest—that is, we care about them. Recall that cognitive biases are 
systematic errors. We care about errors because we want to avoid them—we disvalue 
them. We care about systematic error because such systematicity (a) makes errors 
predictable, (b) renders them conducive to ameliorative measures (e.g., de-biasing), and 
(c) suggests the presence of a coherent problematic cognitive process that explains the
22 In the interest of avoiding unwieldy repetition of “lack of sufficient reason to believe that [P is the case],” 
this phrase will be replaced with formulations of “P is not the case,” though the former should be 
considered implied. 
23 Alignment with the causal operation of the human cognitive system is a descriptor that most aptly applies 
to cognitive processes. Applying it to judgments involves applying it to the products of such processes. 
This is slightly awkward, but ultimately, still apt. It could be argued that a different descriptor should be 
used, but I will stick with it for simplicity’s sake. 
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errors. Just because a kind we care about is not objective (e.g., neither a natural kind nor 
a SOK), that does not mean we should refrain from utilizing science to investigate it. For 
instance, worries have been raised about whether some -or even all- medical diseases and 
psychiatric disorders are non-objective kinds (or something of that sort) (Murphy, 2015, 
§2; Perring, 2010, §3). Nonetheless, this does not (and should not) threaten the practice of
scientific medicine and psychiatry. In other words, whether we use science to address clef 
pallets and anti-social-personality-disorder does not hinge upon their ontological status, 
though it does affect how we should undertake such science—for instance, in kind-
selection, the weight we should assign (if any) to kind-objectivity (e.g., constituting a 
SOK) or more precisely, causation-oriented kind unification (e.g., unification via 
identification with a distinct cognitive mechanism). We often appropriately want 
scientific investigation to recognize distinctions, categories, and kinds that are grounded 
not in objectivity (e.g., causation), but in our cares and interests. Such kinds are (what we 
can call) practical kinds.  
Per the CHB paradigm, judgments are erroneous by virtue of deviating from the-
ideally-rational-judgment. Our caring about such errors reflects our caring about the 
standard, ideal-rationality. Caring about a standard is sufficient grounds for conceiving 
of objects/phenomena in terms of their relation to -or more pertinently, their contrast 
with- that standard, and appealing to or even creating categories and kinds based upon 
those construals. As such, caring about ideal-rationality is sufficient grounds for 
conceiving of judgments in terms of whether they are errors vis-à-vis ideally-rational 
judgments, and when such errors are systematic, conceiving of them in terms of the kind, 
cognitive bias. Such grounding of cognitive bias in our cares and interests renders it an 
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adequate practical kind. Heuristic can thus be a scientifically-useful kind by contributing 
to explaining instantiations of this practical kind. So, does it? 
Recall (§2) that while heuristics cause and thus, explain cognitive dispositions, 
this was insufficient to yield a contribution by the kind, heuristic, due to the causal-
inefficaciousness of SCIRA (a la the non-contribution of climactic-reveal due to -with 
respect to the glasses’ shatterings- the causal-inefficaciousness of its central properties). 
In this respect, SCIRA does not make a causal-explanatory contribution. So, how could 
SCIRA make a contribution to explaining cognitive biases? By making a non-causal 
explanatory contribution—more specifically, by making a contrastive explanatory 
contribution.24  
The central property of cognitive bias is systematic error. Such erroneousness is 
per deviating from the ideally-rational judgment—or more generally, deviation from 
ideal rationality. In this respect, cognitive bias is defined relative to ideal-rationality—
that is, in contrast with ideal rationality. This renders cognitive bias (what we can call) a 
contrastive kind. Contrastive kinds are defined by objects/phenomena’s contrast with 
something else, such as an abstract standard (e.g., ideal-rationality) or a specified object 
(e.g., the ideally-rational-judgment).  
Contrastive kinds are not novel (though they might not be conceived of in these 
terms). For instance, in clinical psychology, various disorders and pathologies are 
conceived of in terms of their contrast with (i.e., deviation from) the cared about standard 
(qua contrastum) of healthy mental and behavioral life—the standard often expressed as 
24 Such non-causal-ness of contrastive explaining may depend upon a narrow view of causation. Verbal 
disputes regarding ‘causation’ aside, there is a substantive difference between (“non-causal”) contrastive 
and (narrow) causal explaining, as shall be shown. 
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well- or normal-functioning. And this is how it should be. We would be much worse off 
if we did away with scientific inquiry into contrastive kinds.  
Often, the root of contrastive kinds is viewing objects and phenomena through the 
lens of what we care about. This allows for causally-unaligned contrasta to enter the 
picture. Note that once DRCT is refuted, ideal-rationality only enters the picture via its 
being something we care about. In this respect, there is a harmony between practical, 
contrastive, and non-SOK kinds. Often, a crucial part of yielding causally-unaligned 
contrastive kinds is not merely selecting objects in accordance with what we care about 
but conceiving of them in terms of what we care about.  
To illustrate this distinction, suppose we care about things that are the tallest or 
biggest on Earth (perhaps we are a fan of world records). Also, suppose that thousands of 
years ago, the tallest mountain on Earth was vaporized by a functionary from the Alpha 
Centauri Zoning Commission. Before that vaporizing, Mount Everest did not possess the 
property, being-the-tallest-mountain-on-Earth. Upon such vaporizing, it did. 
Consider the difference between the following explananda: (1a) How Mt. Everest 
came to be, versus (2a) How Mt. Everest came to be the tallest mountain on Earth. 
Explanandum 1a regards how an object came into existence. Explanandum 2a regards 
how an object came to possess a property. Explanandum 1a involves our cares motivating 
the selection of an object-of-explanation; explanandum 2a involves conceiving of that 
object in terms of our cares. Explanandum 1a can be sufficiently explained by appeals to 
plate-tectonics (or something of that sort). However, that would be insufficient to explain 
explanandum 2a, since you cannot explain Mt. Everest’s being the tallest mountain on 
Earth without mentioning the Alpha Centauri bureaucrat vaporizing the once-taller 
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mountain. 
To see how this distinction can get progressively subtler, let’s now replace the 
name, “Mt. Everest,” with “the mountain that is the tallest mountain on Earth.” As such, 
we will consider the difference between explaining (1b) How the mountain that is the 
tallest mountain on Earth came to be, versus (2b) How the mountain that is the tallest 
mountain on Earth came to be the tallest mountain on Earth. Regarding explanandum 1a, 
the property, being-the-tallest-mountain-on-Earth, merely identifies the object; this is 
reflected in the fact that the parallel explanandum that used the name, “Mt. Everest,” did 
not mention “the tallest mountain on Earth.” Regarding explanandum 2b, the property, 
being-the-tallest-mountain-on-Earth, both identifies the object and is that whose coming 
to be (i.e., whose coming to be possessed by the object) is to be explained.  
Let’s now consider cognitive psychologists explaining errors. Ideally, we might 
want the explanandum, “errors,” more precisely articulated; however, scientific practice 
is not always so accommodating. For instance, a cognitive psychologist might look at an 
erroneous judgment and simply say, “Now what explains that?” without further clarifying 
the that to be explained. Here are two possible explananda: (1c) How the response that is 
erroneous came to be and (2c) How the response that is erroneous came to be erroneous. 
Let’s add a concrete example. Suppose Mathew took a math quiz. It included the 
following question: 2 + 1 * 4 = ? Matthew gave the answer, 12. The correct answer is 6. 
What happened? Mathew forgot to follow the order-of-operations rule (i.e., 
multiplication before addition). Mathew should have first, turned “1 * 4” into “4” and 
then added it to 2, to get 6—i.e.:  
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2 + 1 * 4  =  ? 
2 +   1 * 4   4  =  ? 
2 + 4  =  6 
Instead, he did the operations from left-to-right: first turning “2 + 1” into “3” and then 
multiplying that result by 4, to get 12—i.e.:  
2 + 1 * 4  =  ? 
 2 + 1  3  * 4  =  ? 
3 * 4  =  12 
Explanandum 1c is: How the response that is erroneous came to be—that is, the 
object-of-explanation is simply, “12” (and how it came to be). This can be answered by 
providing a solely causal-mechanical explanation that depicts the transformations that 
Mathew performed to turn the input, 2 + 1 * 4 = ?, into the output, 12. This would be a 
sufficient explanation without any appeal to the correct order-of-operations. In this 
scenario, the cognitive psychologists’ caring about errors motivated them to direct their 
attention towards not just any response, but upon a response that was erroneous. In this 
respect, the property, constituting-an-error, was used to identify the explanandum. This is 
one way in which what one cares about can influence research. If the cognitive psychologist 
goes on to explain all the answers that Mathew got wrong in this way, she is selecting the 
kind, Mathew’s errors. This is one way of viewing kinds through the lens of what she cares 
about. However, this way does not yield contrastive explaining.  
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To be conducive to contrastive explaining, she needs to not merely select a set of 
objects in accordance with her cares, but to conceive of them per her cares. She needs to 
explain not explanandum 1c (i.e. How the response that is erroneous came to be), but 
explanandum 2c: How the response that is erroneous came to be erroneous.25 This yields 
the object-of-explanation’ being: 12-instead-of-6 (and how it came to be). That is, the 
explanandum includes an appeal to the correct answer, 6. The explanation that was 
sufficient for 1c (i.e., a solely causal-mechanical explanation that depicts the 
transformations that Mathew performed to turn the input, 2 + 1 * 4 = ?, into the output, 
12) would be insufficient for 2c. A sufficient explanation for 2c requires conceiving of
Mathew’s performing the operations as: left-to-right-instead-of-per-the-correct-order-of-
operations. Construing the object-of-explanation as 12-instead-of-6 (and how it came to 
be) is conceiving of it in a contrastive way—i.e., a contrastive construal. Its sufficient 
explanation involves an appeal to a contrastive construal of the operations that Mathew 
performed—that is, an appeal to left-to-right-instead-of-per-the-correct-order-of-
operations. That is, the erroneousness of Matthew’s response is explained by the 
erroneousness of the process he executed. In this respect, the explanation is contrastive 
(or includes a contrastive component). In this respect, left-to-right-instead-of-per-the-
correct-order-of-operations makes a contrastive explanatory contribution to the 
explanation of 12-instead-of-6. 
Returning to cognitive heuristics and biases, conceiving of judgments as 
instantiations of cognitive bias is to contrastively construe them as judgments-made-
25 This is somewhat ambiguous. The pertinent sense of “came to be erroneous” regards how Mathew got 
the answer wrong—i.e., the mistake Mathew made. It does not regard how mathematicians established 
the order-of-operations rule or anything like that. 
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instead-of-ideally-rational-judgments—i.e., as judgments qua deviations-from-ideal-
rationality. The central property of heuristic, SCIRA (shortcut-vis-à-vis-the-ideally-
rational-algorithm), entails deviation-from-ideal-rationality (this entailment will be 
important later). In this respect, conceiving of a process as an instantiation of cognitive 
heuristic (insofar as that entails deviating-from-ideal-rationality) is to contrastively 
construe it as a-process-executed-instead-of-the-ideally-rational-process or a process qua 
deviation-from-ideal-rationality. Appealing to this makes a contrastive explanatory 
contribution to the explanation of judgments qua deviations-from-ideal-rationality. In 
other words, such judgments’ deviation from ideal-rationality is explained by their 
generating process’ deviation from ideal-rationality. For example, regarding the 
aforementioned availability heuristic and bias, the bias’ deviation-from-ideal-rationality 
of systematically overestimating the probability of dramatic events is explained by the 
heuristic’s deviation-from-ideal-rationality of inferring probability by assessing ease-of-
recall (coupled with the fact that dramatic events are disproportionately easy to recall).26 
In such respects, appealing to a process qua cognitive heuristic makes a contrastive 
explanatory contribution to the explanation of judgments qua cognitive bias. That is, 
appealing to the instantiating of cognitive heuristic makes a contrastive explanatory 
contribution to the explanation of cognitive biases. In this respect, the kind, cognitive 
heuristic (insofar as it entails deviating from ideal-rationality), makes a contrastive 
explanatory contribution to the explanation of cognitive biases (a la the kind, high-note, 
but not the kind, climactic-reveal, making a causal explanatory contribution to the 
26 Note that the heuristic’s embedded contrastum, ideal-rationality, played an explanatory role without 
(needing to) play any causal role at all. In fact, the contrastum’s entire absence from the system would 
not threaten its explanatory contribution. This reflects the explanatory contribution’s contrastive 
dynamic, as opposed to a (narrow) causal dynamic. 
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explanation of the glasses’ shatterings). As such, cognitive heuristic is a scientifically-
useful kind, but only insofar as it entails deviating-from-ideal-rationality. Such scientific-
usefulness manifests in the sense it makes to group processes that constitute cognitive 
heuristics together as explainers of cognitive biases.27  
27 Some big-picture points. Since cognitive bias is an adequate practical kind and since instances of 
heuristic (qua heuristic) contributes to explaining cognitive biases (qua cognitive bias), heuristic is a 
scientifically-useful kind on explanatory grounds. In other words, heuristic is thereby an adequate 
explanatory kind. In this respect, it is scientifically-useful to group instances of heuristic together—that 
is, it is scientifically-useful to employ the kind, heuristic. Constituting an explanatory kind with respect 
to a practical kind is insufficient to render heuristic an adequate practical kind, per se; however, it does 
ground heuristic’s adequacy in practicality. CHB’s featuring practically-grounded kinds renders it an 
applied scientific research program, in the sense in which clinical psychology (vis-à-vis for instance, 
investigating linguistic processing) is an applied science (vis-à-vis a basic or “pure” science). As an 
adequate explanatory kind, heuristic, need not achieve adequacy through constituting a practical kind. 
Likewise, heuristic need not be an objective kind—e.g., a SOK or a kind unified via identification with 
a distinct cognitive mechanism. Furthermore, heuristic should not have been expected to be an objective 
kind. This stems from ideal-rationality’s being a normative standard. Insofar as it is unsurprising that we 
(and our competences) do not conform to normative standards, it is unsurprising that a kind conceived 
of in terms of its contrast with a normative standard would have a causally-unaligned contrastum and 
would not be an objective kind. Constituting an objective kind -e.g., a kind unified through 
identification with a distinct causal mechanism- is not a (mandatory) desideratum for explanatory kinds 
in an applied scientific research program. As such, Gigerenzer’s (1998) demand and Kahneman’s 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) acquiescence to unifying heuristic through identification with a distinct 
causal mechanism was misguided (or it was misguided to present cognitive heuristics in a manner that 
rendered such unification apparently apt). Kahneman’s exiling anchoring-and-adjustment from the 
extension of heuristic to accommodate such unification was also misguided. Why was cognitive 
heuristic presumed to be a kind for which unification on a causal basis was mandatory? This goes back 
to DRCT. DRCT contended that (core) human processes were ideally-rational. Such processes befit 
constituting a SOK or otherwise causally-unified kinds. In this respect, they befit (narrow) causal 
explaining. So, DRCT befits causal explaining. Since heuristics deviated from ideal-rationality (per 
SCIRA), they falsified DRCT. In this respect, conceiving of such processes qua heuristic was useful -
i.e., heuristic was a useful kind regarding causal explaining- but only insofar as DRCT remained a live
theory to be falsified. Once DRCT was rejected, constituting a falsifier of DRCT is no longer a basis of
causal-explaining usefulness. At that time, conceiving of those processes qua heuristic should have
ended in causal-explaining contexts (regardless of whether those processes kept the name, “heuristic”—
a la referring to the causes of the glasses’ shatterings as “climactic-reveals” -or better yet “the climactic-
reveal”- without presuming that semantic properties or climactic-reveal mattered regarding the
shattering). However, this did not happen. Instead of just falsifying DRCT, CHB replaced it as the
leading positive, descriptive theory—i.e., the leading causal-explaining-theory. The deviation from
ideal-rationality in heuristic (which made it a falsifier of DRCT) constitutes an appeal to ideal-
rationality (even though it is a negative appeal). This embeds the normative standard within heuristic
(or more precisely, ‘heuristic’). In other words, ideal-rationality remained a variable in heuristic (thus
the exclusion of simple-yet-ideally-rational-algorithms like disjunctive syllogism). As such, CHB -with
its embedded normative standard- was employed in causal-explaining. Ironically, CHB, whose thrust
was demonstrating how we fundamentally deviated from ideal-rationality (contra DRCT), ended up
carrying on DRCT’s embedding of ideal-rationality in causal-explaining. That is, CHB carried on
DRCT’s original sin of embedding a normative standard in a causal theory. The way in which this might
have happened is the following. Use of the term, “heuristic” became engrained. Its explanatory
shortcomings went unnoticed because even direct consideration of whether heuristics are explanatory
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6. Conjuncts of SCIRA
Recall that the explanatory-contribution of SCIRA (shortcut vis-à-vis the ideally 
rational algorithm) and thus, heuristic, to contrastively explaining biases was only insofar 
as SCIRA entails deviating-from-the-ideally-rational-algorithm (DEVIRA). While 
SCIRA entails DEVIRA, that is not all there is to SCIRA (and in turn, heuristic). This is 
reflected in SCIRA’s being a prima facie decent candidate for why-have explaining of 
heuristics (i.e., the processes constituting heuristics being selected for because of their 
possession of SCIRA). Yet DEVIRA cannot account for this, as deviating from the 
ideally-rational algorithm is not something to be selected for—if anything it is a cost. As 
this reflects, SCIRA includes (being)-more-economical-than-the-ideally-rational-
algorithm (MEIRA). This accounts for SCIRA being a good candidate for why-have 
explaining. It also captures what cognitive psychologists were neglecting when not 
testing for SCIRA (§1). 
Another aspect of SCIRA (or at least, ‘heuristic,’ as employed in the CHB 
program) is natural-assessment-process. Such processes occupy a middle ground 
between perception and deliberation; the notion more-or-less amounts to intuitive-process 
(or upon the rise of dual-processing models, system-1-process28) (e.g., Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982b, p. 494, p. 499; Keren & Teigen, 2004, p. 93; Tversky & Kahneman, 
2002, p. 20). With the replacement of DRCT with CHB (qua theory), ideally-rational-
                                                            
only reveals the problematic construal if one is sensitive to the subtle distinctions of (1) referential-
adequacy versus sense-adequacy (e.g., heuristics explain, but qua-heuristic does not) and (2) contrastive 
versus (narrow) causal explaining. The shortcoming only concerns sense-adequacy regarding causal-
explaining, which is why unifying heuristic (which regards sense-adequacy) via identification with a 
distinct cognitive mechanism (which is a causal-explaining matter) was such a sore spot (as heuristic is 
not a SOK). 
28 The system 1 (intuitive system) vs. system 2 (deliberative system) distinction of dual-process models has 
since been superseded by type 1 and type 2 processes (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Kahneman (2013) 
now considers those systems to be useful fictions. 
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algorithms were associated with deliberative thinking. SCIRA (or being-a-shortcut) was 
meant not only with regard to each heuristic relative to its corresponding ideally-rational-
algorithm; it also regarded heuristics as a class relative to the class with which ideally-
rational-algorithms were associated—namely, deliberative processes. In this respect, 
SCIRA implied that heuristics were intuitive processes (or more precisely, were 
processes that originated as intuitive processes). In other words, granted, ‘SCIRA’ -or 
‘fast’ and ‘frugal’- are relative concepts—e.g., fast-and-frugal-vis-à-vis-ideally-rational-
algorithm; nonetheless, there is also a non-relative aspect to “fast and frugal” insofar as 
they imply membership amongst the “fast and frugal processes” (i.e., intuitive processes) 
or being of the “fast and frugal system” (i.e., the intuitive system).29 
As such, SCIRA (or at least, ‘heuristic,’ as employed in the CHB program) has 
three aspects (or constituents): DEVIRA, MEIRA, and intuitive-process. These 3 aspects 
befit 3 different types of explanation. DEVIRA befits contrastively explaining cognitive 
biases (§5), MEIRA befits why-have explaining (why we have those processes that 
constitute cognitive heuristics) (§4), and intuitive-process befits causal-mechanical 
explanation (§2-3). Especially if an intuitive system is presumed, the pertinent feature of 
intuitive-process is that as a kind, it is good candidate for a system-specific-objective-
kind (SOK) and thus, befits participation in causal-mechanical explanations.  This notion 
of heuristic as a prospective SOK is consistent with Gigerenzer’s (1998) demand to 
identify cognitive heuristics with a distinct cognitive mechanism, and Kahneman’s 
29 One could argue that being-an-intuitive-process was not embedded in (the employed meaning of) SCIRA 
but was a separate central property (or feature) of ‘heuristic’ or even, was a theoretical commitment 
entirely separate from the meaning of ‘heuristic.’ I think it was embedded in SCIRA, but even if it were 
not, it ultimately does not affect the conclusions that follow—though it makes getting there a lot more 
laborious. Ultimately, resolving this issue would take us far afield into the analytic/synthetic distinction, 
holism, and notions (e.g., essential properties) to which the CHB program was not sensitive. 
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acceptance of this demand as appropriate and (attempted) acquiescence to it (Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2002).30 
When appealing to heuristic, all three aspects are present. In this respect, the three 
aspects are not disjuncts to select amongst depending upon the context; they are 
conjuncts that are always present. We can emphasize this dynamic by identifying the 
aspects as “conjuncts.”31 
Recall that the only explanatory contribution found from SCIRA was contributing 
to contrastively explaining cognitive biases insofar as SCIRA entailed DEVIRA. In this 
respect, DEVIRA contributes to explaining cognitive biases and thus, is scientifically-
useful. As such, any revision to heuristic should retain DEVIRA.  
Does DEVIRA contribute to the other discussed ways of being scientifically-
useful? 32 Recall (§2) that the kind, heuristic -i.e., such processes qua heuristic (a la the 
singing qua climactic-reveal)- did not make a causal-explanatory contribution due to the 
central property, SCIRA, being causally-inefficacious. That was so because of the human 
cognitive system’s insensitivity to SCIRA. That stemmed from such sensitivity requiring 
implausible DRCT-style capacities in order to differentially interact with processes 
depending upon their possession of SCIRA. The need for such capacities stems from 
30 This acceding yielded the aforementioned attribute-substitution model of heuristic (see n. 33). The 
seriousness and sincerity of this acceding is reflected in the fact that Kahneman and Frederick excluded 
one of the original heuristics, anchoring-and-adjustment, from the extension of ‘cognitive heuristic’ in 
order to comply with the demand. 
31 It is worth noting that since each befitted type of explanation has at least one befitting conjunct, 
vagueness in the meaning of ‘heuristic’ can yield the appearance of being unproblematically 
explanatory in each type of explanation by, when a specific type of explanation is under consideration, 
emphasizing the corresponding conjunct and ignoring those that might be problematic. 
32 For readability’s sake, in the following examination of the conjuncts and means of scientific-usefulness, 
the unwieldy and repetitive qualifier, “there is not sufficient reason to believe [X],” is usually replaced 
with simply, “not [X]” (or transformations thereof). As such, the claims therein should be interpreted 
per the conservative assessment of warrant that the qualifier would have provided. 
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SCIRA excluding simple-yet-ideally-rational-algorithms. That exclusion stemmed from 
SCIRA encompassing the conjuncts, DEVIRA and MEIRA. In this respect, DEVIRA not 
only does not contribute to heuristic making a causal-explanatory contribution, it 
precludes heuristic from doing so and from being scientifically-useful in this way.  
Similarly, DEVIRA (and MEIRA) were behind heuristic’s not constituting a 
system-specific-objective-kind (SOK). This is because DEVIRA and MEIRA, by virtue 
of their contrast with the-ideally-rational-algorithm, exclude processes that constitute 
simple-yet-ideally-rational-algorithms (e.g., disjunctive syllogism and &-elimination), 
and we lack sufficient reason to believe that processes would belong to different systems 
depending upon their consistency with ideal-rationality. As such, DEVIRA precludes 
heuristic from being scientifically-useful via being a SOK.  
Recall that heuristic did not contribute to why-have explaining because SCIRA 
was not the right property for selection (not even per SCIRA-score) because the right 
standard for selection regarded (something like) resource-independent practical 
usefulness, not conformity with ideal-rationality. DEVIRA (and MEIRA) entail the 
appeal to ideal-rationality. As such, they preclude heuristic from being scientifically-
useful via contributing to why-have explaining. 
Since any revision to heuristic should retain DEVIRA, heuristic (either as is or 
upon revision) should not be expected to deliver either a SOK or contributions to either 
causal explanation or why-have explaining.  
How do the other conjuncts fare with respect to explaining cognitive biases? 
Intuitive-process is neither (a) necessary, nor (b) sufficient for yielding and thus, 
explaining cognitive biases. This is because (a) deliberative processes can yield cognitive 
95 
biases (e.g., deliberative processes that deviate from ideal-rationality)—thus, intuitive-
process is not necessary, and (b) intuitive processes can fail to yield cognitive biases 
(e.g., if the intuitive process is disjunctive syllogism)—and thus, it is not sufficient. As 
such, intuitive-process does not contribute to explaining cognitive biases. 
Regarding MEIRA-(process), MEIRA is not necessary for yielding and thus, 
explaining cognitive biases, as a process possessing DEVIRA can yield them without 
possessing MEIRA. For instance, a DEVIRA process that is less economical than the-
ideally-rational-algorithm can yield cognitive biases (e.g., if it turns out that the 
representativeness heuristic is less economical than the corresponding ideally-rational-
algorithm, this would not impede its yielding the Linda-Conjunction-Fallacy). Since 
MEIRA entails DEVIRA, MEIRA is indeed sufficient for yielding cognitive biases. 
However, MEIRA regards the process’ economy, which does not make a unique 
contribution to yielding cognitive biases (beyond that made by DEVIRA). That is the 
explanatory contribution of MEIRA is exhausted by DEVIRA. In this respect, MEIRA is 
explanatorily superfluous—a la if objects of gold metal qua metal caused an effect and 
such objects were identified as gold metal, the inclusion of gold -vs. metal (simpliciter)- 
would be explanatorily superfluous. Once DEVIRA is invoked, including MEIRA (i.e., 
excluding processes that lack MEIRA) amounts to adding an arbitrary factor in extension 
designation or kind-scope. That is, it makes the kind too narrow—it includes too little. To 
illustrate this with (an extreme) example, one could add the conjunct, more-than-four-
and-less-than-6-times-more-economical-than-the-ideally-rational-algorithm. Like 
MEIRA, this conjunct would be sufficient for yielding cognitive biases, as it would entail 
DEVIRA. However, once DEVIRA is being invoked, appealing to more-than-four-and-
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less-than-6-times-more-economical-than-the-ideally-rational-algorithm would obviously 
be explanatorily superfluous and an arbitrary factor in kind-scope. In this respect, it 
would not make an explanatory contribution to explaining cognitive biases. In a similar 
respect, neither does MEIRA.  
Given the proceeding, we lack sufficient reason to believe that either intuitive-
process or MEIRA contribute to explaining cognitive biases, and thus, lack sufficient 
reason to believe that either intuitive-process or MEIRA are scientifically-useful to 
explaining cognitive biases. As such, DEVIRA is the only conjunct that we have 
sufficient reason to believe is scientifically-useful with respect to explaining cognitive 
biases. As such, the only way in which (we have reason to believe that) the kind, 
heuristic, is scientifically-useful is with respect to contrastively explaining cognitive 
biases and only insofar as SCIRA entails DEVIRA.33 
33 Recall that this dissertation focuses upon cognitive heuristic per its classical conception within the 
Kahneman and Tversky research program (Ch. 1, n. 6; Ch. 2 n. 27) (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; 2000). This notion is distinct from the subsequent notion of 
cognitive heuristic per attribute-substitution (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p. 53-60). Attribute-
substitution involves (e.g., with respect to the aforementioned availability heuristic), substituting the 
target attribute of assessment (e.g., the probability of an event) with a heuristic attribute (e.g., the ease 
with which similar events can be recalled). The heuristic attribute can be thought of as the proxy 
(attribute) (a la Ch. 1, §3.1). For both the classical and attribute-substitution conceptions, an important 
dynamic is cognitive heuristic being (or attempting to be) (1) a descriptive-oriented category, or more 
precisely, a causally-significant category (e.g., either being a SOK/ kind-unified-by-identification-with-
a-distinct-mechanism, or making a narrow-causal explanatory contribution), while also being (2) a 
normatively-significant category (e.g., heuristics being essentially non-ideal) that explains normatively-
significant explananda (e.g., explaining aspects of human irrationality), which cashes out as making a 
contrastive explanatory contribution within a normatively-construed taxonomy. In other words, 
cognitive heuristic is a kind that (attempts to) reflect carving in accordance with both (1) causation, and 
(2) normative evaluation. These two orientations/roles are in tension. For instance, regarding simple-
yet-ideally-rational-algorithms, causal-carving dictates including them in the extension of cognitive
heuristic, but normative-carving precludes it. Blindly importing this tension into the moral analogue
would be a mistake. This makes the classical conception of cognitive heuristic more useful for adapting
because it is more conducive to being reduced into elements that allow us to separate-out these
orientations/roles—namely, the reduction of cognitive heuristic (or ‘cognitive heuristic’ or more
specifically, the central property/feature, SCIRA), into the “conjuncts,” DEVIRA, MEIRA, and
intuitive-process. Intuitive-process isolates the kind’s potential as a causally-significant category.
DEVIRA (and MEIRA, though that’s a bit more complicated) isolates the kind’s normative-orientation
or more precisely, its contrastive-explanatory potential. The attribute-substitution conception of
cognitive heuristic also encompasses these two orientations/roles. It encompasses (1) potential causal-
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7. ‘Moral Fallacy’
Let’s return to the topic of developing the moral analogue of cognitive heuristic. 
Adapting ‘cognitive heuristic’ without revision would involve importing moral analogues 
of SCIRA and its encompassed conjuncts—that is, importing shortcut-vis-à-vis-the-ideal-
moral-reasoning-procedure (SCIMP) and the conjuncts, deviating-from-the-ideal-moral-
reasoning-procedure (DEVIMP), more-economical-than-the-ideal-moral-reasoning-
procedure (MEIMP), and moral-domain-regarding-intuitive-process. However, the 
preceding examination showed that the only way in which (we have reason to believe 
that) the kind, cognitive heuristic, is scientifically-useful is with respect to contrastively 
explaining cognitive biases and only insofar as SCIRA entails DEVIRA. As such, that is 
the only part of cognitive heuristic that should be imported. This yields a moral analogue 
of cognitive heuristic with the central property DEVIMP and an expectation of scientific-
usefulness only regarding contrastively explaining moral biases. Given that the central 
property is not SCIMP, calling it “moral heuristic” would be misleading. As such, the 
moral analogue should be called “moral fallacy” (it will be amended to “subjective moral 
fallacy” in chapter 5). Assuming that moral bias is an adequate practical kind, moral 
fallacy explaining moral bias would be sufficient scientific-usefulness for moral fallacy 
to not have to constitute an objective kind or SOK; as such, moral fallacy need not 
significance by identifying the kind with the distinct (allegedly) causal mechanism of substitution—i.e., 
replacing the target-attribute with the heuristic-attribute. (I am skeptical of whether the distinction 
between a “replacement” occurring or not is a causal difference, as opposed to merely a difference in 
there being a good versus bad match between the given target attribute and the assessment executed; if 
there is not a causal difference, the kind loses its causal-significance.) It also encompasses (2) potential 
normative-significance in that the attribute that (ideally) should be assessed is the target attribute, not 
the heuristic-attribute. In other words, assessing the heuristic-attribute is a deviation from the normative 
procedure of assessing the target-attribute. However, reducing attribute-substitution into elements that 
separates these two orientations/significances/roles is much more difficult and its results much messier 
than doing so with the classical conception (i.e., shortcuted-ness—i.e., SCIRA). 
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require unification via identification with a distinct cognitive mechanism. In addition, 
moral fallacy would presumably also be an adequate practical kind. 
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CHAPTER 4: ADAPTING ‘COGNITIVE BIAS’ 
1. Worry: Scientifically-Admissible Moral Standard?
The definition of ‘cognitive bias’ is systematic error. Initiating adaption by 
replacing its cognitive-domain-regarding (or domain-general-regarding) features with 
moral-domain-regarding features yields a prima facie concept of ‘moral bias’ with the 
definition: systematic moral error. Identifying moral errors constitutes attributing the 
property, moral erroneousness, to judgments/decisions/actions. Recall the objective of 
developing a paradigm that can undergird fruitful moral psychological research—that is, 
fruitful scientific research. This raises a worry: Are attributions of the property “moral 
erroneousness” compatible with science? Consider a judgment that abortion is morally 
(im-)permissible. Should a scientific research program be in the business of attributing 
moral erroneousness (or correctness) to such judgments? It seems like such attributions 
would be inadmissible (if you will) within science. To specify erroneousness, judgments 
are not erroneous, simpliciter, they are erroneous with respect to some standard of 
correctness. Thus, we can specify the worry as: What standard, if any, could ground 
moral erroneousness within a scientific context? That is, what moral standard might be 
scientifically acceptable—i.e., scientifically admissible? More precisely, within the 
context of a scientific research program, what standard, if any, would be admissible such 
that a judgment/decision/action’s deviation from that standard would warrant the 
attribution of the property, moral erroneousness, or the description of that 
judgment/decision/action as a moral error? For instance, surely the standard “Mark’s 
moral view” is not a scientifically-admissible standard—that is, surely, deviating from 
Mark’s moral view is an unacceptable basis for attributing moral erroneousness within a 
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scientific context. Consider Lawrence Kohlberg’s problematic adapting of Jean Piaget’s 
epistemic model to the moral domain, as revealed by Carol Gilligan’s critique (Gilligan, 
1982; Kohlberg, 1958; Piaget, 1970). In hindsight, this episode shows how easily 
psychological research programs can mishandle the selection and privileging of moral 
norms and standards. As such, great care needs to be taken when identifying the MBF 
paradigm’s standard of moral error. 
Before attempting to identify that standard, I should address the basis upon which 
I will assess scientific-admissibility. One option is to formulate and justify a theory of 
scientific-admissibility. This would yield assessing whether a given moral standard is one 
that (I contend) the scientific community should deem admissible. A second option is to 
accept scientific-admissibility as it currently stands. That is, assess whether a given moral 
standard is one that the scientific community currently would deem admissible. This can 
be operationalized as whether the standard would pass muster with editors of scientific 
journals and members of grant-awarding committees. I adopt this latter option.  
One objection to that option is (something like): it implies a dubious cultural-
relativism regarding scientific-admissibility. However, recall that the objective of this 
dissertation is to develop an MBF paradigm that can undergird a fruitful cognitive 
psychological research. In other words, the point of this dissertation is to develop a 
paradigm that would actually be employed. This requires compliance with current 
scientific-admissibility. We can consider this a practical constraint on the larger project in 
which this dissertation partakes, and an aspect of that project that renders the dissertation 
an instance of applied philosophy. Adhering to this practical constraint does not imply 
rejecting challenges to current scientific-admissibility; it merely considers such to be a 
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project beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
1.1. Adapt Ideal-Theoretical-Rationality? 
To conduct the search for a scientifically admissible moral standard, it will be 
useful to: (1) identify standards that have unproblematically grounded erroneousness in 
other applications of the heuristics-and-biases paradigm—we can refer to these as 
unproblematic standards, and (2) consider whether they can be adapted to identify moral 
errors within the context of a scientific research program.  
One unproblematic standard is ideal-theoretical-rationality.1 Exemplar 
constituents of ideal-theoretical-rationality are the principles of logic, statistics, and 
probability theory (e.g., modus tollens, and the relevance of sample size). In the 
terminology of judgment-and-decision-making psychology, this standard is often referred 
to as “epistemic rationality.” An example of this standard being employed within the 
heuristics-and-biases paradigm regards ranking “Linda is a feminist bank-teller” as more 
probable than “Linda is a bank-teller” and identifying the ranking as an error by virtue of 
its violating the conjunction rule (i.e., no conjunction can be more probable than one of 
its conjuncts) (Ch. 2, §2.5). The conjunction rule is a constitutive principle of probability 
1 It is worth noting that there have been prominent disputes regarding whether deviations from ideal-
theoretical-rationality (e.g., despite ecological validity) are indeed “irrational” (e.g., Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002; Lopes, 1991). These disputes have been referred to as the “rationality debate” or 
“rationality wars” (Doherty, 2003; Samuels, Stich & Bishop, n.d.). Such disputes may appear to cast 
doubt upon whether ideal-theoretical-rationality is indeed an unproblematic standard. However, the 
dispute can largely be disarmed by disambiguating “rationality,” and clarifying that the deviations-in-
question are departures from ideal rationality and not necessarily departures from pragmatic 
rationality—or in Jonathan Baron’s (2004) terminology, departures from normative rationality, but not 
necessarily departures from prescriptive rationality. Such disambiguation may leave open the question 
of which type of rationality constitutes “rationality, simpliciter” (if that question even has an answer); 
but settling this is unnecessary for proceeding with productive research. Both types of rationality -and 
people’s conformity with or deviation from them- are of interest. In fact, judgments/decisions/actions 
and processes that conform to pragmatic rationality, but violate ideal rationality constitute an interesting 
class that can only be identified upon accepting the legitimacy of both standards. In this respect, ideal-
theoretical-rationality provides an unproblematic grounding of error, so long as such error as clarified as 
ideal error, and not necessarily pragmatic error. This distinction is discussed further in §2.1. 
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theory and in turn, ideal-theoretical rationality. 
Can this unproblematic standard be adapted to ground moral erroneousness within 
the context of a scientific research program? The pertinent feature of ideal-theoretical-
rationality is its provision of (perhaps, loosely speaking) a priori knowledge (e.g., the 
knowledge that ranking “Linda is a feminist bank-teller” as more probable than “Linda is 
a bank-teller” is erroneous). Adapting ideal-theoretical-rationality to assessing moral 
erroneousness would yield a standard that purportedly provided a priori moral 
knowledge. Exemplars of moral theories in the ballpark of such adaptions are those that 
are purportedly derived from rationality, such as Kantian ethics. An exemplar of the 
purported a priori moral knowledge that such a standard might provide is that violating 
the categorical imperative is morally erroneous. Such purported a priori moral 
knowledge is scientifically-inadmissible. In other words, while a Kantian may claim to 
have made unassailable derivations from rationality, nonetheless, the notion that the 
scientific admissibility granted to the conjunction rule be bestowed upon the categorical 
imperative is simply a non-starter.  
Recall that due to the interest in actually conducting fruitful MBF research in the 
near term, practical constraints are heeded, and the basis of scientific-admissibility is 
what the scientific community would deem admissible. While unnecessary for this 
assessment, I will add that I am highly sympathetic to such non-admission. This is 
because the case for moral uncertainty and skepticism is simply too strong to admit 
purported a priori moral knowledge into scientific contexts. Such non-admission may 
seem more exclusionary than it actually is. For instance, scientific-inadmissibility does 
not entail that purported a priori moral knowledge is inadmissible in all contexts or 
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domains of inquiry. In other words, just as the standards of evidence differ between the 
criminal and civil justice systems, the (in-practice) standards of justification may differ 
between scientific and other contexts.  Furthermore, scientific-inadmissibility does not 
entail that for instance, the categorical imperative is false. Ultimately, the scientific-
inadmissibility of purported a priori moral knowledge merely reflects the fact that 
metaethics and moral philosophy have not progressed to the point of delivering 
sufficiently incontrovertible pertinent moral knowledge (assuming providing such is even 
a proper aim of metaethics and moral philosophy). Reaching such a point is an incredibly 
steep climb. It requires incontrovertibly establishing that (1) there are moral facts, (2) 
those facts are knowable, (3) such facts are known, and (4) such known facts are 
sufficiently specific and pertinent to ascribe erroneousness to particular moral judgments 
(such as those regarding abortion or the death penalty) with a comparable epistemic 
warrant to that held when ascribing erroneousness to ranking “Linda is a feminist bank-
teller” as more probable than “Linda is a bank teller.” The conclusion here is not that 
metaethics and moral philosophy will never reach (4); it is merely that they have not 
reached it as of now.2    
The appeal to moral skepticism above raises a partners-in-guilt objection. An 
interlocuter might voice this objection as follows: “Granted, skepticism can be 
marshalled against a priori moral knowledge. Nevertheless, skepticism can also be 
2 Ultimately, I will conclude that (what I call) ideal-instrumental-moral-rationality (IIMR) is a viable 
standard of moral correctness and error and I will adopt it for the MBF framework. Given the scientific-
inadmissibility of adaptions of ideal-theoretical-rationality (and later, adaptions of a posteriori 
knowledge), one is pushed towards an option like IIMR. However, so long as one grants the viability of 
IIMR, agreeing that one is pushed towards adopting it is not necessary for being on-board with this 
dissertation’s project. For instance, ratcheted-down versions of the scientifically-inadmissible claims 
(such as merely acknowledging that adapting ideal-theoretical-rationality, etc. would raise problems 
whose avoidance is reasonable) can be practically consistent with accepting IIMR. Nevertheless, I think 
the stronger scientific-inadmissibility claims are true and buttress adopting IIMR.  
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marshalled against ideal-theoretical-rationality. Since we do not think such skepticism 
precludes grounding erroneousness in ideal-theoretical-rationality, why think moral 
skepticism precludes grounding moral erroneousness in a priori moral knowledge?”  
The difference is that, unlike moral principles, many of the principles of ideal-
theoretical-rationality that have undergirded error-ascriptions (e.g., modus tollens and the 
relevance of sample size) are indispensable presuppositions of psychological research, 
and science in general. Acquiescing to skepticism of ideal-theoretical-rationality would 
make conducting science impossible. Recall that the ultimate objective of this dissertation 
is undergirding scientific research. As such, a presupposition of this project is accepting 
the presuppositions of science. A presupposition of science is rejecting skepticism of 
ideal-theoretical-rationality. As such, a presupposition of this project is rejecting 
skepticism of ideal-theoretical-rationality. In other words, ideal-theoretical-rationality is 
indispensable to the practice at-hand. Rejecting ideal-theoretical-rationality would 
amount to a self-excluding stance (a la a self-defeating argument). By this I mean, such 
rejection would exclude the project from the practice it intends to undertake. Such a 
stance would be akin to objecting to a theory proffered at an epidemiology conference by 
appealing to solipsism. Unlike skepticism of ideal-theoretical-rationality (or jumping 
ahead, skepticism of a posteriori knowledge via skepticism of the external world), moral 
skepticism leaves science intact. In other words, appeals to a priori moral knowledge are 
unnecessary for conducting science. As such, this partners-in-guilt objection is 
unsuccessful.3 
3 There may be room for a counterargument here and subsequent replies that would take us far afield. 
Nonetheless, that debate is somewhat moot as in this dissertation, scientific admissibility is ultimately 
determined by what the scientific community would deem admissible and the preceding was merely my 
explaining my sympathy for the non-admissibility of a priori moral knowledge (e.g., my sympathy for 
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1.2. Adapt A Posteriori Knowledge? 
Another unproblematic standard is that which grounds erroneousness regarding 
the haze illusion (Brunswik, 1943; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The haze illusion 
refers to the tendency to overestimate the distance of objects in hazy weather conditions. 
It stems from the fact that when we assess the distance of an object (e.g., a mountain), 
one perceptual cue we use is the perceived blurriness of the object’s edges; the blurrier 
the edges, the farther away we assess the object to be. Hazy weather increases perceived 
blurriness in general, and as such, the edges of objects appear blurrier than they otherwise 
would. As such, we exhibit the perceptual bias of systematically overestimating the 
distance of objects in hazy weather conditions. Such overestimation constitutes an error. 
This erroneousness is grounded in the estimate’s deviation from what is known to be the 
actual distance—or more generally, the estimate’s deviation from the unproblematic 
standard, a posteriori knowledge. 
Can a posteriori knowledge be adapted to ground moral erroneousness within the 
context of a scientific research program? Such adapting would yield a standard that 
provided purported a posteriori moral knowledge. Moral claims in the ballpark of such 
are those that are purportedly grounded in the observation of moral properties (or 
something of that sort). However, within the context of a scientific research program, 
such purported a posteriori moral knowledge would be inadmissible. In other words, 
while one may claim to observe moral wrongness in a particular act or event, nonetheless, 
the notion that the scientific admissibility granted to the observation of a mountain’s 
distance be bestowed upon purported observations of moral properties is simply a non-
                                                            
the scientific admissibility granted to the conjunction rule being extended to the categorical imperative 
being simply a non-starter). 
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starter. Once again, while the basis of scientific-admissibility is what the scientific 
community would deem admissible, I am highly sympathetic to not admitting purported 
observations of moral properties given that metaethics and moral philosophy simply have 
not progressed to the point of delivering sufficiently incontrovertible pertinent moral 
knowledge (whether a priori or a posteriori).  
2. Viable Solution: Ideal Instrumental Moral Rationality
An additional unproblematic standard is ideal-instrumental-rationality. Someone 
exhibits instrumental rationality (simpliciter) -i.e., means-ends rationality- “insofar as she 
adopts suitable means to her end” (Kolodny & Brunero, 2013). In this respect, 
instrumental rationality regards the optimization of goal-fulfillment (Stanovich, Toplak & 
West, 2008, p. 252).4 Notably, the agent’s ends are accepted as the ends in question 
4 (1) An exemplar instantiation of the means-ends relation is an action (means) causing the fulfillment of a 
goal (end)—e.g., one’s drinking water (means) causing the quenching of one’s thirst (end). However, 
deviations from this exemplar model are common. For instance, since most ends can constitute means 
to a more fundamental end, most “things” that constitute ends (e.g., goals, preferences, states-of-affairs, 
etc.) can (with some minor adjustments) also constitute means. For example, the action of overthrowing 
a tyrant can constitute a means to the end of freeing a populace, the latter of which can also constitute a 
means to the more fundamental end of maximizing happiness. Ends can feature values (e.g., fairness, 
liberty, etc.) and can be expressed as a goal in terms of realizing/instantiating that value (e.g., realizing 
fairness). The means to such goals can consist of not only actions (and intentions, decisions, etc.), but 
also judgments, attitudes, etc. For example, a tolerant attitude towards a different race can constitute a 
means to the end of equality; an accurate judgment about a person can constitute a means to the end of 
fairness. Furthermore, attitudes, dispositions, relations, judgments, and actions can constitute ends in 
themselves (especially in the context of non-consequentialist value systems). For example, instantiating 
a compassionate attitude, courageous disposition, friendship, unbiased judgment, and right action can 
constitute ends in themselves. In sum, all sorts of “things” (e.g., actions, states-of-affairs, attitudes, etc.) 
can be formulated to constitute means or ends, and often, both. (2) For an example of instrumental-(ir-
)rationality, consider the following. Suppose Cassie is sitting in the back of a classroom. Once the class 
ends, she will have only ten minutes to get to her next class, which is on the other side of campus. She 
wants to get to her next class on time—that is her goal—her end. “Therefore,” once the bell rings and 
class is over, Cassie gets out of her chair, and walks in a complete circle around her desk. After circling 
her desk, she moves to the desk in front of her, and circles it. Finishing that circumnavigation, she walks 
to the next desk in front of her and circles it. And so on. She continues to do this until she finally 
reaches the desk closest to the door, circles it, and then exits. Cassie’s route out of the classroom is not 
only bizarre but given her goal of getting to her next class on time, the route is irrational. It is a route 
(i.e., means) she has little reason to take given her goal of getting to her next class on time (i.e., end). 
The rational route or means, given her end is something like, the more direct route of walking down her 
row to the front of the class and walking straight out the door. In this respect, the circling route is 
instrumentally irrational. 
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(though this will get more complicated later). In this respect, the ends are subjective ends, 
and the standard, instrumental-rationality, is a subjective standard (or something of that 
sort). This contrasts with standards that appeal to objective ends, such as Aristotelean 
accounts of practical reason. Fellow travelers of such views include objective theories of 
a person’s good or well-being (e.g., objective list theories) and external reasons.5 
Ideal-instrumental-rationality contrasts with pragmatic-instrumental-rationality.6 
The former evaluates means in terms of their contribution to the ideal satisfaction of 
ends; the latter, evaluates means in terms of their contribution to the pragmatic 
satisfaction of ends (e.g., accommodates satisficing).7  
5 It is worth noting that while instrumental rationality’s ends are subjective, the extent to which a means 
contributes to the satisfaction of those ends is an objective matter. 
6 Restating the above in Jonathan Baron’s (2004) terminology: ideal-instrumental-rationality -that is, 
normative-instrumental-rationality- contrasts with pragmatic-instrumental-rationality -that is, 
prescriptive-instrumental-rationality.  
7 The ideal/pragmatic distinction gets a little tricky regarding instrumental rationality. It was fairly 
straightforward regarding theoretical rationality. For instance, for a computationally daunting problem 
with low stakes, it may be pragmatic to use a heuristic that quickly and easily yields close, but slightly 
incorrect answers. In this respect, the heuristic can straightforwardly be pragmatically rational, despite 
not being ideally rational. Regarding instrumental-rationality, suppose you have the goal of reducing the 
length of your drive home from work. Suppose the means at issue are what route to take. The ideal 
means would be the shortest route. However, suppose that the shortest route is also very complicated—
it requires an extraordinary number of turns, highway transfers, and unfamiliar roads. Suppose an 
alternative route is slightly longer, but much simpler. Given normal human limitations, you are 
susceptible to missing your turn and getting lost. As such, the route that is best to prescribe to you -the 
pragmatic route- may be the slightly longer, but simpler route. In this respect, that route is 
pragmatically-instrumentally-rational. Though the shorter route might not be pragmatically-
instrumentally-rational, there is still a sense in which it is the best route—the sense that is independent 
of your limitations. That sense is captured by describing the shorter route as being ideally-
instrumentally-rational. It might be tempting to argue that the pragmatically-instrumentally-rational is 
the ideally-instrumentally-rational. However, the difference between the two is not only conceptually 
substantive, it is also useful. For instance, the difference facilitates recognizing opportunities for 
interventions that overcome normal human limitations and allow for the realization of the ideal. For 
example, if the difference between the ideal and pragmatic route is significant enough, it may be 
worthwhile for you to get a smartphone equipped with GPS navigation. The trickiness of applying the 
ideal/pragmatic distinction to instrumental-rationality stems from different senses of “can” and 
“possibility.”  To illustrate this, consider that regarding the route-home problem, the most “ideal” route 
is flying in a direct line at the speed of light. Of course, this is impossible for humans and so, it is 
nonsensical to identify this as the ideal means. As such, there is a sense of possibility that constrains 
what can count as the ideal. However, once this condition is introduced, we can ask whether there is a 
principled way of preventing this constraint from collapsing the ideal into the pragmatic. While 
articulating such a principle is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I believe we can rely upon 
intuitions to preserve this distinction and prevent such collapsing. Nonetheless, this a complication 
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We can now turn to unproblematic uses of ideal-instrumental-rationality to 
ground erroneousness in applications of the heuristics-and-biases model. The formal 
doctrine (if you will) of judgment-and-decision-making psychology, in general, and 
heuristics-and-biases psychology in particular, includes a commitment to (ideal)-
instrumental-rationality as the standard of assessment whenever decisions, etc. are 
evaluated (Baron, 2008; Over, 2004, p. 5; Stanovich, Toplak & West, 2008, p. 252).  For 
example, this standard is used to ground attributions of erroneousness to irrational 
gambles. The erroneousness ascribed to an irrational gamble depends upon the 
presumption that the goal or end of such gambling is maximizing expected financial 
payoff (or something of that sort). What grounds privileging this end as the standard from 
which deviations constitute errors? For instance, why not privilege the end, having fun? 
Appeals to (something like) purported objective values to ground such privileging would 
be scientifically-inadmissible. However, appealing to the gambler’s subjective ends is 
scientifically-admissible. The subjectivity here can be obscured by (a) the near universal 
acceptance of such ends, and (b) the presence of the standard’s objective aspects—for 
instance, the role of ideal-theoretical-rationality (which is objective) in assessing the 
extent to which the means (e.g., a particular gamble) contributes to the ideal satisfaction 
of the player’s ends (e.g., maximizing winnings).8  
worth noting. 
8 Despite the official commitment to instrumental-rationality, I have some doubts about whether the 
standards employed in actual research are subjective (in the aforementioned sense). Ultimately, the 
standards are probably insufficiently specified to determine this. Nevertheless, if push comes to shove, I 
ultimately believe that the standards employed are subjective (or at least, would be upon rational 
reconstruction). Nonetheless, this ultimately, does not matter for my purposes. The primary function of 
reviewing unproblematic groundings of erroneousness by variants of the heuristics-and-biases paradigm 
is to use them to develop standards that can be employed in the MBF program. If adapting instrumental-
rationality yields a useful MBF standard, whether instrumental-rationality was ever an employed 
standard is not that important. In other words, the standard developed for the MBF program will sink or 
swim on its own merits, not those of the inspiration for its development. 
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The proceeding (with some simplification) yields: per ideal-instrumental-
rationality, an action/decision/judgment φ by agent A is an error insofar as φ-ing 
frustrates the ideal satisfaction of A’s ends.9 
Adapting ideal-instrumental-rationality begins with replacing cognitive-domain-
regarding or domain-general-regarding features with moral-domain-regarding features. 
Recall that the definition of ‘ideal-instrumental-rationality’ is a standard that evaluates 
one’s actions, etc. (i.e., means) in terms of their contribution to the ideal satisfaction of 
one’s goals (i.e., ends). Applying the replacement procedure yields the following: ideal-
instrumental-moral-rationality (IIMR) is a standard that evaluates one’s actions, etc. (i.e., 
means) in terms of their contribution to the ideal satisfaction of one’s moral goals—i.e., 
one’s moral ends—or generally speaking, one’s morality. In this respect, the standard can 
be referred to as subjective morality (not to be conflated with moral subjectivism—see 
§2.1).
Given a standard, we can construe actions/decisions/judgments that deviate from 
it as mistaken or incorrect vis-à-vis that standard—that is, as errors vis-à-vis that 
standard. As such, we can construe actions that deviate from IIMR as errors vis-à-vis 
IIMR—that is, errors vis-à-vis subjective morality—that is, subjective moral errors (and 
when systematic, subjective moral biases).  The proceeding (with some simplification) 
yields the following simple model:  
Simple Model of Subjective Moral Error: an action/decision/judgment φ by agent A is a 
9 This formalization may be vulnerable to counterexamples. However, the qualifiers, etc. necessary to 
redress them get very complicated very quickly and would take us far afield. As such, I will stick with 
the simple formalization given, as it captures the basic idea, which is sufficient for our purposes.  
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subjective moral error insofar as φ-ing violates A’s morality (i.e., violates IIMR—i.e., 
frustrates the ideal satisfaction of A’s moral ends). 
For an example of such erroneousness, suppose Rachael opposes racial 
discrimination—that is, she supports racial egalitarianism. Being racially egalitarian is a 
moral goal of hers; racial egalitarianism is a moral end of hers. Rachael must choose 
between two job applicants: Katie, who is white, and Shauntel, who is African-American. 
Had Rachael been unaware of the candidates’ races, she would have given the job to 
Shauntel. However, Rachael is aware of their races and is prone to an implicit bias 
against African-Americans due to her unconsciously associating African-Americans with 
negative traits. Rachael selects the candidate to hire by “going with her gut” and choosing 
the candidate that “feels right.” She gives the job to Katie. Rachel’s doing so frustrates 
(the ideal satisfaction of) her moral end, being racially egalitarian; her doing so violates 
her morality. As such, Rachael’s giving the job to Katie constitutes a subjective moral 
error. 
2.1. Independence from The True, Best, and/or Real Morality 
An important feature of ideal-instrumental-moral-rationality (IIMR) is its 
independence from any notion of being the true, best, and/or real morality (or “the true 
morality,” for short). Alternatively framed, IIMR is a standard or more aptly, a metric, 
and not a moral theory (it is distinct from moral subjectivism). To elucidate this 
distinction, let’s focus on actions and consider the following.  
Instrumental rationality (simpliciter) is a standard/metric. It concerns the extent to 
which one’s actions (i.e., means) contributes to the satisfaction of one’s ends. 
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Instrumental-rationality can also be proffered as a normative theory of practical reason 
(loosely speaking, a theory of what one ought to do) (Kolodny & Brunero, 2013). This 
theory claims (something like): one ought to act such that one’s acts (maximally) 
contribute to the satisfaction of one’s ends. Nonetheless, instrumental-rationality can be 
utilized as merely a standard/metric without any claims about practical reason or what 
one ought to do all-things-considered.  
Now consider utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is a moral theory—a theory of morally 
right action. Simplified, it claims: one’s action is morally right if it maximizes utility. 
Utility maximization can also constitute a standard/metric independent of claims to 
rightness. For example, it is coherent to ask how utilitarian a policy is (i.e., to what extent 
does it maximize utility) without making any appeal to rightness.  
The preceding theories have the following form: one’s action (1) has a status 
(e.g., is morally right, is what one ought to do) per (2) some standard/metric (e.g., the 
extent to which it: maximizes utility, is instrumentally-rational). IIMR is a 
standard/metric; it concerns the extent to which one’s action contributes to the ideal 
satisfaction of one’s moral ends. One could proffer IIMR as a moral theory, yielding: 
one’s action (1) is morally right (2) to the extent that it conforms with IIMR. Such “is 
morally right” amounts to something in the ballpark of identifying IIMR as the true 
morality. We could refer to this moral theory as IIMR-ism. Nonetheless, IIMR can be 
utilized as a standard/metric independent of any notion of its being the true morality (for 
why one might utilize it in this way, see §4). 
Let’s replace “IIMR” with “subjective morality.” Conforming with subjective-
morality is merely a standard/metric. One could proffer subjective morality as a moral 
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theory—i.e., proffer that one’s action is morally right to the extent that it conforms with 
subjective morality. This would be a version of the moral theory, moral subjectivism (i.e., 
individual moral relativism or speaker subjectivism). However, one can appeal to or 
employ subjective-morality as a standard/metric without claiming that acts that conform 
to this standard/metric are morally right. That is, one can utilize subjective morality as a 
standard/metric independent of any claims to rightness—i.e., independent of any notions 
of its being the true morality. Just as utilizations of the standard/metric, utility-
maximizing, is distinct from utilitarian-ism; utilizations of subjective morality as a 
standard/metric are distinct from moral subjective-ism. In this dissertation, “subjective 
morality” is a synonym for IIMR and is proffered as merely a standard/metric, not a 
moral theory.10   
The previous adaptions of ideal-theoretical-rationality and a posteriori knowledge 
yielded standards that provided purported moral knowledge (either a priori or a 
posteriori). As knowledge constitutes (something like) justified, true belief, the standards 
provided purported moral truth. In this respect, the standards claimed to constitute the 
true, best, and/or real morality. Such claims are scientifically-inadmissible. In short, 
metaethics and moral philosophy -at least thus far- have not progressed to the point of 
delivering sufficiently incontrovertible pertinent moral knowledge that can yield 
ascriptions of moral erroneousness with a comparable epistemic warrant to that held by 
ascriptions of erroneousness to either ranking “Linda is a feminist bank-teller” as more 
probable than “Linda is a bank teller” or deviating from (justifiably purported) a 
posteriori knowledge of a mountain’s distance. IIMR’s independence from any claim to 
10 More precisely, IIMR is a specification of subjective morality. In this respect, IIMR is a theory of 
subjective morality. Nonetheless, they can be considered interchangeable within the text. 
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constituting the true, best, and/or real morality avoids this pitfall. In this respect, IIMR 
avoids this route to inadequacy. However, does it achieve adequacy? 
We lack sufficient reason to believe that deviating-from-IIMR -i.e., deviating-
from-subjective-morality—i.e., subjective moral error- is causally-aligned with the 
human cognitive system. As such, we lack sufficient reason to believe that it is an SOK. 
Nonetheless, recall that caring about a standard (e.g., ideal rationality), is sufficient 
grounds for construing objects and creating kinds in terms of their relation to that 
standard (e.g., the practical kind, cognitive bias). As such, moral bias can achieve 
adequacy -i.e., constitute an adequate practical kind- by our caring about subjective-
moral-errors or more generally, caring about subjective-morality. For the moment, let us 
assume we (should) care about subjective morality—i.e., IIMR (I will justify this in §4). 
(Upon payment on this promissory note) this constitutes an adequate grounding of 
subjective moral erroneousness. As such, IIMR and subjective-morality is a viable option 
for an MBF moral standard. 
Such utilization of IIMR/subjective-morality with the explicit absence of any 
claim to its being the true moral standard is especially conducive to allowing one to reject 
subjective morality with respect to moral theory and still (a) consider it a standard/metric 
of interest, and (b) consider an MBF program grounded in subjective morality to be a 
worthwhile research program. As such, one can be for instance, a Kantian, a utilitarian, or 
even a moral nihilist and still endorse undertaking a subjective-morality-based MBF 
research program (for why they might, see §4).  
Since IIMR/subjective-morality is not claimed to be the true moral standard, 
adopting it does not preclude the development of other MBF programs that adopt a 
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different standard (so long as that standard is one we care about). For instance, one might 
develop an MBF program that adopted utilitarianism as the moral standard. However, as I 
will later argue (§4.2), subjective morality is the best standard to adopt for an MBF 
research program, and thus the one I will utilize. As such, we can specify the MBF 
paradigm proffered in this dissertation as the subjective moral biases and fallacies 
paradigm, which features subjective moral biases (i.e., systematic subjective moral errors) 
and subjective moral fallacies.11 
3. Subjective Moral Error
We can further flesh-out subjective moral error by responding to the following 
worry: since IIMR/subjective-morality accepts a person’s moral ends, how would a 
person’s actions/decisions/judgments deviate from their own ends to yield an error? One 
straightforward way in which this can occur is for one to fail to identify the action that 
constitutes the means to their ends. A simple way in which this can happen is by 
employing fallacious reasoning (e.g., affirming the consequent) when determining what 
action to take.12  
11 Claiming that a standard constitutes the true morality does not preclude its use in a MBF program. 
However, what is precluded is grounding that standard’s adequacy in its purportedly being the true 
morality. For instance, one might think that the Pope’s morality is the true morality and that may 
motivate developing a MBF program that utilizes the moral standard, the Pope’s morality. That is fine, 
so long as the standard’s adequacy is grounded in for instance, our caring about the Pope’s morality as a 
standard (assuming we do). Furthermore, such caring can be motivated by a widespread belief that the 
Pope’s morality is the true morality, so long as it is the caring that grounds the standard’s inclusion in 
scientific inquiry. 
12 In this respect, moral errors do not require their being generated by -or the otherwise involving- moral 
fallacies or moral-domain-specific processes. For instance, racially discriminatory hiring decisions need 
not be the result of moral reasoning to be a moral error (subjectively or otherwise). Tracing moral errors 
to (arguably) non-moral processing (a la arguably, implicit biases) holds practical promise, as such 
errors are especially susceptible to debiasing measures (e.g., instituting blind review of job 
applications). In other words, they are cases where progress can be achieved through the relatively easy 
work of instituting best practices, as opposed to the more challenging task of changing people’s hearts. 
It is worth noting that while moral errors need not be the product of moral-domain-specific processes, if 
those errors are of particular practical or scientific interest, there is nothing preventing a focus upon that 




A way to deviate from one’s own moral ends that has broad implications is 
suggested by a canonical consideration in subjectivist theories of normativity, such as 
internalist theories of practical reason and subjectivist theories of well-being and the good 
(e.g., Brandt, 1979; Railton, 1986a, 1986b; Rosati, 1996; Sobel, 2017; Smith, 1995; 
Williams, 1981). One manifestation of this consideration regards internal reasons. 
Internal reasons are reasons grounded in an agent’s desires.13 Internal reasons contrast 
with external reasons, which are grounded elsewhere, such as in objective goodness. A 
simple model of internal reasons is: 
 
Simple Model of Internal Reasons: An agent A has an internal reason to perform some 
action φ iff A possesses some desire whose satisfaction will be served by φ-ing.14 
 
This model of internal reasons is too simple, as it cannot handle cases of false 
beliefs. For example (a la Williams, 1981, p. 78), suppose Gaston is thirsty. He sees a 
glass of clear liquid and believes it is water. As such, he desires to consume the content 
of the glass. Unbeknownst to him, the glass is filled with gasoline. According to the 
simple model, he has a reason to pick up the glass and drink the gasoline. This is a 
                                                            
13 More precisely, internal normative reasons -as opposed to motivational or explanatory reasons- are 
distinguished by (something like) a function of the agent’s contingent conative set (Sobel, 2009, p. 337) 
or suitably connected to the agent’s subjective motivational set, which includes not only desires, but 
“dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as 
they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent” (Williams, 1981, p. 81). “Desire” 
will be used as a stand-in for contingent conative set, etc. 
14 This discussion of internal reasons largely draws from the literature defending reasons-internalism. 
Reasons-internalism is a neo-Humean view that denies the existence of external reasons (Finlay & 
Schroeder, 2012). As such, proponents of reasons-internalism treat their models of internal reasons as 
models of normative reasons, simpliciter. Reasons-externalists can accept the existence of both internal 
and external reasons; as such, they can accept models of internal reasons. This dissertation is agnostic 
on reasons-internalism versus externalism. As such, models of internal reasons are simply that, and 
should not be construed as models of normative reasons, simpliciter. 
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reductio of the simple model. 
Upon adaption to our subject matter, this consideration becomes that one can have 
mistaken moral ends. Just as (a) the simple model of internal reason allowed false beliefs 
to yield mistaken desires (Railton, 2007, p. 267) that in turn, yield putative reasons, 
likewise, (b) the simple model of subjective moral errors allows false beliefs to yield 
mistaken moral ends that in turn, yield putative assessments of moral erroneousness.  
For an illustration, suppose that Justine values retributive justice. Suppose that 
executing a murderer would further her moral ends and executing an innocent person 
would frustrate those ends. Suppose Justine falsely believed that Iona was a murderer. As 
such, Justine would adopt—and possess—the moral end of executing Iona. As such, 
according to the simple model of subjective moral errors, Justine’s sentencing Iona to 
death would not be a subjective moral error. However, this cannot be right, as Iona is 
innocent.15 As such, just as Gaston’s having a reason to drink the gasoline was a reductio 
of the simple model of internal reason, the assessment that putting innocent Iona to death 
is not a subjective moral error is a reductio of the simple model of subjective moral error 
(i.e., A’s φ-ing is a subjective moral error insofar as φ-ing violates A’s morality—i.e., 
frustrates the ideal satisfaction of A’s moral ends). 
3.1. Idealization 
More refined models of internal reasons (e.g., Williams, 1981) avoid such 
reductios by (a) utilizing counterfactual idealizations of the agent (e.g., endowing the 
15 One might interpret “moral error” in a way that could indeed render sentencing Iona to death not a moral 
error. One might say, “It isn’t a moral error; it’s a doxastic error.” However, what is meant by “moral 
error” is akin to what is typically meant by “morally wrong.” One would say, “Killing innocent Iona is 
morally wrong.”  One would not say, “It’s not morally wrong; it’s doxastically wrong.” The relation of 
“morally” to “wrong” is how one should interpret the relation of “moral” to “error.” 
117 
agent with omniscience and perfect rationality) and (b) grounding internal reasons in the 
idealized agent’s desires. This yields: 
Idealized Agent Model of Internal Reasons: A has an internal reason to φ iff A+ 
(idealized agent A) possesses some desire whose satisfaction will be served by φ-ing.16  
Given an idealization that includes omniscience, idealized Gaston (Gaston+) would know 
that the glass is filled with gasoline and thus, would not desire to consume its contents. 
As such, according to the idealized agent model of internal reasons, (non-idealized) 
Gaston would not have an internal reason to drink the gasoline. As such, the reductio is 
avoided. 
A sensible way to avoid such reductios with IIMR (e.g., Justine’s sentencing 
innocent Iona to death’s not being a subjective moral error) is to likewise employ 
counterfactual idealizations. This is sensible because while IIMR regards a person’s 
moral ends, it (should) only regard their genuine moral ends. That is, it should not 
necessarily regard whatever moral end a person believes she has or acts upon. In this 
vein, a moral end is genuine (or something of that sort) insofar as it would be possessed 
by A+ (i.e., agent A upon idealization)—that is, insofar as it is constitutive of A+’s 
morality. In this respect, a moral end of A is genuine insofar as it would “survive the 
idealization” of A. This yields: 
16 In the practical reason literature, what I am calling the “idealized agent model” is sometimes called the 
“deliberative model” (Arkonovich, 2011). 
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Idealized Agent Model of Subjective Moral Errors: A’s φ-ing is a subjective moral error 
insofar as φ-ing violates A+’s morality (i.e., frustrates the ideal satisfaction of A+’s moral 
ends).  
3.2. Extensional Adequacy & Non-Alienation 
So, with respect to yielding an A+ for IIMR and subjective moral error, what are 
the right counterfactual idealizations (e.g., omniscience? perfect rationality?)? Before 
jumping into this question, it will be worthwhile to address some preliminaries.  
Firstly, while there is an established canon of such idealizations regarding 
subjectivist value theory and practical reason (e.g., Brandt, 1979; Railton, 1986a, 1986b; 
Rosati, 1996; Sobel, 2017; Smith, 1995; Williams, 1981), unfortunately, there is a paucity 
of philosophical work done on idealization regarding subjectivist morality (in the 
relativistic sense—addressed shortly).17 As such, much of the following will draw from 
adaption of the former. 
Secondly, an important tension hangs over the consideration of idealization 
options. Subjectivism involves grounding an agent’s normativity in an aspect of that 
agent (e.g., grounding her reasons in her desires).18 Idealization involves hypothetically 
17 Some moral relativists do appeal to idealizations (e.g., Wong, 1984). In this respect, there is 
philosophical work that utilizes idealizations of subjective morality (at least with respect to idealizations 
of epistemic capacities bearing upon subjective morality). However, at least for the literature I have 
been able to find (e.g., Baghramian & Carter, 2015; Gowans, 2015; Prinz 2007; Wong, 1984; 2006), the 
idealizations, themselves, are not much explored. Indulging some sociological speculation, I suspect 
that this apparent hole in the literature stems from many philosophers rejecting speaker subjectivism 
(qua moral theory). This is akin to one neglecting specifications of utility because one is not a 
utilitarian. Insofar as one cares about utility, which is far from sufficient for utilitarianism, this would be 
unwise as a general practice. Perhaps there are enough utilitarians out there to pick up any slack. By 
contrast, there might be too few speaker subjectivists out there to get around to delving into this topic. 
This sociological dynamic could persist despite the consistency of (a) interest in idealized subjective 
morality and (b) a rejection of speaker subjectivism. 
18 Adapting this paragraph to subjective morality yields a “de-normativized” (or less explicitly normative) 
version, wherein for instance, subjective-ism and normativity are replaced with (something like) 
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changing the agent and deriving conclusions regarding the actual agent from the 
hypothetical agent (e.g., deriving an agent’s reasons from the idealized agent’s desires). 
Subjectivist idealization must thus thread the needle of (a) changing the agent enough to 
secure extensional adequacy (e.g., not yielding a reason to drink gasoline), while (b) not 
changing the agent in a way that threatens the resultant idealized agent’s connection to 
the original agent (who ultimately, grounds the normativity—e.g., Finlay & Schroder, 
2012, 1.2.3; Railton, 1986a, p. 46; Rosati, 1996). An illustrative (though possibly 
problematic) example of maintaining this connection is ensuring that the idealization 
process preserves the original agent’s deepest values, final ends, or tie to the deep-self. 
Idealizations that lose this fundamental connection yield reasons, goodness, etc. from 
which the original agent is alienated. These dual desiderata of (a) extensional adequacy 
and (b) non-alienation are important to keep in mind whenever considering idealization 
options.  
A further feature of idealized subjectivism’s -or more precisely, neo-
Humeanism’s- commitment to non-alienation is (what we can describe as) the individual-
relativistic spirit, which is an impulse to index to individuals. In other words, it is what 
drives adding the qualifier, “to you” or “for you,” to claims such as “X is a reason.” It is 
distinguished by its rejection of universalism. This spirit is most clearly manifested in the 
distance neo-Humean exemplars of subjective idealization maintain from Kantian views 
of practical reason (e.g., Arkonovich, 2013, p. 215; Bagnoli, 2017, sect. 3; Sobel, 2017, p. 
6). While Kantian views satisfy some of the technical criteria of “subjectivism,” these 
views contend that all idealized agents’ desires, etc. converge (e.g., Korsgaard, 1986). 
subjective standards and subjective constructs of interest. I’ll just stick with the more reader-friendly 
normative version.   
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Given human diversity (let alone the diversity amongst possible rational agents), the 
individual-relativistic spirit manifests as strong skepticism that a view of practical reason 
could yield universal convergence without violating non-alienation—that is, without 
violating subjectivism (e.g., Joyce, 2001, p. 75). In other words, arriving at universal 
convergence shows that the view is “not really subjectivist.” In this respect, such “real 
subjectivism” (implicitly at least) has an individual relativistic spirit.19 Loosely speaking, 
the individual relativistic spirit is that which drives neo-Humeans to declare that Kantian 
views are members of a different camp.20 In this dissertation, subjectivism can be 
presumed to be non-Kantian and non-universal subjectivism. The individual relativistic 
spirit also distances exemplars of idealized subjectivism from (some versions or 
interpretations of) ideal-observer theories (e.g., Firth, 1952; Kauppinen, 2014, §4.2). The 
most important takeaway for present concerns is that the individual-relativistic spirit 
clarifies the pertinent sense of ‘non-alienation’ invoked in the aforementioned 
desideratum. 
3.3. Counterfactual Endowments 
Having addressed these preliminaries, we can return to the question of what 
counterfactual idealizations are the right ones for yielding an A+ for IIMR and subjective 
moral error. We can split this question in two: (1) what should the idealized agent be 
endowed with? (e.g., omniscience? full rationality?), and (2) by which “mechanism” (if 
you will) should these capacities be exploited to yield genuine ends? (e.g., by identifying 
19 This divide between neo-Humeanism and neo-Kantianism reaches a head on the conceivability of an 
ideally rational sadist (e.g., Caligula) (Bagnoli, 2017, §3). Kantianism, which claims to derive morality 
from rationality, contends that an ideally rational Caligula is inconceivable. Neo-Humeans disagree; 
their position reflects the implicit individual relativistic spirit of neo-Humeanism subjectivism. 
20 The issue of whether Kantian practical reason counts as “real subjectivism” is not a surprising one given 
Kant’s tendency to upend sweeping categories such as the subjective. 
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the unidealized agent’s genuine ends with the idealized agent’s ends?). To answer these 
questions, I will first lay out some options. These options are not exhaustive.  
The first class of endowments to consider are informational endowments. One 
dimension on which informational endowments can vary is their domain. One such 
domain is all non-normative facts—that is, endowing the idealized agent with non-
normative omniscience. (Henceforth, the qualifier, non-normative, will often be left off 
and should be considered implicit.) 
One might think that such omniscience should be ruled out as a possible 
counterfactual idealization because it is too strong. One basis for thinking this might be 
something like: “Omniscience is grossly unrealistic for humans. As such, calling 
someone’s action/decision/judgment a moral error due to their lacking something so 
grossly unrealistic is unfair.” The problem with this line of thinking is that it conflates the 
commission of moral errors with blameworthiness.  
To illuminate this distinction, consider a math problem whose solution requires 
mathematical abilities that are grossly unrealistic for any unaided human—for example, 
identifying the square root of 1,524,155,677,489. There is one correct answer to this 
problem: 1,234,567. Is a failure to provide this answer blameworthy? No. How about 
providing the incorrect answer: 1,234,500? Not only is that answer not blameworthy, it is 
praiseworthy for an unaided human to get so close to the correct answer. Nevertheless, 
the answer is still incorrect; it is still erroneous—providing that answer still constitutes 
making an error. Objections of the sort, “this is an unrealistic standard of error,” would be 
confused. Mathematical correctness is not a standard that adjusts for realistic human 
expectations, and that is fine, so long as we keep in mind the distinction between mere 
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error and blameworthiness.  
A variant of the above objection that may get more traction is: “Omniscience is 
grossly unrealistic for humans. As such, calling someone’s action/decision/judgment 
irrational due to their lacking something so grossly unrealistic is unfair (and/or 
inaccurate)” (a la Joyce, 2001, §3.0, §3.7). The problem with this objection is that it 
conflates rationality simpliciter with ideal rationality. The standard at issue in this chapter 
is ideal-instrumental-moral-rationality. The pertinent generalization that encompasses the 
above example is ideal-rationality. Deviations from this standard are merely irrational per 
ideal-rationality. While it is unclear what “irrational [simpliciter]” amounts to, it cannot 
invalidate ideal rationality. Even if rationality simpliciter is identical with something like 
realistic, pragmatic, or prescriptive rationality, one still needs ideal rationality to make 
sense of it being wise to employ a calculator to answer the math question.21 In short, 
rationality per pragmatic rationality, realistic rationality, etc. neither entails nor 
invalidates ideal rationality. Similarly, ideal irrationality (1) does not entail pragmatic, 
realistic, and/or all-things-considered irrationality and (2) does not invalidate pragmatic, 
realistic, and/or all-things-considered rationality. This was the fundamental confusion 
driving the aforementioned misguided “rationality wars” (n. 1). Just as the previous 
objection conflated deviations from accuracy (i.e., errors) with blameworthiness, this 
objection seemingly similarly conflates deviations from ideal rationality with 
blameworthiness.  
In sum, once we recognize the distinctions between (1) erroneousness versus 
21 In a similar vein, recall (n. 6) the case of the driving-route. Though the easier-to-follow route was the 
pragmatically rational route to take, this cannot invalidate the ideal rationality of the shorter-but-more-
complicated route, as evidenced by the possible worthwhileness of getting a GPS navigator in order to 
take the latter route. 
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blameworthiness, and (2) pragmatic, etc. rationality versus ideal rationality, we see that 
omniscience and other unrealistic endowments should not be ruled out as counterfactual 
idealizations for IIMR and subjective moral error.  
A second domain of information is the relevant facts (Brandt, 1969-1970, p.45-
46; Kolodny & Brunero, 2013). Having the-relevant-facts as an option renders 
omniscience obsolete. Any fact made accessible by omniscience that is relevant is 
covered by the-relevant-facts. The difference between the two is whether the idealized 
agent is endowed with access to irrelevant facts. Since those facts are irrelevant, such 
access does not matter. In other words, nothing that matters is lost by downgrading 
omniscience to the-relevant-facts. In addition, omniscience may open cans of worms and 
philosophical puzzles that the-relevant-facts do not. As such, the-relevant-facts is a 
preferable informational endowment over omniscience. I will return to informational 
endowments shortly.  
In the gasoline case, we saw how false beliefs can yield defective desires that 
yield putative reasons. Such defective desires and, in turn, putative reasons, can also arise 
from failures of rationality. For instance, suppose Gaston correctly believes the following 
conditional: If the glass contains water, then the water bottle will be empty. Suppose he 
sees that the water bottle is empty and affirms the consequent, concluding: Therefore, the 
glass contains water. Believing such, he forms the desire to consume the liquid in the 
glass. Unbeknownst to him, the liquid is gasoline. As such, according to the simple model 
of internal reasons (which lacks idealizations), he would have an internal reason to drink 
the gasoline. As with informational idealizations regarding false beliefs, models of 
internal reasons can avoid such reductios from failures of rationality by bestowing 
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rationality endowments.  
One such endowment is inferential-perfection. So endowed, idealized Gaston 
would not affirm the consequent, and, in turn, would not conclude that the glass is filled 
with water, would not form the desire to consume the liquid in the glass, and thus, would 
not have an internal reason to drink from the glass. As such, inferential-perfection is a 
basic endowment of idealization. 
An important condition of rationality is preference-coherence (which includes 
consistency and arguably, unity—e.g., Joyce, 2001, p. 71).22 Achieving preference-
coherence can involve revising preferences, including morally-relevant preferences. 
Revising preferences per se is not a big deal. For example, the Gaston case involved 
revising a preference for consuming the liquid. However, such cases involve (what we 
can call) shallow preferences. What shallow preferences are will be easier to grasp by 
contrasting them with deep preferences. Two major dimensions of deepness: (1) intrinsic-
ness and (2) higher-order-ness. Intrinsic preferences involve preferring the object for its 
own sake. This contrasts with instrumental preferences, which prefer their object as a 
means to satisfying another preference (which either is -or ultimately, is grounded in- an 
intrinsic preference). Higher-order preferences, or more specifically, second-order 
preferences, are preferences for having a preference. Formulated in terms of desires, 
second-order desires are desires to have a particular desire. This distinction illuminates 
cases of akrasia (i.e., weakness-of-will), wherein one has a first-order desire for say, a 
delicious fatty food or procrastination, but does not have a second-order desire for having 
22 Per the conventions of the practical reason literature, I previously used the term, “desires,” as a stand-in 
for contingent conative set, etc. (n. 12). Regarding rationality, I will follow the conventions of its 
discipline and use the term, “preferences.” “Preference” and “desire” can be considered generally 
interchangeable stand-ins. 
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that first-order desire. Second-order desires are a form of endorsement. Values are 
commonly analyzed as second-order desires/preferences (e.g., Joyce, 2001, p. 69). 
Intrinsic preferences and second-order preferences are deep preferences; such 
preferences’ revision risks alienation. In this respect, opening the door to idealization 
revising deep preferences (e.g., values) is a big deal.  
Our preferences’ vulnerability to coherence-based revision stems from the general 
messiness of human psychology. In other words, if one digs into the human mind, one 
will not find a tidy utility function that obeys the axioms of decision theory. Furthermore, 
it is debatable whether our preferences (ends, values, etc.) are stable (Zimbardo, 2007), 
known (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006), relevant (Haidt, 2001), assessable (Fischhoff, 
1991), or present in any coherent form (Churchland, 1996). Achieving preference-
coherence can require revising morally-relevant preferences.  
The extent of revision required to redress coherence deficits varies. On the low-
revision end of the spectrum is redressing inchoate (morally-relevant) preferences. This 
can merely require assigning preference-orderings and weightings. Such redressing might 
even be described as merely specifying or clarifying preferences, as opposed to revising 
them (Milgram, 1996, p. 504). For instance, suppose a question at hand is whether to 
support a tax cut for the wealthy. Suppose one holds deep preferences for liberty and 
equality. Prima facie, this entails that it is both rational and irrational to support the tax 
cut. This prima facie conflict can be resolved by clarifying the relative weights one 
assigns to these preferences (it is more complicated than that, but this is the basic idea).  
On the high-revision end of the spectrum is redressing intransitive preferences, 
wherein for instance, one prefers: A>B, B>C, and C>A (in other words, when one is 
126 
vulnerable to becoming a money pump—Ramsey, 1928). For example, one might prefer: 
harm-avoidance > liberty, liberty > fairness, and fairness > harm-avoidance. How to 
render intransitive preferences coherent is not obvious, as there are multiple solutions. 
For instance, one can replace A>B with B>A, or replace B>C with C>B, or replace C>A 
with A>C. 
Especially when preference-incoherence cannot be resolved by mere clarification, 
one option is to privilege certain types of preferences. This is already done by privileging 
intrinsic preferences over instrumental preferences; though this is uncontroversial since 
such privileging is built into the notions of ‘intrinsic’ and ‘instrumental.’ That is, it is by 
definition that instrumental preferences are authoritative only insofar as they contribute to 
the satisfaction of intrinsic preferences. More controversial would be privileging second-
order preferences above first-order preferences (a la value-based Humeanism—Radcliffe, 
2012, p. 783). Furthermore, this first/second order dichotomy may be too simple as 
valuing often comes in degrees—Radcliffe, 2012, p. 777). Nevertheless, it is an attractive 
option as it would provide a mechanism for discounting (arguably) less authoritative 
preferences, such as those that stem from akrasia, addiction, impulses, whims, or alien 
desires (Hubin, 2003). Nonetheless, desires that lack second-order validation can still be 
intrinsic and strong; as such, revising them raises alienation concerns.  
Once privileging preferences is on the table, another option is to privilege 
morally-relevant preferences according to the types of cognitive processes that yield 
them. For example, one might privilege morally-relevant preferences from deliberative 
(type 2) processes over those from intuitive (type 1) processes (e.g., Greene, 2007; 
Singer, 2005; contra Bartsch & Wright, 2005; Kass, 1998; Railton, 2014) —or at least, 
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discount moral preferences that lack deliberative endorsement (or lack principled 
endorsement, a la moral dumbfounding—Haidt, Bjorklund & Murphy, 2004). 
Privileging second-order preferences segues into idealization procedures that 
subject preferences to second-order evaluation. Such evaluation is at the heart of 
reflection. The pursuit of coherence and the privileging of second-order evaluation 
(arguably) drives the method of reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 1971). Something in the 
ballpark of utilizing reflective equilibrium -or at least reflection- for grounding moral 
error within scientific psychology has been endorsed by some (e.g., Stein, 2005; Tetlock, 
2005), but rejected by others, particularly out of distrust of intuitions (e.g., Baron, 2005; 
Singer, 2005b). In sum, endowing rationality and in turn, preference-coherence can open 
a can of worms regarding preference-revision. I will return to rationality endowments 
shortly. 
An additional class of endowments regards the agent’s state-of-mind (or mental 
condition). One option is to have no such endowment. Most likely, this would mean that 
the default desires, etc. that the idealized agent inherits are those the agent possesses at 
the time of the judgment/decision/action-at-hand.  
To begin with an extreme case, suppose that Heidi is hypnotized (Rosati, 1996, p. 
302). Under hypnosis she may be made to have deep desires that would otherwise be 
completely alien to her. Presumably, such desires would not be legitimate grounding for 
her normativity (e.g., would not determine what is constitutive of her good). Such desires, 
once transferred to idealized Heidi, might survive informational and rationality 
endowments (e.g., if under hypnosis, all of Heidi’s desires and aversions are flipped). To 
preserve the normative grounding of desires, desires due to hypnosis must be excluded.  
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Taking the example down a notch, suppose Debra is depressed—perhaps even 
suicidal (Bjorklund, Bjornsson, Eriksson, et. al, 2012, p. 126). This may affect Debra’s 
desires and yield various alienated desires or eliminate non-alienated desires. Other 
mental conditions with similar effects include apathy, exhaustion, mania, obsessive 
compulsion, and emotional disturbance. To preserve the normative grounding of desires, 
these desires will also need to be excluded. As such, there is a need for the idealized 
agent to receive a mental condition endowment.  
Drawing from the literature on motivational internalism (i.e., moral judgment 
internalism) one such endowment is “psychological normalcy” (Bjorklund, Bjornsson, 
Eriksson, et. al, 2012, p. 125-127). While intuitively compelling at first, “psychological 
normalcy” opens a can of worms. A classical commitment of subjectivists -or more 
precisely, Humeans- is that an idealized sadist (e.g., Caligula) is conceivable (contra 
Kantians). It seems that sadism is not psychologically normal but idealizing away sadism 
would violate a core Humean subjectivist commitment to non-alienation. Would 
psychological normalcy exclude all conditions that are classified as disorders in the DSM 
(American Psychological Association, 2013)? Should it? 
Another state-of-mind that could render preferences illegitimate sources of 
normativity is inflamed passions (e.g., Brandt, 1943, p. 487; Rawls, 1971, p. 47). For 
instance, desires while enraged might require exclusion. In accordance, a common state-
of-mind endowment is a state-of-calm (e.g., Rosati, 1996, p. 305; Sobel, 1994, p. 791; 
Wallace, 2014, sect. 5). Such states are often presumed to be optimal for deliberation and 
reflection.  However, arguably, reducing passions might hinder that which drives moral 
preferences.  
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Another type of endowment is (conspicuously) moral psychological endowments. 
For example, bestowing maximal compassion and/or empathy. Such endowments could 
include sets of virtues, attitudes, and/or capacities that enhance sensitivity to each of the 
foundations of moral psychology, as proffered by Jonathan Haidt (2013)—namely, care, 
fairness, loyalty, authority, sanctity/purity, and liberty. Another endowment option is 
bestowing the “highest” stage of Kohlbergian moral development (1958; contra Gilligan, 
1982). Other options include bestowing impartiality (a la the ideal observer—Firth, 
1952), moral maturity (Bartsch & Wright, 2005, p. 546; Brandt, 1943, p. 486), 
selflessness (Daniels, 1979, p. 270) and open-mindedness (Richardson, 1994, p. 31). 
3.4. Two-Tiered Subjective Idealization 
Prima facie, it is unclear which endowments are the right ones to select for 
subjective moral errors. Such selection risks significant alienation. For instance, if I 
simply declare that A+ should be endowed with maximal reverence for authority, that 
could yield preferences from which one was alienated. Regarding Haidt’s (2013) 
foundations of moral psychology, people vary not only in the weight they assign to such 
foundations, but also in whether they consider certain ones such as loyalty (which 
includes in-group loyalty) to have any normative authority at all.  
A solution to this problem can be found by turning to the question of which 
“mechanism” of idealization to use. Recall the idealized agent model of internal reasons: 
An agent A has an internal reason to perform some action X iff A+ (idealized agent A) 
possesses some desire whose satisfaction will be served by X-ing (a la Williams, 1981). 
In this case, the “mechanism” is the introduction of A+ (as the vessel for endowments) 
and the appeal to A+’s desires. The solution is adapting two-tier internalism (Rosati, 
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1996).23 Per such -upon adaption- the endowments selected are those that the agent 
would consider authoritative. For instance, should your idealized agent be endowed with 
maximal reverence for authority? That depends upon whether you consider such an 
endowment authoritative. 
However, this move -as currently stated- would confront challenges faced by the 
simple model of internal reasons—namely, the granting of authority to preferences that 
have not been cleaned-up by idealization. Suppose an agent is enraged; one might think 
that being in such a state would delegitimize her granting or denying of authority to 
particular endowments. One response to this problem is to create a counterfactually 
idealized agent to select the endowments—i.e., create an idealized endowment-selector. 
23 Rosati’s (1996) model regards a person’s good, though it can be adapted for other applications. Such 
internalism (or per our terms, subjectivism) is two-tier in that the normative object (a person’s good) is 
(1) grounded in (the desires of an idealized version of) that agent (as opposed to an objective list), and
(2) the makeup of that idealized agent -i.e., the idealization conditions or endowments- is also grounded
in that agent (as opposed to declared from “outside”). With respect to (1), we left off at the Ideal Agent
Model of Internal Reasons (i.e., A has an internal reason to perform some action X iff A+ possesses
some desire whose satisfaction will be served by X-ing). By -and during- Rosati (1996), (1) changes.
For one, the Ideal Agent Model succumbs to the reductio of being unable to yield an internal reason for
A to improve her rational capacities if A+ is already endowed with perfect rationality (Railton, 1986a, p.
53). This is an instance of the conditional fallacy, wherein an agent’s reason (e.g., to improve her
rational capacities) stems from the agent’s non-idealized state (e.g., her rational capacities’ being
imperfect), but having that reason is “blocked” because the model requires that such reasons be
grounded only in desires that would occur under idealization (e.g., under perfect rationality) (Finlay &
Schroeder, 2012, §2.4). Such “blocked” reasons -i.e., reasons that “break” upon idealization- are also
referred to as fragile reasons (Sobel, 2001). This reductio is avoided by the Ideal Advisor Model,
wherein: A has an internal reason to perform some action X iff A+ would desire that A possess some
desire whose satisfaction would be served by X-ing (a la Railton, 1986a; 1986b). Another problem is
ensuring that A+ is acting in A’s interest; this yields: A+ is to assume A’s place -including her lack of
endowments- upon completing the idealization procedure (Railton, 1986a, p. 53). An additional
problem is indirection, wherein desire for -or explicit pursuit of- an object frustrates attaining that object
(e.g., the paradox of hedonism) (Rosati, 1996, p. 304). This is rectified by having A+ desire not that A 
possess a certain desire, but that A pursue a certain action, etc. A further problem is doubt that the
accounts provide a sufficient condition; this is rectified by replacing “(A has an internal reason…) iff
(A+…)” with “only if” (Rosati, 1996, p. 311). With these developments, (1) ends up as: A has an
internal reason to perform some action X only if, were A+ contemplating the situation of A as someone
about to assume A’s position and non-idealized state, A+ would desire that A perform X (a la Rosati,
1996). More specifically, Rosati’s formulation -i.e., regarding an internalist conception- is: “something
X can be good for a person A only if [A+] would care about X for [A], were [A+] under appropriate
[idealization] conditions and contemplating the situation of her actual self as someone about to assume
her position” (p. 303-304).
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But which endowments should be bestowed upon that idealized endowment-selector. One 
could create a counterfactually idealized agent to select the endowments for that idealized 
endowment-selector—i.e., create an idealized endowment-selector for the idealized 
endowment-selector; however, this could continue ad infinitum. To avoid both this 
infinite regress and having non-cleaned-up preferences determining endowments, 
Rosati’s solution is to state that the endowments selected be grounded in the agent under 
ordinary optimal conditions.  
We need a way to rule out alienated [endowments], without 
allowing the appropriateness of [endowments] to depend 
upon how they now strike a person, whatever her present 
state might be [e.g., enraged]. We can do so by requiring 
that a person regard counterfactual [endowments] as 
appropriate not in her present state, but under ordinary 
optimal conditions. These would include that a person not 
be sleeping, drugged, or hypnotized, that she be thinking 
calmly and rationally, and that she not be overlooking any 
readily available information. This list of conditions is not 
intended to be exhaustive. By ‘ordinary optimal conditions’ 
I mean whatever normally attainable conditions are optimal 
for reflecting on questions about what to [care about or 
do].…Thus, we might say, counterfactual [endowments] 
are appropriate only if a person would so regard them under 
ordinary optimal conditions. (p. 305) 
Adapting this solution yields: the endowments of A+ are those the agent would consider 
morally authoritative under ordinary optimal conditions. 
We are now in a position to more fully flesh out subjective moral error. The major 
ingredients are the following. (1) An action/decision/judgment φ by agent A is a 
subjective moral error insofar as φ-ing deviates from A’s genuine morality—i.e., φ-ing 
violates ideal-instrumental-moral-rationality (IMMR)—i.e., X-ing frustrates the ideal 
satisfaction of A’s genuine moral ends. (2) A morality -and moral end- is genuine insofar 
as it would survive idealization—i.e., is constitutive of A+’s morality (i.e., the morality 
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of agent A upon idealization)—i.e., is a moral end possessed by A+. (3) A counterfactual 
idealization of A yields the relevant A+ insofar as the endowments bestowed upon A+ 
are those that A considers authoritative under ordinary optimal conditions. This yields:  
Two-Tier Model of Subjective Moral Errors: A’s φ-ing is a subjective moral error insofar 
as φ-ing deviates from the A’s genuine morality (i.e., frustrates the ideal satisfaction of 
A+’s moral ends), wherein A+ is a counterfactual idealization of A upon whom is 
bestowed those endowments that A considers authoritative under ordinary optimal 
conditions.24  
4. Why Subjective Morality?
We can now turn to justification. We have no reason to think that genuine 
IIMR/subjective-morality’s derivative kinds (e.g., moral-bias-vis-à-vis-subjective-
morality) constitute system-specific objective-kinds (SOKs). As such, their scientific 
adequacy -or more precisely, scientific admissibility- depends upon our caring about 
them, or more generally, our caring about (genuine) IIMR/subjective-morality. 
4.1. Species of Instrumental Rationality 
As evidenced by the cognitive-heuristics-and-biases program, we care about the 
extent to which people are ideally-instrumentally-rational. Since ideal-instrumental-
moral-rationality (IIMR) is a species of ideal-instrumental-rationality, we have reason to 
care about the former. To care about ideal-instrumental-rationality regarding prudential 
matters, but not moral matters, is unjustifiably myopic. This simple point is sufficient for 
24 While I contend that this account is sufficient for communicating the basic idea, I recognize that it may 
have difficulty with certain cases and be susceptible to counterexamples (a la those raised in n. 23). 
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caring about IIMR (i.e., subjective morality) in-and-of-itself. 
Nevertheless, an objection that might be raised is that IIMR can yield positive 
evaluations of racist actions and negative evaluations of egalitarian actions. This stems 
from IIMR’s acceptance of an individual’s (genuine) moral ends. For example, David 
Duke has racist moral ends (i.e., a racist moral code, wherein “moral” is meant in a 
descriptive and not normative sense). As such, (ceteris paribus) the more racist his 
actions are, the more he satisfies his racist ends, and the more he conforms with ideal-
instrumental-moral-rationality. Per IIMR, Duke’s racist actions warrant a positive 
evaluation, and his racially egalitarian actions constitute errors. Yielding such 
evaluations can appear to be a reductio of IIMR and the MBF research program. 
It is not. This is because IIMR neither is nor claims to be a standard of all-things-
considered evaluation. IIMR is merely one dimension by which an 
action/decision/judgment can be evaluated. It is not the only evaluative dimension that 
we care about; but it is one that we do care about. Likewise, ideal-theoretical-rationality 
is also merely a single dimension of evaluation. Suppose Duke performs a racist act that 
conforms to ideal-theoretical-rationality. Per that standard, the act also receives a positive 
evaluation. Nonetheless, this is not a reductio of caring about ideal-theoretical-rationality, 
which grounds much of the cognitive heuristics and biases program. All-things-
considered, we may have good reason to prefer that Duke violates IIMR so that the 
satisfaction of his racist ends is frustrated. However, this does not impugn the value of 
IIMR any more than all-things-considered, preferring that Duke is theoretically-irrational 
impugns the value of theoretical rationality. For instance, it may be better if Duke 
affirms-the-consequent (as it would frustrate the fulfillment of his racist ends); however, 
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this does not preclude caring about valid inference and construing such conclusions as 
errors. For example, if Duke’s racist ends are frustrated by instantiating the availability 
bias, this does not impugn construing the availability bias as an error. All it means is that 
evaluating an action/decision/judgment as theoretically irrational is insufficient for 
determining its all-things-considered evaluation. In sum, just as theoretical rationality is 
one evaluative dimension among many, so is IIMR. In this respect, we still have (pro 
tanto) reason to care about IIMR (i.e., subjective-morality) in-and-of-itself.  
4.2. The Best Standard for the MBF Program 
An assumed premise of this dissertation is that we have reason to care about the 
MBF program’s potential benefits (Ch. 1, §4). As such, we have reason to care about 
having an MBF program as a means to realizing those potential benefits. In other words, 
the MBF program is instrumentally valuable with respect to realizing the potential 
benefits. More specifically, we have reason to care about having the best version of an 
MBF program and in particular, the best moral standard (de dicto) with respect to 
realizing those potential benefits. One especially important benefit is the potential 
practical benefit of decreasing immoral acts/decisions/judgments—i.e., decreasing moral 
errors. This requires changing behavior. As such, a practical criterion of the best moral 
standard is its conduciveness to changing behavior. A standard that lacks this 
conduciveness is practically inadequate. A standard that (best) has such conduciveness is 
practically adequate (at least in this respect—addressed in §4.3). As such, it is a standard 
we have reason to care about (as a means to -best- realizing the practical benefit of 
reducing moral errors). As will be shown, (genuine) IIMR/subjective-morality is that 
practically adequate best moral standard. 
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Let us now turn to different possible standards and consider how they fare with 
respect to conduciveness to changing behavior. As endorsed by Jonathan Baron (2005), 
one possible standard is utilitarianism.25 For illustrative purposes, let’s focus on simple-
utilitarianism. Simple-utilitarianism can entail very controversial judgments (e.g., 
involuntary organ redistribution being morally obligatory). If simple-utilitarianism is 
adopted as the standard, then opposing any such judgments constitutes a moral error. 
However, what would happen, in practice, when someone opposes such judgments? The 
research program would identify -or better yet, declare- that the person’s judgment was 
morally erroneous, and the person would disagree—perhaps vehemently. What is the 
practical point of this result? Where do things go from there? Is the person expected to 
just accept the researchers’ attribution of error? Why should they? In short, the standard, 
simple-utilitarianism, has an authority problem. People who do not accept the standard 
lack reason to accept its entailments. As such, they do not have reason to accept the 
research program’s conceiving of their judgment as a moral error. Given this, how is the 
research program going to change behavior? For instance, how is debiasing going to 
work? Will it be manipulative? Coercive? The answer to how debiasing is going to work 
is that it simply won’t. In short, dissenters from simple-utilitarianism will not have reason 
to change their behavior. As such, the standard, simple-utilitarianism, is not conducive to 
changing behavior and thus, is practically inadequate. 
This problem is not unique to simple-utilitarianism. Controversial entailments 
arise with many moral theories (e.g., stereotypical-Kantian-ethics entailing it being 
wrong to lie to the murderer at the door). One response to such entailments is to select a 
25 More precisely, if we are heeding independence from the true, best, and/or real morality (§2.3), the 
standard/metric would merely be maximizing utility (i.e., shorn of normative claims). 
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less contentious standard. Cass Sunstein (2005) proposes the purportedly uncontroversial 
standard that he calls weak consequentialism.26 Weak consequentialism features a 
utilitarian default that is muted by allowing the violations of rights to count among the 
consequences that matter. However, no matter how broadly acceptable this standard 
might be, it inevitably would not be accepted by everyone, as people have irreconcilable 
moral views. Such purportedly uncontroversial standards will inevitably clash with some 
person’s morality and confront the authority problem. As such, we are back where we 
were with simple-utilitarianism. The clash between the research program and those who 
do not accept its standard may occur less often with weak consequentialism than it would 
with simple-utilitarianism, but the obstacle to changing behavior remains the same and 
likewise, renders the standard practically inadequate. Perhaps the most broadly 
acceptable standard, by definition, is cultural-relative-morality (i.e., not cultural relative-
ism, but cultural-scope subjective-morality shorn of appeal to rightness per §2.1); 
however, this standard also confronts the same problem of inevitable disagreement 
yielding practical inadequacy.  
The above standards have difficulty with changing behavior due to the authority 
problem. The crux of this problem is the potential divergence between these standards 
and a person’s morality. This problem does not confront (genuine) IIMR/subjective-
morality, as it accepts each person’s (genuine) moral ends. As such, divergence does not 
arise. In other words, we do not have this issue of the person not accepting the standard 
because it is their own standard. As such, the agent already accepts it as authoritative (in 
26 Sunstein proposed a MHB framework that was groundbreaking, but full of problems including 
equivocations on “weak consequentialism” (Adler, 2005) and “heuristic” (Hahn, Frost & Maio, 2005), 
and dismissing Kantian ethics by not much more than simply pronouncing it a mere heuristic (Fried, 
2005). 
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the relevant respect). If deemed necessary, we could even stipulate that the relevant moral 
ends for attributing erroneousness are those the agent accepts as authoritative (under 
ordinary optimal conditions). As such, the person (at least under optimal conditions) 
agrees with the researchers’ attributions of moral erroneousness; that is, the agent accepts 
the researchers’ conceiving of certain acts/decisions/judgments as moral errors. As such, 
she accepts that she has some reason to change her behavior. If necessary, we can 
stipulate these conditions as constituents of the pertinent sense of “accepting as 
authoritative.” As such, debiasing is not imposed. Subjective-morality is the only type of 
standard that can achieve this (or at least, it is the type of standard that best achieves this). 
In this respect, IIMR/subjective-morality offers a conduciveness to changing behavior 
that other standards do not, and as such, is the best moral standard for the MBF program 
and is practically adequate. As such, we have reason to care about IIMR/subjective-
morality as a means to (best) realizing the potential benefits of the MBF program.  
Another standard worth mentioning is any-plausible-moral-theory. This standard 
is typically appealed to when a moral judgment is shown to be a function of an obviously 
irrelevant factor (e.g., such as ordering effects). It often manifests as statements such as, 
“no plausible moral theory would endorse this.” For each appeal to the standard, any-
plausible-theory, the person either agrees with the standard’s assessment or does not. If 
the person agrees, then IIMR/subjective-morality would yield the same result; if the 
person disagrees, then the authoritativeness problem arises (and thus, the failure to be 
conducive to changing behavior). As such, subjective morality is still the better standard 
for the MBF program to adopt. 
In addition to being the best moral standard for the MBF program, there are other 
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potential benefits -or more aptly, applications- of (genuine) IIMR/subjective-morality. 
For instance, consider moral education, especially in public schools. In such contexts, 
appeals to the true, best, and/or real morality may constitute inappropriate indoctrination 
and a violation of liberal values (e.g., Hand, 201827). Grounding moral education in 
IIMR/subjective-morality avoids these problems. In a similar vein, IIMR/subjective-
morality may have applications in public reason liberalism (e.g., Rawls, 1996).  
In all, we have reason to care about IIMR/subjective-morality both in-and-of-
itself (§4.1) and as a means to (best) realizing the potential benefits of an MBF research 
program (§4.2). As such, the standard -and the kinds it yields, such as subjective moral 
biases- are practically adequate. As such, those kinds are (worthwhile) practical kinds 
and so long as they are recognized and utilized as such (as opposed to mistaking them for 
SOKs warranting causation-oriented unification), they are also scientifically adequate. 
4.3. Subjective Morality and Moral Improvement 
The big payoff of having IMMR/subjective-morality as the moral standard for the 
MBF paradigm is scientific and practical adequacy. Such adequacy is enabled by 
IMMR/subjective-morality’s independence from the true, best, and/or real morality. 
More specifically, such independence avoids scientific-inadmissibility (unlike the 
adaptions of ideal-theoretical-rationality and a posteriori knowledge) (§1-2) and enables 
practical adequacy by averting the authority problem (§4.2).  
However, one might be interested in a moral biases and fallacies program only 
insofar as it would yield moral improvement in terms of (what one considers to be) the 
true, best, and/or real morality. For instance, the initial presentation of the benefits of the 
27 Hand (2018) ultimately proffers a standard that constitutes (being encompassed by) the true, best, and/or 
real morality. 
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program (Ch. 1, §1) spoke of decreasing immoral acts/decisions/judgments (with issues 
of moral truth set aside until this chapter). The transition from immoral 
acts/decisions/judgments to moral errors to subjective moral errors might seem like a 
bait-and-switch. One might care about the practical criterion of conduciveness-to-
changing-behavior (§4.2) only insofar as such behavioral changes align with the (what 
one considers) the true, best, and/or real morality (in other words, that practical criterion 
may be insufficient for practical adequacy). Furthermore, the reason to care about 
IIMR/subjective-morality in-and-of-itself was as a species of ideal-instrumental-
rationality (§4.1). This might yield a conception of the practical moral payoff of an MBF 
program as something closer to enhancing moral agency than achieving moral 
improvement (per what one considers the true, best, and/or real morality). 
Unfortunately, unless one is a speaker-subjectivist/individual-moral-relativist 
(which few are), one cannot have an MBF program that satisfies the conjunction of (1) 
scientific-admissibility (i.e., scientific-adequacy), (2) practical adequacy, and (3) a moral 
standard per (what one considers) the true, best, and/or real morality. To illustrate this, 
recall that direct appeals to the true, best, and/or real morality are scientifically-
inadmissible. Nevertheless, one can seemingly circumvent this constraint by going 
outside of the scientific context, specifying (what one considers) the true, best, and/or 
real morality, formulating it in terms of scientifically-admissible properties (e.g., via 
reductive naturalism, identifying the Pope’s morality as a standard-of-interest, etc.), and 
then entering the scientific context and introducing that standard as a standard-of-interest 
(assuming sufficient caring about it). While such moves can secure scientific-
admissibility and utilize (an equivalent of) a moral standard per (what one considers) the 
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true, best, and/or real morality, such moves sacrifice practical adequacy insofar as the 
standard runs into the authority problem (§4.2). That is, rendering (what one considers) 
the true, best, and/or real morality scientifically-admissible also renders it 
unauthoritative. 
Nonetheless, one can get an MBF program with (1) scientific-admissibility, (2) 
practical adequacy, and a degree of (3) a moral standard per (what one considers) the 
true, best, and/or real morality, insofar as individuals’ genuine subjective morality aligns 
with (what one considers) the true, best, and/or real morality. Furthermore, an MBF 
program might focus upon relatively uncontroversial cases, which would yield high rates 
of alignment. Focusing on uncontroversial cases can still be very productive when there 
is significant susceptibility to committing subjective moral errors and biases. For 
instance, if one considers racial egalitarianism to be a part of the true, best, and/or real 
morality, then insofar as racial egalitarianism is often a part of individuals’ genuine 
morality and individuals are susceptible to committing subjective moral errors regarding 
such, an MBF program would yield moral improvement per (what one considers) the 
true, best, and/or real morality. In this respect, if one is interested in moral improvement 
per (what one considers) the true, best, and/or real morality, then insofar as there are 
cases of alignment with individuals’ genuine morality, one should be interested in an 
MBF program. 
Some areas, such as racial egalitarianism, may be prone to alignment, and thus 
yield moral improvement per (what one considers) the true, best, and/or real morality. 
However, such alignment and moral improvement are not inevitable. For instance, 
consider people’s tendency to give more money to identifiable victims than statistical 
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victims. So long as individuals do not genuinely consider identifiability morally-relevant, 
this constitutes a subjective moral bias. An MBF program (including subjective moral 
debiasing) might identify, explain, and ultimately, rectify that bias—i.e., rectify that 
distortion per identifiability. However, whether that distortion would be rectified by 
increasing donations to statistical victims or decreasing donations to identifiable victims 
depends upon people’s genuine subjective morality.28 As such, if increasing donations to 
victims constitutes moral improvement per (what one considers) the true, best, and/or 
real morality, then it is possible that people’s genuine subjective morality would rectify 
the distortion by decreasing donations to identifiable victims and thus, subjective moral 
debiasing would yield moral regression per (what one considers) the true, best, and/or 
real morality.  
In this respect, the extent to which pursuing an MBF program would yield moral 
improvement (per what one considers the true, best, and/or real morality) is sensitive to 
the extent to which individuals’ genuine morality aligns with one’s own. In other words, 
if one is only interested in moral improvement per (what one considers) the true, best, 
and/or real morality, then perhaps one’s supporting an MBF program is ultimately, a bet 
that individuals’ genuine morality more aligns than misaligns with one’s own.  
28 Some debiasing measures regarding the identifiable victim effect have yielded greater deductions in 
donations to identifiable victims than increases in donations to statistical victims (Small, Lowenstein, & 
Slovic, 2007).  
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CHAPTER 5: CLOSING REMARKS 
This dissertation pursued scientifically and practically adequate moral analogues 
of cognitive heuristics and biases via adapting the CHB paradigm (Ch. 1, §1). This 
yielded the concept, ‘subjective moral bias’ (Ch. 4), with the meaning: systematic 
subjective-moral-error (Ch. 4, §2), wherein (per the two-tier model—§3.4) A’s φ-ing is a 
subjective-moral-error insofar as φ-ing violates A’s genuine morality—i.e., violates 
genuine-ideal-instrumental-moral-rationality—i.e., frustrates the ideal satisfaction of 
A+’s moral ends (§3.1), wherein A+ is a counterfactual idealization of A upon whom is 
bestowed those endowments (§3.3) that A considers authoritative under ordinary optimal 
conditions (§3.4). Such biases are scientifically adequate—or more precisely, 
scientifically-admissible (§1). This stems from firstly, scientific-inadmissibility being 
avoided via the biases’ standard of error’s being adapted from ideal-instrumental 
rationality (§2), which -unlike ideal-theoretical-rationality (§1.1) or a posteriori 
knowledge (§1.2)- is subjectively-grounded (if you will), and thus, upon adaption, yields 
a standard -namely, IIMR/subjective-morality (qua standard/metric, and not moral 
theory)- that is independent of appeals to the true, best, and/or real  morality (§2.1), 
which moral philosophy and metaethics have yet to render sufficiently incontrovertible 
for admission in scientific contexts (§1.1). Subjective moral bias secures scientific 
adequacy, despite not being causally-aligned -i.e., not constituting a system-specific-
objective-kind (SOK) (§2)- by constituting an adequate practical kind per its relation to a 
standard -namely, genuine IIMR/subjective-morality- about which we have reason to care 
(§4). Such reason-to-care includes reason to care about genuine IIMR/subjective-
morality, intrinsically, per its being constitutive of ideal-instrumental-rationality, 
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simpliciter (even if such care is not necessarily sufficient for all-things-considered 
evaluations) (§4.1). Such reason-to-care also includes reason to care about genuine 
IIMR/subjective-morality, instrumentally (§4.2), in that it is the best standard for 
realizing the potential benefits of the MBF program (Ch. 1, §1 & §4) due to its satisfying 
the practical criterion of conduciveness-to-changing-behavior due to its authoritativeness 
for individuals (i.e., avoiding the authority problem) stemming from its subjectivity (Ch. 
4, §4.2). An MBF program per genuine IIMR/subjective-morality (including subjective 
moral debiasing) would yield moral improvement with respect to (what one considers) 
the true, best, and/or real morality insofar that standard aligns with individuals’ genuine 
morality (§4.3).  
The adaption also yielded ‘moral fallacy,’ with the meaning: reasoning that 
deviates from the ideal moral reasoning procedure (i.e., possesses DEVIMP) (Ch. 3, §7). 
This stems from the only way (in which we have reason to believe) that cognitive 
heuristic is scientifically-useful is neither per making a causal explanatory contribution 
(§2), nor constituting a (system-intrinsically objective—§3.1) system-specific objective
kind (SOK) (§3), nor contributing to why-have explaining (§4), but only per contrastively 
explaining biases and only insofar as SCIRA entails deviating-from-the-ideally-rational-
algorithm (DEVIRA) (§5-6). Since we lack sufficient reason to believe that either 
DEVIRA contributes to any of the other discussed ways of cognitive heuristic being 
scientifically-useful, and since the other conjuncts, MEIRA and intuitive process, do not 
contribute to explaining cognitive biases (§6), only DEVIRA-explaining-cognitive-biases 
should be imported, yielding deviates-from-the-ideal-moral-reasoning-procedure 
(DEVIMP) as the central property of “moral heuristic,” or more aptly named, “moral 
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fallacy” (§7). 
A moral reasoning procedure is ideal insofar as it yields only morally correct 
judgments/decisions/actions—i.e., does not yield moral errors.1 Given that the moral 
errors in-question are subjective-moral-errors per violating genuine IMMR/subjective-
morality, the ideal-moral-reasoning-procedure in-question is per genuine 
IMMR/subjective-morality. As such, the moral fallacies in-question are subjective moral 
fallacies. In this respect, adaption ultimately yields ‘subjective moral fallacy’ with the 
meaning: reasoning that deviates from the ideal moral reasoning procedure per genuine 
IMMR/subjective-morality. Given the contrastive explanatory relation that subjective 
moral fallacy is poised to have with subjective moral bias (which is a practically 
adequate kind), subjective moral fallacy is poised to be an explanatorily adequate kind, 
and in this respect, a scientifically adequate kind. Furthermore, it is presumably of 
practical interest as well, and thus, a practically adequate kind in its own right. As such, it 
is unnecessary to unify subjective moral fallacy via identification with a distinct cognitive 
mechanism.   
As for the identification of a reasoning procedure as moral, I will defer to current 
standards, such as those that govern the designation of processes as moral processes.2 
Recall the hypothesized process that used cuteness as a proxy for moral status 
(Ch. 1, §2). Suppose that Erin’s execution of this process yields a judgment that grants 
1 Basing the ideal-ness of a moral-reasoning-procedure upon the correctness of its 
judgments/decisions/actions may seem off-target; it may seem that the definition should more directly 
focus on the procedure, itself. However, such focus on the judgments/decisions/actions -i.e., the output-
per-inputs mediated by the procedure- is akin to defining inferences’ validity in terms of premises-
conclusion (i.e., input-output) truth-preservation. 
2 Delineating the moral psychological domain is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, I can 
say that I am hesitant to infuse the concept of ‘moral fallacy’ with unnecessary presuppositions, such as 
conceptually presupposing the existence of moral-domain-specific processes. It is worth noting that the 
existence of such processes is not required for scientific inquiry into moral reasoning. 
145 
low moral status to rats (e.g., vis-à-vis squirrels) due to the former’s low levels of 
cuteness. Is this an instantiation of a subjective moral bias? Yes, if it is a subjective-
moral-error that is systematic (either with respect to Erin’s judgments across time or 
between Erin and other individuals).3 Let’s stipulate that such judgments are systematic. 
Are such judgments subjective moral errors? Yes, if Erin is such that the judgment 
violates her genuine morality—i.e., violates Erin+’s subjective morality—i.e., violates 
ideal-instrumental-moral-rationality with respect to Erin+—i.e., frustrates the ideal 
satisfaction of Erin+’s moral ends, wherein Erin+ is a counterfactual idealization of Erin 
upon whom is bestowed those endowments that Erin considers authoritative under 
ordinary optimal conditions. Another way to frame this is whether Erin+ would consider 
cuteness an inapt proxy in this case (§1.3). I presume that few people -upon idealization- 
would endorse cuteness as a criterion of moral status; however, that someone would 
endorse such cannot be ruled out a priori.4  
Is that process an instantiation of a subjective moral fallacy? Yes, if it deviates 
from the ideal moral reasoning procedure (possesses DEVIMP)—i.e., if it is a procedure 
that yields subjective moral errors.5 If the process yields a subjective moral error in this 
case, then it is necessarily not ideal. Cutting to the crux of the matter, whether the process 
3 We can stipulate that the standards of systematicity that yield a moral bias are the same as those that yield 
a cognitive bias. Such binary designations of constituting-a-bias or not papers over various continuous 
metrics of systematicity. It is certainly not necessary for cognitive errors to be universal between 
individuals or completely constant within an individual to constitute a cognitive bias. 
4 The operationalization of idealization is a project for future research that is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Nonetheless, it could resemble other attempts at yielding privileged value-laden judgments, 
such as medical consultation per the deliberative model of the physician-patient relationship (Emanuel 
& Emanuel, 1992). Such operationalizations will of course, be far from perfect; nonetheless, providing 
an in-principle definitive result is theoretically important. 
5 This constitutes a fairly simple model of subjective moral fallacy. Nonetheless, it communicates the basic 
idea and reflects significant strides from moral-analogue-of-cognitive-heuristic. Just as the simple 
model of internal reasons required modifications, similar modifications will presumably be required for 
this simple model of subjective moral fallacy—though this is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
146 
is a subjective moral fallacy will depend upon whether cuteness is an inapt proxy—that 
is, whether assessments of cuteness perfectly correlate with assessments of moral status 
(a la a synthetic entailment between variables). As proxies can vary in the extent to 
which they deviate from perfect correlation, processes can vary in the extent to which 
they constitute subjective moral fallacies—i.e., the extent to which they are subjectively 
morally fallacious. Perhaps some intuitive threshold will emerge for binary assessments 
of whether a process constitutes a subjective moral fallacy or not, but the more precise 
reality will be continuous. 
The proffered meanings of ‘subjective moral bias’ and ‘subjective moral fallacy’ 
provide a conceptual foundation for a subjective moral biases and fallacies paradigm that 
could undergird fruitful moral psychological research. This includes (1) illuminating 
various subjective moral errors by identifying and unifying them as instantiations of 
subjective moral biases, (2) (contrastively) explaining many such biases with subjective 
moral fallacies, and (3) yielding subjective moral debiasing techniques to reduce the 
incidence of subjective moral errors. Of course, much work remains, but the preceding 
provides a solid groundwork to build upon. 
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